MANU-SMRTI

THE LAWS OF MANU WITH THE BHĀSYA OF MĒDHĀTITHI

3450

Translated by

GANGĀ-NĀTHA JHĀ,

Mahamahopadhyaya, M. A , D. Litt ,
Principal, Sanskrit College, Benares.

Vol. III

Part I

Published by the
University of Calcutta
1922

NOTE.

Part I of Vol. III, comprising Discourses V and VI, is now given out to the public. Part II of this Volume, comprising Discourse VII, is in the Press ; and the Index to the whole of Volume III will go with that Part. Discourse VIII also is in the Press.

BENARES :
December 5, 1922.

GANGANATHA JHA.

DISCOURSE V.

Sources of Evil

SECTION (I)

What shortens Life?

VERSE (I)

THE SAGES, HAVING HEARD THE DUTIES OF THE ACCOMPLISHED STUDENT AS JUST DESCRIBED, SAID THIS TO THE HIGH-SOULED BHṚGU, WHO SPRANG FROM FIRE.—(1)

Bhāṣya

Having heard the duties of the Student and the Householder as expounded in the foregoing three Discourses, the great Sages, Marīchi and others, '*said to*'—asked the following question of—Bhṛgu, their teacher.

"In the text we find the expression *of the Accomplished Student*—'*snātakasya*' ; why then do you bring in the *Student*?"

Our answer to this is that the present verse is meant to be descriptive of what has gone before ; and as a matter of fact, the duties of the Student also have been described.

'*High-souled*' and '*who sprang from the fire*' are the epithets of Bhṛgu ;—'He whose origination was from the fire.'

"But in discourse I, verse 34, Bhṛgu has been spoken of as the son of Manu".

True; but what was stated there was an imaginary commendation, while what is said here is in accordance with the account found in the Vedas of Bhṛgu having been born out of fire. The name '*Bhṛgu*' has been thus explained—'What rose out first out of the fallen semen was the Sun, and what rose as the second was Bhṛgu'. Or, what is asserted here may be only figurative; the origin of Bhṛgu being described as 'Fire', on the basis of similarity, as regards effulgence.

In any case, it is not necessary to lay stress upon either of the two explanations as being the more reasonable of the two; because this is not what forms the main subject-matter of the treatise.

The whole of the text, describing the question and the answer, is meant to indicate the importance of the subject of the evils attaching to food; the meaning being that the evils attaching to the food itself are more serious than those attaching to the nature of its gift and acceptance; and this on the ground that the defects attaching to the thing itself are more intimate, and hence more serious, than those arising from contact.

"In connection with the defects of contact, the Expiatory Rite that is laid down is a three days' fast; while that in connection with the thing itself, is a single day's fast (5. 20). How then can this latter be said to be *more serious*?"

Our answer is as follows:—The greater seriousness here spoken of refers to *garlic* and such things, in connection with which it is stated that—'by eating these intentionally the man becomes an outcast' (5.19); so that the expiation necessary would be that which has been prescribed for outcasts (which is very serious).—(1)

VERSE (2)

"How is it, O Lord, that Death overpowers the Brāhmaṇas who are learned in the Vedic lore, and who perform their duty exactly as it has been thus described?" —(2)

Bhāṣya

'*Thus*'—refers to the *manner* in which the Treatise has propounded the subject; and '*exactly as described*'—refers to the *subject-matter* of the Treatise.

Those Twice-born men who perform the duty exactly in the form in which it has been described in the present Treatise ;—that all *twice-born men* are indicated by the terms '*vipra*' '*brahmaṇa*', in the Text will be clear from what is going to be said in verse 26 below, where 'twice-born' is the term used ;—'*how is it that Death overpowers them*'—while still in the state of the 'Student,' or in that of the 'Accomplished Student' ? How is this, when, in reality, they should live the full span of human life ? The span of a man's life is a hundred years ; so that the death of Brāhmaṇas before that is not proper ; specially as it has been declared that 'from right conduct one attains longevity' (4·156), and 'no calamity befalls persons who recite the Veda and offer oblations' (4·146). (2).

VERSES (3-4).

BHṚGU, THE RIGHTEOUS SON OF MANU, SAID TO THE GREAT SAGES—"LISTEN, BY WHAT FAULT DEATH SEEKS TO DESTROY THE BRĀHMAṆAS."—(3).

DEATH SEEKS TO DESTROY THE BRĀHMAṆAS ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR OMITTING THE STUDY OF THE VEDAS, ON ACCOUNT OF NEGLECT OF RIGHT CONDUCT, ON ACCOUNT OF SLOTHFULNESS AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE DEFECTS OF FOOD.—(4).

Bhāṣya.

Objection—"When the question has been put forward in regard to Brāhmaṇas *who perform their duties.* it is not right to answer it by indicating the 'fault' ; nor can there be any connection with what follows (in verse 4) [as omission of Vedic Study &c. is not possible for those who perform their duties]."

The answer to the above is as follows :—'Omission of Vedic Study' and the rest have been put forward only by way of illustration : the sense being—'just as the omission of Vedic Study

and the rest are acknowledged by you all to be the causes of death, so also are the defects of food, going to be described below. Even when a man carries on Vedic Study &c., the fulfilment of his above-described duty is not complete, if it is beset with the very much more serious drawback of defective food. This is emphasised here in view of the fact that this is an entirely different section (dealing with defects of food). (3-4)

SECTION (2.)

Objectionable Food.

VERSE (5).

GARLIC, LEEKS AND ONIONS, MUSHROOMS AND ALL THAT PROCEEDS FROM IMPURE THINGS, ARE UNFIT TO BE EATEN BY TWICE-BORN MEN.—(5).

Bhāṣya.

The terms '*garlic*' &c. are well-known among men.

The term '*kavaka*' is the name of a genus, sometimes regarded as the same as the well-known thing '*kṛyāku*' (?); mushrooms also are '*kavaka*'; as it is forbidden under the name of '*kavaka*', while the expiatory rite in connection with its eating has been prescribed under the name of '*chhatrāka*,' in verse 19; and no other thing (except the mushroom) is known by the name '*chhatrāka*'; nor will it be right to regard, on the basis of verbal similarity alone (between '*chhatrāka*' and '*chhatrākāra*', umbrella-shaped), all those things as '*chhatrāka*' which *resemble the umbrella*, are '*chhatrākāra*'; as in that case the prohibition (of '*chhatrāka*') would apply also to the *suvarchala* and other things (which also are *umbrella-shaped*); and this would be contrary to all usage. Hence we conclude that '*chhatrāka*' and '*kavaka*' are one and the same thing. Says the author of the *Nirukta*—'The *chhatrāka* is *kṣuṇṇa*, since it is smashed.' From this it is clear that the name '*kavaka*' applies to those white shoots that grow out of the earth that has been ploughed; this is also in keeping with what is going to be said in connection with '*kavakas growing out of the earth*' (6·14); and it has also been just pointed out that the name applies to what is 'smashed' by a stroke of the foot. It is for this reason (of its being described as *growing out of the earth*, and of its being *smashed* by a

stroke of the foot) that the prohibition (of '*kavaka*') is not applicable to those vegetable growths that shoot out of the trunks of trees.

In medicinal treatises the *kukuṇḍa* has been described as '*kavaka*'; but this explanation (of the name on a purely conventional basis) cannot be accepted in the same manner as that in regard to the term '*go*' and the rest. Further, as a matter of fact, in ordinary *parlance* the term '*kavaka*' is always applied to a *vegetable*. Hence it is on the basis of usage that the exact signification of the term, wherever it occurs in a medical or other scientific treatise, should be ascertained, and we have already shown what that signification is.

Other things also, which resemble garlic and such things mentioned here, which resemble these latter in colour and smell, have been forbidden by Viṣṇu. In the *Smṛti* of Parāshara however the prohibition is by name, and this for the purpose of prescribing the special Expiatory Rite of '*Chāndrāyaṇa*' in connection with it. From this it follows that '*lavataka*', '*karnikāra*' and such other things are forbidden.

'*Things proceeding from impure substances*';—those that grow of impure things or are in contact with them.

Others have declared that it is not right to forbid those things that grow only out of impure things, these standing on the same footing as '*mūlā*' (radish) '*vāstuka*' (a kind of grass) and such other things (known to grow out of impure things);—so that the prohibition does not apply to those grains and vegetables growing in fields specially manured for the purpose of enriching the harvest.

This however is not right. Because from what the text says it is clear that all these things are equally unfit to be eaten. Further, what has been suggested might have been accepted, if it were absolutely impossible for anything to grow without the use of impure substances. There are some things however that grow directly out of impure substances, while there are some

that grow out of mere connection with them ; the right view to take therefore is that the prohibition applies to the former only, and not to the latter.

As regards *meat*, even though it grows out of semen and blood (both impure substances), yet the present prohibition does not apply to it ; because it has been dealt with in a totally different context.—(5)

VERSE (6)

HE SHALL CAREFULLY AVOID THE RED EXUDATION FROM TREES, AS ALSO THOSE FLOWING FROM INCISIONS, THE SHĒLU BERRIES, AND 'CURDLED MILK' OF THE COW.—(6)

Bhāṣya

'*Exudation from trees*';—anything, apart from the constituent parts of the tree itself,—such as, the root, the trunk, the branches, the leaves, the fruits and the flowers,—which proceeds from the tree, either in the form of some liquid flowing from the cavity in the tree, or in some other form. The epithet 'red' excludes, from prohibition, such exudations as the camphor and the like.

Those that have their origin, source, in '*incisions*'; those that flow from the bark and such parts of the tree. These things, if not red, are not forbidden.

'*Shēlu*'—the *shleṣmātaka* fruit, to be known from medical and other treatises. It should not be taken to mean the cream of fresh milk ; as it is never known to have that meaning. It has been argued that—"it is better to take the word as standing for *cream*, on account of its proximity to the term, 'curdled milk' ". But *proximity* becomes a means of deciding in favour of one of the two possible meanings of a term, only when the term is actually found in usage to be used in both senses ; but it can never be the authority for attributing an unheard of meaning to a word.

'*Of the cow*';—this shows that that of the buffalo etc. is not forbidden. The milk is unfit to be eaten if, by mere contact with

fire, it becomes '*curdled*',—*i.e.* thickened without adhesion ; the term '*pīyūṣa*' is used in the sense of the milk of the newly-calved cow.

"The text is going to declare, as *unfit to be eaten*, the milk, along with all its preparations, of the cow for the first ten days of its calving; and it is only during three or four days that the milk is of the nature described above (*i.e.* curdled by mere contact with fire) [so that no separate prohibition appears to be called for.]"

True ; the thing is mentioned in the present verse with a view to those cases where the milk continues to be so 'curdled' even after the first ten days.

The two words—'*carefully*' and '*avoid*'—are added only for filling up the metre ; since '*unfit to be eaten*' (of verse 5) continues to be connected with all that is mentioned in the text.—(6)

VERSE (7)

NEEDLESSLY COOKED RICE-SESAMUM AND BUTTER-SUGAR-SESAMUM, MILK-RICE AND FLOUR-CAKES, UNCONSECRATED MEAT, FOOD OF THE GODS AND SACRIFICIAL VIANDS ;—(7)

Bhāṣya

'*Kṛsarasamyāvan*' is an aggregative copulative compound. Rice cooked with Sesamum is called '*kṛsara*' ;—'*samyāva*' is a particular article of food, made up of butter, sugar, sesamum and such things, well-known in cities.

Some people, on the strength of the root '*yu*' (from which the term '*samyāva*' is derived) signifying the act of *mixing*, explain the term '*samyāva*' as standing for all those articles of food that are prepared by mixing together different kinds of grains,—such as the *mudga*, the *kuṣṭhaka* and the rest.

For these persons the separate mention of '*kṛsara*' would be superfluous; as this would be included under '*samyāva*', as just explained.

The term '*needlessly cooked*' is to be construed with all the terms. It stands for what the householder cooks for himself, and not for the sake of Gods, Pitṛs or guests.

This however does not appear to be right. Because the ordinary cooking that the Householder does is not always for any such set purpose as that of making offerings out of it. What happens is that the cooking having been done, without reference to any particular purpose, and only in a general way, the Five Sacrifices have been laid down, as to be offered out of the food thus cooked. So that if the man eats the food without having made the offering to the Vishvedevas out of it, he transgresses a direct injunction ; but no prohibition enters into the case. According to the present text however, as just explained, such eating would necessitate two expiatory rites,—one due to transgressing an injunction (by not making the offering to the Vishvedevas), and another due to the doing of a prohibited act (of cooking the Rice-sesamum needlessly). If however such articles of food as 'Rice-sesamum' and the rest, are cooked without reference to a particular God, or to a particular sacrificial rite,—this involves a transgression of the rules pertaining to one's daily duties also.

As regards the text 'one shall not cook for himself',—this cannot be regarded as a prohibition ; because it being absolutely necessary to do the cooking, all that the sentence does is simply to make a reference to the *act of eating* done by one who has disobeyed the rules (regarding the daily 'sacrifices'). For, as already pointed out above, if it were a prohibition, there would be a twofold expiatory rite involved. Then again, even when the cooking is done for some other purpose, it cannot be absolutely denied that it has been done by the man 'for himself' also. 'Cooking' means the act of cooking food, and the fact of its being done for one's own self cannot be denied by means of the same word; as the man is directed to live upon the same food (*i.e.* what is left after the feeding of the guests &c). The eating of the remnant of food, after the guests and others have been fed, (which has been laid down for the Householder) is not meant to be a mere 'embellishment' of the Remnant (and not an act necessary for the maintenance of the man himself). Nor has it been laid down anywhere that at the time of cooking the Householder is to make use of any such formula of determination as 'cook food *for me*',

which would be regarded as forbidden (by the sentence 'one shall not cook for himself') In fact the cooking is said to be 'for himself' only in consideration of what happens subsequently. That is to say, if the food were cooked with the determination to make an offering to the Gods, and then subsequently the man were to eat it all himself, this would involve the wrong of being false to one's own resolve also. From all this it is clear that the sentence in question is a mere reiterative reference, the sense being—'what one cooks, he should not use for himself, until he has made the offering to the *Vishvēdēvas*'.

It is in view of all this that this same rule has been held to be applicable also to the case of the man eating *uncooked* food ; in accordance with the assertion—'the Gods of a man have the same food as the man himself' (*Vālmīkīya Rāmāyaṇa.*)

Further, cooking is not to be done only by the hungry householder ; in fact, the act of cooking every day forms an integral factor of *Householdership* itself. So that even on the day on which the man himself does not eat, if he omits the act of cooking, he incurs sin.

The upshot of the whole is this:—The man may cook for himself, or for others ; the words 'shall not cook for himself' can only mean that people should not undertake the act, if they do not intend to make the offering to the Vishvēdēvas. So that this only reiterates the obligatory character of the offering. Similarly also the text that—'For the removal of the sin of the Five Slaughters, the Vishvēdēva-offering shall be made in the ordinary fire, in the Vedic sacrificial fire, in the fire in which oblations have been already poured and the deity dismissed, in water or on the ground,'— only reiterates the obligatory character of the offering to the *Vishvēdēvas*. Because the said offering cannot be made into the Vedic sacrificial fire ; specially as there is no authority attaching to a *Smṛti* text (as against a *Shruti* text) [so that the text just quoted cannot be taken in its literal sense].

'*Milk-rice and flour-cakes*'.—'*Pāyasa*', '*Milk-rice*,' stands for rice cooked in milk, and not for preparations of milk ;—'*Puroḍāsha*' is flour-cake.

'*Food of the Goods*' ; - what these are can only be ascertained from usage.

'*Sacrificial viands*',—the materials laid down in the *Shruti* as to be offered into the Fire.

These are 'unfit to be eaten' only before the *Grahahomas* ; as the text is going to lay down the necessity of eating the remnants of the offerings.

The meat of an animal that has not been 'consecrated,'—*i.e.* which has not been killed at a sacrifice. 'Consecration' is a peculiar form of purification of the animal, prescribed in connection with the 'Animal-Sacrifice.' The mention of this indicates that one should eat the remnant of the meat that has been offered at a sacrifice.

Though the Text has already used the qualification '*needlessly prepared*', yet the epithet '*unconsecrated*' has been added with a view to forbid the meat of the cow, the sheep and the goa that may have been left by the guest and other persons to whom they may have been offered. Or, the term *unconsecrated* may be taken as refering specially to the meat of the cow, the sheep and the goat; since it is the killing of these animals only that has been enjoined in connection with sacrifices; the other animals being described as already '*prokṣita*', 'washed clean' (fit for eating).

VERSE (8)

THE MILK OF THE COW THAT HAS NOT PASSED ITS TEN DAYS, AS ALSO THAT OF THE CAMEL AND OF ONE-HOOFED ANIMALS AND OF SHEEP; THE MILK OF THE IRREGULAR COW, AS ALSO THE MILK OF THE COW WITHOUT HER CALF.—(8)

Bhāṣya.

If we read the opening words as '*anirdashāham goḥ kṣīram*,' then the prohibition regarding the milk of the camel and other ani-

mals also would be understood as limited to the ten days from calving; so that the qualification 'that has not passed its ten days' being taken with every one of the animals, it would become necessary to depend entirely upon usage in support of the absolute prohibition of the milk of the camel and other animals. If however we read '*anirdashāyāḥ*' in the feminine form, then there would be no possibility of the above misunderstanding. Because it would not be possible to interpret the nominal affixes (attached to the names of the other animals) as, in any way, connecting these animals with the epithet '*anirdashāyāḥ*)

In as much as the word 'milk' is repeated in the second half of the verse, this implies that what are forbidden by the former half are the milk of the camel, of the one-hoofed animals, of the sheep, of the goat and of the cow within ten days of its calving,—along with all its preparations; while in the case of the 'irregular' cow and the cow 'deprived of its calf', it is the *milk* only that is forbidden. Such is the usage also.

That cow is called '*anirdashāha*,' 'not passed its ten days', in whose case ten days have not passed since her calving.

'*Irregular cow*';—the cow that is expected to give milk both morning and evening, but gives it only at one time; giving milk in the evening only if not milked in the morning; and on account of the supply of milk being scanty, she is milked once only.

Some people explain '*Sandhinī*' as standing for that cow which, on having lost her own calf, is made to yield milk by bringing to her the calf of another cow; and in this case the cow '*without her calf*' would be one whose calf is alive, but is separated from it, and is milked, independently of the calf, through presenting before her such special articles of food as the husks of barley, rice etc., so that the cow would be called 'without her calf' by the calf being held aside; just as people say—'bring the cow without her calf'.

The 'cow' having been already mentioned in the first half, the term is repeated in the second half, with a view to show that similar milk of the goat and the buffalo is not forbidden. The same does not hold good regarding the epithet '*anirdashāyāh*,' 'that has not passed its ten days;' so that in this connection the 'cow' in-

cludes the goat and the buffalo also. Śaṅ says Gauṭama (17.22-23) —'The milk of the cow that has not passed its ten days, during the period of impurity; also of the goat and the buffalo.'

The term '*payaḥ*' 'milk,' has been added because it is not easy to construe the term '*goḥ*,' 'of the cow,' with the term '*kṣīram*,' 'milk' as contained in the compound '*sandhinīkṣīram*.'—(8)

VERSE (9)

THAT OF ALL WILD ANIMALS, EXCEPT THE BUFFALO; THE MILK OF FEMALES (WOMEN) AND ALL SOURED SUBSTANCES SHOULD BE AVOIDED.—(9)

Bhāṣya

'*Wild animals*'—cows, elephants, monkeys and so forth.

There can be no milk of males ; hence the masculine gender used in connection with the words '*sarvēṣām mṛgāṇam*' is to be taken as standing for the genus, and the connection is with the female members of that genus ; the term '*mṛgakṣīram*' thus being similar to '*kukkuṭāṇḍam*'. This has been made clear by the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* in connection with the rules relating to the change of the feminine form into the masculine, (when occurring within a compound).

'*Māhiṣam vinā*' ;—the neuter form has been used, in view of the neuter form '*payaḥ*' 'milk'.

'*Females*,'—human females, women. Though in such passages as '*strī gauḥ somakrayiṇī*', 'the female cow is the price of the *soma*',—the term '*strī*', 'female', is found to be used in connection with the *animal with the dewlap* also,—yet it is to be understood here in the sense of the 'woman', in as much as in the present context the term cannot apply to any other species of animals, and as it is better known as standing for the 'human female' only. In all such assertions as—'females desire sweets', 'females are the best jewels'—the word is understood as standing for the *woman*.

The term '*ēva*' in the text has been explained as indicating the prohibition of applying the woman's milk to the eye and such other uses of it; the meaning being that 'the milk of the woman is to be avoided, not only in eating, but also in all similar uses. The word can be taken as indicative of all this only on the strength of usage and other *Smṛti* texts; and it cannot be regarded as directly expressive of it.—(9).

VERSE (10.)

AMONG SOURED SUBSTANCES, THE CURD IS FIT TO BE EATEN, AND ALL THAT IS PREPARED OUT OF IT; AS ALSO ALL THAT IS DISTILLED FROM PURE FLOWERS, ROOTS AND FRUITS;—(10)

Bhāṣya

All 'soured substances' having been forbidden in the foregoing verse, the present text makes an exception in favour of a few of them.

'*Shukta*', 'soured substance', is the name of those substances which, being juicy in their constitution and having a distinct taste of their own, become *soured* either by the flux of time, or by the contact of some other substance. For instance, the *Āmrātaka*, which is sweet and full of juice, becomes 'soured' after the lapse of some time; cane-juice becomes 'soured' after sometime. Things that are sour by their very nature—*e. g.*, the Pomegranate, the Āmalaka, the Lemon &c.—are not called 'soured substances'; nor those that are still *unripe*. Because the term '*shukta*', 'soured', is not synonymous with 'sour'. What are directly forbidden here are only those soured substances that have become sour by fermentation; and those that turn sour by the contact of flowers and roots &c. are only indirectly indicated; according to what Gautama has said (17·14)—'All soured substances except Curd only'.

'*Distilled*.'—Distillation consists in allowing the thing to remain soaked in water over-night.

"In that case the sourness would be due to the length of time (so that all these would be included among 'Soured Substances')."

True; these also are 'soured substances'; and the Instrumental ending may signify either *instrumentality* or *association*. The meaning thus is —'what are *distilled*— *e.g.* made out of—flowers etc. along with water'.

Some people offer the following explanation:—"The roots of trees are directly productive of *sourness*. Such 'sour substances' as the Pomegranate, the *Āmalaka* and the rest are 'fit to be eaten', while those that are distilled from grapes and other sweet things are not eaten. 'Distillation' means *producing acidity*; hence '*distilled from flowers*' means soured by flowers and such things. Grapes and such other things however are not themselves productive of acidity; in their case it is *time* alone that is the acidulating agent."

This however i not right; simply because such is not the meaning of the term ('distillation'). When one says —'he is *distilling* Soma'—this is not understood to mean that he is *making it sour*; what is understood is as we have explained above.

'*Prepared out of curd*';—*e.g. Udashvit*, *Mastu* (whey), *Kilāṭa* (Coagulated milk), *Kūrchika* (Inspissated milk) and so forth.—(10)

VERSE (11)

HE SHALL AVOID ALL CARNIVOROUS BIRDS, AND ALSO THOSE LIVING IN VILLAGES, THE ONE-HOOFED ANIMALS NOT SPECIFIED, AND ALSO THE TITTIBHA. — (11)

Bhāṣya

'*Carnivorous*';— those that eat raw flesh ; such as the Heron, the Vulture &c. What are meant are those that eat *raw flesh* only; and not those that eat both (raw and cooked flesh), such as the Peacock and the rest.

'*Living in villages*'—even though they be not carnivorous.

'*One-hooted animals* ;'—*e.g.*, the Horse, the Mule, the Ass and so forth.

'*Not specified*';—*i.e.* those that have not been specified as *fit to be eaten* should not be eaten; those that have been so specified are fit to be eaten. For instance, it has been declared that 'one who desires to obtain offspring shall eat the meat of the camel, the horse, the bear and the white ass'. [and here the one-hoofed animals, horse and white ass, are specified as fit to be eaten].

"The eatability of these animals is known only from this *Shruti* passage. And the presence of the term 'specified' in the verse would be understood to mean that the animals thus specified in the Vedic passage may be eaten even elsewhere (apart from Vedic sacrifices also); the meaning of the text being 'one shall avoid those *not specified*, but not *those specified*.' As a matter of fact however, nowhere in the *Smṛti* have any one-hoofed animals been *specified* as fit to be eaten, with reference to which the term 'not specified' (of the text) could be explained. Hence it comes to this that 'those not specified *in the Shruti* are unfit to be eaten'."

Our answer to the above is that such a sense of the Smṛti would be contrary to all usage. The term 'not specified' is a mere re-iterative reference.

'*Ṭiṭṭibha*'—is a bird which is always screaming 'ṭiṭ', 'ṭiṭ'. In most cases the names of birds are in imitation of their sounds; as says the *Nirukta*—'The name *Kāka* is in imitation of the sound; such is the case with most bird-names.'—(11).

VERSE (12).

THE SPARROW, THE PLAVA, THE HAMSA, THE CHAKRAVĀKA, THE VILLAGE-COCK, THE CRANE, THE RAJJUDĀLA, THE DĀTYŪHA, THE PARROT AND THE STARLING.——(12).

Bhāṣya.

'*Sparrow*', '*Kalabiñka*', is the name of a village-bird described in the scriptures. Its prohibition being already got at by the general prohibition of all 'village-birds', the separate mention of

the sparrow implies the eatability of the *female* sparrow ;-the term '*kalabiñka*' being a masculine just like the term 'bull.'

Others have explained that this name has been added for the purpose of excluding (from the prohibition) the *wild* sparrow, which retires to the forest during the rains. They are called 'village-birds' because of their living in the villages during the greater part of the year ; just as is the case with the 'wild buffalo.'

The prohibition of the '*plava*, the *hamsa*, and the *chakravāka*' being already got at from the general prohibition of all 'web-footed birds', the separate mention of these is for the purpose of emphasising the obligatory character of their exclusion, —the eating of the '*Ātya*' and other 'web-footed' birds being regarded as *optional*.

'*Village-cock*'—the specification of the '*village*-cock' permits the eating of the wild cock.

"But why should there have been any suspicion regarding the non-eatability of the *wild* cock at all ?"

Because another *Smṛti* text says simply—'Among birds, *the cock*', which indicates that all kinds of cock are equally 'unfit to be eaten' ; it is for this reason that this general statement has been sought by the present text to be limited in its scope.

"But why cannot this be regarded as a case of option, since the present text permits the eating of the wild cock, which the other text forbids ?"

This cannot be a case of option; it is a case of option only when there are two contradictory texts of equal authority bearing upon the same subject; in the present case however, there is no contradiction; there is no difference in the actual teaching of the two *Smṛti-texts* concerned; because it is quite reasonable to regard the general statement as restricted in its scope; specially as a third independent text has already been quoted above.

"If this be so, then the general prohibition regarding the web-footed birds may be taken as restricted in its scope to the *Hamsa* and other specified birds; so that the prohibition does not extend to all crows and web-footed birds."

This would have been the case if the Smṛti-treatises were not the work of a human author. In the case of works of non-human origin, if they proceed from different sources, there would be no useful purpose by making the general statement restricted to the particular case of the *Haṁsa* and other birds; while in the case of the work of human authors, if they proceed from different persons, it is quite possible that the person who knows the truth in its general form is ignorant of it in the restricted form, or the person who know it in the limited form is ignorant of it in the wider form; so that when we come to consider the source of the two statements, we assume the existence (in the Veda) of a general statement as the source of one, and a particular statement as the source of the other; and these two Vedic statements occurring in two different recensional texts, the only reasonable course is to construe them together, unless there are distinct injunctions bearing upon the two statements. Specially as no such complaint can be raised against the Vedas as—'What is the use of the *general* statement if it is to be taken in its restricted sense?' There is no room for such a complaint, because there is no author in the case against whom such a complaint could be raised. Specially as in the case of a Vedic statement, the only idea that is obtained is from the actual words of the text, only that which can be derived from the words themselves; and there can be no justification for the assuming of any other meaning, for any purpose whatsoever.

What the '*Rajjudāla*' and other birds are is to be learnt from persons versed in the science of birds.—(12)

VERSE (13)

THOSE BIRDS THAT FEED BY STRIKING WITH THEIR BEAKS, THOSE THAT ARE WEB-FOOTED, THE KOYASTI, THOSE THAT SCRATCH WITH THEIR NAILS, THOSE THAT DIVE AND EAT FISH, SLAUGHTER-HOUSE MEAT, AND DRIED MEAT.—(13)

Bhāṣya.

Those that feed by 'striking'—piercing—' with their beaks. Such is the nature of these birds. The *Shatapatra* and other birds belong to this class.

'Web-footed'.—The *Āti* and the rest. That there is an option in regard to this has already been pointed out above (*Bhāṣya* on 12.)

"Wherever there is an *option*, it depends upon the man's wish which of the two options he will adopt : and as a matter of fact, it is only an unforbidden course that can be so adopted. The act of *eating* is an ordinary temporal act, possible only when there is a desire on the part of the man (to do it); it is not a spiritual act, which would have to be done in any case. So that we do not see any useful purpose that could be secured by an optional prohibition."

Our answer to this is that this has already been answered.

"But what has been said may be all right in regard to cases where (as in the Veda) the comprehension of the meaning depends entirely upon the words of the text, and there is no intention (of any author) behind them (to indicate their true purport). The present treatise however is the work of a human author, having been composed by him with great care and labour, for the purpose of supplying in brief all the information that was contained in another voluminous work containing a hundred thousand verses; so that no needless word can be used in it. In fact it is for this reason (of his not using a single superfluous word) that the author comes to be regarded as a 'Teacher'. It is not that there is no prohibition of *all web-footed birds* in general, in which case alone the prohibition of a particular web-footed bird, the *Hamsa*, could be justified. Since the present verse also is a Smṛti-text (and it forbids all web-footed birds in general). Some people have held that the term '*jālapāda*' (web-footed bird) in the present verse is a wrong reading".

We have already explained that the intention of the Teacher is undertsood with the help of gestures, actions and the spinning out of long explanations; and in the present case particular details are also inferred. What was meant to be said was that 'one shall not eat web-footed birds in normal times'; but the author has propounded the prohibition

in the wider form, with a view to justifying both prohibitions (of *web-footed* birds in general, and of the *Hamsa* in particular).

'*Sūnā*' 'Slaughter house', is that place where animals are killed for the purpose of selling their flesh. Others explain it as 'meat-market'.

'*Dried meat*', '*Vallūra*', is flesh dried and kept for several days.

'*Nakhaviṣkira*' are those birds that scratch with their nails;—*e.g.* the Peacock, the Cock &c.
These birds are partly 'fit to be eaten' also, in view of the assertion that these may be eaten 'in abnormal times;' specially in view of what another Smṛti-writer has said regarding 'the Cock among birds' (being eatable). But the present text of Manu cannot be regarded as referring to the Cock; as in that case the separate mention of the 'Cock' would be useless.—(13)

VERSE (14)

THE BAKA, THE BALĀKĀ, THE KĀKOLA, THE KHAÑJARĪṬA, THE FISH-EATERS, AND VILLAGE PIGS; AS ALSO FISH ALWAYS.—(14)

Bhāṣya

The prohibition of the '*Baka, Balākā and Kākola*' being already included under that of 'fish-eaters', these have been mentioned separately in order to indicate that the eating of the other fish-eating birds is optional.

'*Fish-eaters*'.—Animals other than birds also, which eat fish, are to be regarded as 'unfit to be eaten"; such animals, for instance, as the alligator and the like; that this is what is meant is clear from the fact that the name '*fish-eater*' is to be applied in its literal sense.

Kākola is the same as the Kite, such being its name in foreign lands; for instance, it is known by this name in the *Bāhlīka* country.

The prohibition of the '*village-pig*' implies the permission to eat the wild pig. The prohibition of those 'living in villages' in the preceding verse (11) should be taken, on the strength of the context, as referring to *birds* only. It is only thus that there would be any point in the mention of the 'village-pig' in the present verse. The pig that lives in villages is called '*viḍvarāha*', '*village-pig*.'

"If in verse 11, 'those living in villages' are to be taken, on the strength of the context, as *birds* only, then the term 'fish-eaters' in the present verse also should be taken as referring to *birds* only."

Not so ; because the present context is not restricted to *birds* only ; since it mentions also non-birds, such as the 'village-pig' and 'fish.'

'*Sarvashaḥ*,'—always.

This is a general rule : its exceptions we shall explain later on.——(14).

VERSE (15).

HE WHO EATS THE FLESH OF AN ANIMAL, IS CALLED THE 'EATER OF ITS FLESH'; HE WHO EATS FISH IS THE 'EATER OF ALL KINDS OF FLESH'; HENCE ONE SHALL AVOID FISH.—(15).

Bhāṣya.

This is a commendatory supplement to the foregoing prohibition of fish.

When one eats the flesh of an animal, he comes to be described as connected with the act of eating that animal ; *e.g.* the mungoose is called 'serpent-eater', the cat 'rat-eater' and so forth. He who eats fish eats all kinds of flesh ; it would be right to speak of him as a 'beef-eater' also.

Hence, by reason of the possibility of this calumny, one should avoid fish.——(15).

VERSE (16).

THE 'PĀṬHĪNA' AND THE 'ROHITA' ARE FIT TO BE EATEN WHEN USED AS OFFERINGS TO GODS OR PITṚS; THE 'RĀJĪVA', THE 'SIMHATUṆḌA' AND THE 'SASHALKA,' (ONE MAY EAT) ON ALL OCCASIONS—(16)

Bhaṣya.

'*Pāṭhīna*' and '*Rohita*'—two particulars kinds of fish—having been mentioned as fit to be offered to Gods and to Pitṛs, the eating of these is permitted on the occasion of the performance of *Shrāddha* and other rites; and not in the course of ordinary daily food. As for the *Rājīva*, the '*Simhatuṇḍa*' and the '*Sashalka*' fish on the other hand, these are to be eaten '*on all occasions*'; *i.e.* they may be eaten also on occasions other than the offerings to Gods and to Pitṛs.

'*Rājīva*';—some people regard this as standing for lotus-coloured fish. Others explain it as standing for those fish that are marked by lines.

'*Simhatuṇḍa*,'—those having a lion-like face.

'*Sashalka*'—is the same as the fish called '*Shakalin.*'—(16).

VERSE (17).

HE SHALL NOT EAT SOLITARY ANIMALS, NOR UNKNOWN BEASTS AND BIRDS, EVEN THOUGH INDICATED AMONG THOSE FIT TO BE EATEN; NOR ANY FIVE-NAILED ANIMALS.—(17).

Bhāṣya.

'*Solitary*'—those animals that move about singly (not in herds); such as serpents, owls and the like.

'*Unknown*'—as regards *name* and *kind.*

'*Beasts and birds*;'—neither beasts nor birds are fit to be taken.

'*Even though indicated among those fit to be eaten*'—Those that are not actually forbidden are, to that extent, regarded as fit to be eaten; and hence indirectly 'indicated' as such. In reality, there is no direct indication of those fit to be eaten. Those that are not specially recognised as to be avoided come to be regarded as fit to be eaten; and these are spoken of as '*indicated as fit to be eaten*'.

'*Five-nailed animals*;'—*e.g.* the Monkey, the Jackal and the like.

'*Any*'—has been added for filling up the metre.—(17)

VERSE (18)

AMONG FIVE-NAILED ANIMALS THEY DECLARE THE PORCUPINE, THE HEDGE-HOG, THE ALLIGATOR, THE RHINOCEROS, THE TORTOISE AND THE HARE, AS FIT TO BE EATEN; AS ALSO ALL ANIMALS HAVING ONE LINE OF TEETH, EXCEPT THE CAMEL. —(18)

Bhāṣya.

Among five-nailed animals, the Porcupine and the rest are fit to be eaten.

In another *Smṛti*, there is option regarding the Rhinoceros. Says Vashiṣṭha (14-47)—'They dispute about the rhinoceros.

With the exception of the camel, all those animals are fit to be eaten which have only one line of teeth; for instance, the cow, the goat and the deer.

"In as much as the present verse specifies the porcupine &c. as alone fit to be eaten, among five-nailed animals,—it follows that all the other five-nailed animals are unfit to be eaten; so that the prohibition of 'all five-nailed animals' becomes entirely superfluous."

There is nothing wrong in this. When the prohibition is stated in so many words, our comprehension of it is *direct*; if on the other hand, we were to derive our knowledge of what should not be eaten from the specification of what should be eaten, our comprehension of the prohibition would be only inferential, indirect; and this would be a complicated process. —18).

SECTION (3).

Penalty for eating Forbidden Food.

VERSE (19.)

THE MUSHROOM, THE VILLAGE-PIG, GARLIC, THE VILLAGE-COCK, ONIONS AND LEEKS,—THE TWICE-BORN MAN EATING THESE INTENTIONALLY WOULD BECOME AN OUTCAST.—(19).

Bhāṣya.

'*Chhatraka*' is the same as *kavaka*, the mushroom.

'*Viḍvarāha*' is the village-pig, which wanders about unchecked.

By eating these the man becomes an outcast. That is, he should perform the Expiatory Rites prescribed for outcasts. It will be asserted later on (11·56)—'The eating of forbidden food is like the drinking of wine.'—(19.)

VERSE (20.)

HAVING EATEN THESE UNINTENTIONALLY, HE SHOULD PERFORM THE 'KṚCHCHHRA SĀNTAPANA', OR THE 'YATI-CHĀNDRĀYAṆA'; AND IN THE CASE OF THE REST ONE SHOULD FAST FOR A DAY.—(20)

Bhāṣya.

'*Unintentionally*'—unwillingly,—'*having eaten these*'—any one of the six just mentioned;—that it is any *one* that is meant, and not *all together*, is indicated by the fact that the act of eating in this case is not what is actually *enjoined*.

'*In the case of the rest*'—*i.e.* in the case of eating the other things—'red exudations from trees' and other things forbidden above,—one should desist from eating '*for a day*';—the term 'day' is used as including the *night* also; *e. g.* in such passages as 'the day is dark, the day is bright'—(*Rgveda* 6. 9. 1.)

In connection with the eating of some of the things here forbidden, the text is going to prescribe in the section on Expiatory

Rites (Discourse 11) distinct expiatory rites ;—*e. g.* in connection with 'carnivorous animals, pig etc.' (11·156) ; and in this case those are the Rites to be performed ; since they have been directly enjoined in so man words ; specially as the single 'day's fast' here prescribed will have its application only in cases other than those especially provided for. – (20)

VERSE (21)

ONCE A YEAR THE BRĀHMAṆA SHALL PERFORM THE 'KṚCHCHHRA' PENANCE, IN ORDER TO ATONE FOR UNINTENTIONAL EATING ; BUT FOR INTENTIONAL EATING, SPECIAL ONES.—(21).

Bhāṣya.

This refers to the Brāhmaṇa who is in the habit of eating at the house of those *Shūdra* whose food he is permitted to eat.

It is possible that at the house of a *Shūdra*, there may be some articles of food that are not fit to be eaten by the Brāhmaṇa, which can not always be avoided ; if the Brāhmaṇa eats at the house of such a *Shūdra*, there is always a fear of his having partaken of some forbidden food ; hence for him it is laid down that he should perform the '*Prājāpatya Kṛchchhra*'. In all cases where the precise form of the '*kṛchchhra*' is not laid down, it should be understood to be the 'Prājāpatya' *kṛchchhra*, as we shall explain later on.

'*In order to atone for unintentional eating*';—*i.e.* in the event of there being suspicion of his having unwillingly partaken of forbidden food ; that is, for the expiating of the sin incurred, in the event of his having eaten forbidden food.

"But the expiation for this is going to be prescribed later on, under 5·127."

What that means and refers to we shall explain in connection with that verse.

For the act committed intentionally, special rites should be performed ; *i.e.* that expiatory rite which has been prescribed in so many words in connection with a particular case—(21).

SECTION (4)

Killing of Animals for Food.

VERSE (22).

THE COMMENDED BEASTS AND BIRDS MAY BE KILLED BY BRĀHMAṆAS FOR THE PURPOSE OF SACRIFICE, AND FOR THE PURPOSE FEEDING THEIR DEPENDENTS; AS AGASTYA DID THIS OF OLD.—(22).

Bhāṣya

In connection with food fit to be eaten, the Text proceeds to sanction the act of killing.

If one's dependents are very much pressed by hunger, and no other food can be found, then one may kill such birds and beasts as are fit to be eaten. The exact meaning of the term 'dependent' has been explained before (as standing for parents, wife etc.)

The mention of Agastya—that Agastya did the act—is only by way of recommendation.

The first half of the verse is purely commendatory; because the act of killing in connection with sarcifices is directly enjoined by the Vedic injunctions themselves (and as such does not stand in need of any sanction from the present text).

'*Commended*'—*i. e.* permitted as fit to be eaten.

This same thing is stated in the next verse in greater detail, as bearing upon the recommendation of certain acts.—(22).

VERSE (23)

IN ANCIENT TIMES, AT SACRIFICES PERFORMED BY THE SAGES, AS ALSO AT SACRIFICES PERFORMED BY BRĀHMAṆAS AND KṢATTRIYAS, THE SACRIFICIAL CAKES WERE MADE OF EATABLE BEASTS AND BIRDS.—(23)

Bhāṣya

The killing of beasts and birds has been prescribed in connection with the sacrifice named '*Ṣaḍvimṣhat-samvatsara*' (Twenty-

six Years). This is what is referred to in the present verse. The Brāhmaṇa-passage bearing upon the subject is as follows:—'At the end of the day the master of the house goes out hunting, and out of the flesh of the animals that he kills sacrificial cakes are made'.

In as much as the present verse is purely commendatory, no significance is meant to be attached to the past tense in the term '*babhūva*', '*were made*' : hence the same thing is done now-a-days also.

The same holds good regarding the term '*purāṇēṣu*', '*in ancient times*'. This also means that people should not consider that the said sacrificial practice has come into force in recent times only.—Or, the term may be taken to mean that 'it should not be understood that there is nothing to sanction the practice of killing animals at sacrifices '.—Or, the term may be regarded as added for the benefit of those persons who are incapable of comprehending the meaning of the scriptures themselves, and who regulate their conduct entirely in accordance with the practices of other people, on the principle that 'the right path is that whereby great men have gone'. The meaning is that 'this practice is not of recent origin, it is without beginning'.

The 'ancient sages' are certain Brāhmaṇas, well-known for their austerities. Or, it may stand for a distinct species of beings; as described in the Mahābhārata and other works. In this connection it is not necessary to press the objection that—"If these sages belong to a distinct species of beings, they are like *Gandharvas* and others, and as such, not entitled to the performanec of sacrifices.";—since the passage is a purely commendatory one, and as such, may be understood in any way one chooses.

'*Brahmakṣattriyasava*',—*sacrifices* performed by Brāhmaṇas and Kṣattriyas.

SECTION (5)

Stale Food

SUCH FOOD AND EATABLES AS ARE MIXED WITH OILS MAY BE EATEN THOUGH STALE, IF UNSPOILT; SO ALSO WHAT MAY BE THE REMNANT OF A SACRIFICIAL OFFERING.—(24)

Bhāṣya

'*Whatever food is mixed with oils.*'—'Food' stands fro Rice etc. Though the roots to 'eat' and to 'feed' are synonymous, yet the two terms 'food' and 'eatables' have been used with a view to the various articles of food.

'*Unspoilt*'—here stands for what has not become sour by keeping.

Such food '*may be eaten, though stale*'. That is called 'stale' which has been kept over night. What is cooked on one day also becomes 'stale' the next day.

'*Mixed with oils.*'—In regard to this the following question is raised :—

"Does this mean that whatever in the shape of vegetable-juice etc. has been cooked with oils should be eaten even when stale ?—Or, that oils are to be mixed up with dry articles of food, at the time that they are going to be eaten stale ? According to the latter view stale cakes and sweets also would have to be eaten only after having been *mixed with oils.*"

There is, it is argued, no room for any such doubt ; since what is asserted by the words 'may be eaten though stale' is only the eatability of food mixed with oils ; so that the epithet 'mixed with oils' is part of the Subject, and not of the Predicate. Nor do we find it referred to by the pronoun '*tat*', 'that', by any such form of expression as 'what is stale, *that* may be eaten mixed with oils' (which would make the epithet part of the Predicate).

The answer to this is that there is still some ground for doubt; as (according to the explanation just suggested) there would be no point in the separate mention of the 'remnants of sacrificial offering', which are stale and *not mixed with oils* (the latter being implied by their being mentioned apart from 'food mixed with oils:' because there is no chance of these remnants being 'mixed with oils' and becoming 'stale'. Consequently the separate mention of these can have some sense only if in their case it were not considered necessary to mix oils at the time of eating. So that the separate mention of these becomes justified only if, in the case of these Remnants, it be not necessary to mix oils at the time of eating (*which is considered necessary in the case of the other articles of food.*)

But, even so, there need not be any doubt. For in that case, it would be only right to take the epithet 'mixed with oils' as part of the Predicate, for the purpose of justifying the separate mention of the 'Remnants of sacrificial offerings'. [So that thus also, the meaning would be quite clear, though different from what we had explained before.]

In answer to this it is argued that there is only this ground for doubt that in view of the fact that the direct construction of the words as they stand is always to be preferred to any other roundabout constructions,—would it be right to regard the mention of the 'sacrificial remnants' as merely reiterative (and not injunctive) [in which case it may well be left pointless]? Or that, inorder to guard against the mention being pointless, the words should be construed to mean that whatever is stale should be mixed with oils at the time of eating?

On this point there is no doubt; rather than allow the words of the text to be regarded as pointless, it is far more reasonable to have recourse to the indirect method of construction. The real decision however depends entirely upon usage.

'*Oils.*'—This term stands for butter, oil, fat and bone-marrow—(24).

VERSE (25).

ALL THAT IS MADE OF BARLEY AND WHEAT, AS ALSO ALL PREPARATIONS OF MILK, MAY BE EATEN BY TWICE-BORN MEN, WITHOUT BEING MIXED WITH OILS, EVEN THOUGH THEY MAY HAVE BEEN KEPT LONG—(25).

Bhāṣya

'*Kept long*'—*i.e.* kept for two nights.

The term '*even though*' implies that those 'mixed with oils' are also meant to be included.

Even though unmixed with oils, such things as fried flour and cakes, etc. as are made of barley and wheat.

Also '*preparations of milk*,'—such as curd, skimmed milk and the like.—(25).

SECTION (6)

Lawful and Forbidden Meat.

VERSE (26)

THUS HAS BEEN DESCRIBED IN FULL WHAT IS FIT AND WHAT UNFIT TO BE EATEN BY TWICE-BORN MEN. NEXT I AM GOING TO EXPLAIN THE RULE REGARDING THE EATING AND AVOIDING OF MEAT.—(26)

Bhāṣya

The first half of the verse cuts off the preceding section ; and what is implied by this cutting off of the section is that the section that has gone before pertains to the twice-born castes only, not to *Shūdras*, while what follows applies to *Shūdras* also. It is for this reason that several methods of eating meat shall be described, and the reward resulting from the giving up of meat-eating shall accrue to the *Shūdra* also. If this were not so, then, in the matter of eating meat also, the *Shūdra* would be free to do what he likes ; just as he is in regard to the eating of garlic and other things that has been forbidden for 'twice-born persons' only, in verses 5 *etc. etc.* above.

"If it is as you say, then there is the following difficulty :—In verse 32 below, the Text is going to declare the eatability of the meat left from the worship of the Gods :—*viz.* 'One does not become contaminated by sin if he eats meat after having worshipped the Gods and the Pitṛs';—now the 'worship of the gods' etc. can be done only with such meat as is sacred ; and those beasts and birds that have been forbidden for twice-born people (in the next section) are not sacred ; hence, the worshipping of Gods etc. with the meat of these beasts and birds being impossible,—and what does not form the 'remnant of worship' being unfit to be eaten,—these other beasts and birds also, mentioned in a different context, become forbidden for the twice born people ; and the

prohibition of these could be made to apply to the *Shūdra* also by some such other method (of reasoning). So that there is no point in the dividing of the sections (simply for making the prohibitions of the next section applicable to *Shūdras* also). And as for the prohibition of garlic and such things (that have been forbidden specially for twice-born persons), it is not applicable to *Shūdras* at all."

There is this useful purpose served by the dividing of the two sections, that the prohibition of garlic and other things ceases to be applicable to the *Shūdra*. As regards meat also, in as much as the *Householder* only is entitled to do the worshipping of Gods, it is a matter purely optional for such *Shūdras* as are not 'householders'.

"As a matter of fact, *Shūdras* also are entitled to the performance of sacrifices with cooked food; the eating of food has also been prescribed for Householders; but no 'sacrifices with cooked food' are ever offered with garlic and such other things. So that these things may be eaten, or not, by *Shūdras*, entirely according to their option.—'Why'? What would be the harm?' In that case the mention of 'twiceborn persons' (in connection with the forbidding of garlic, etc.) would have no point at all."

This has been already answered by the explanation that one who is not a Householder, or who is travelling away from home, may do what he likes. Nor is it necessary that the Householder shall not eat what has not been offered in oblations; the meaning of the declaration 'one shall live on remnants' being that 'he shall not eat until he has made the offering to the Vishēdēvas.' Now, that substance alone is 'sacred', and can be offered as oblation, which has been prescribed as to be offered at, and thus helping the fulfilment of, a sacrifice. Some people fetch food from somewhere, at the time of eating, and eat it in their own house; and in this case even though the food may not be the 'remnant of a sacrifice', it would not be forbidden. As regards *meat* however, we have the restriction directly imposed, that 'it shall never be eaten unless it has been offered to the Gods.'

"If this is applicable to all the four castes, then there is no point in what is going to be said (under 5.57) in connection with purifications."

The use of that we shall explain at that place.

"In view of the mention of *twice-born people* in the foregoing section, it follows that *dog's meat* and such things also are fit to be eaten by *Shūdras*."

Under Discourse XI we shall show that there are indications to the effect that 'the village-pig', the ass, the camel, and other animals mentioned in the three verses (157 ect.) are 'unfit to be eaten' for the *Shūdra* also.—(26).

VERSE (27)

HE MAY EAT MEAT THAT HAS BEEN CONSECRATED; ALSO AT THE WISH OF BRĀHMAṆAS; AND WHEN INVITED ACCORDING TO LAW; AND WHEN HIS LIFE IS IN DANGER.—(27)

Bhāṣya

The remnant of the meat of the animal sacrificed at the *Agniṣṭoma* is figuratively called 'consecrated'.

"The term '*prokṣita*' literally means *sprinkled with water*, being derived from the root '*ukṣa*,' 'to sprinkle, ; and it is in this sense that the word has been used in all such expressions as 'bring the *prokṣaṇī* water-vessels,' 'butter is the *prokṣaṇa*, the sprinkling-material,' '*prokṣaṇībhiḥ udvējitāḥ*,' 'bothered by sprinklings,' and so forth. Thus then, if the word literally means 'what is done by sprinkling,' then why should such terms as are expressive of certain consecrations prescribed in the Veda, (such as *sprinkling with water* and the like), be taken as indirectly indicating the animal (sacrificed) and its meat ? Why should the direct signification of the word be abandoned in favour of an indirect indication ? For these reasons it is better to take the text to mean 'meat *sprinkled with water and such liquids*'."

What is urged would be quite true, if there were no other texts and commendatory passages bearing upon the matter; such as

we have in the shape of such texts as 'Unconsecrated meat etc.' (Verse), 'Animals not consecrated with sacred texts etc.' (36). A careful examination of all these texts leads to the conclusion that the meaning of the word is as we have explained it.

"If so, then what is said here being already mentioned in the texts quoted, what would be the use of the present text?"

Some people say that the present verse is purely re-iterative. It cannot be an injunction of eating meat when one wishes to do so. Because the man who is hungry and wishes to eat meat can take to it through his desire to relieve his hunger (and he does not need an injunction for that). That is called an 'Injunction' which points to such activity of the agent as would not be possible under the influence of any ordinary visible motive; such injunctions, for instance, as 'one shall perform the *Agnihotra* through out his life;' and on such a matter, the scripture is the sole source of knowledge (and authority) available. We need not seek for scriptural authority in the case of the acts in connection with which we have the positive and negative notions to the effect that—'if it is done, such and such a reward shall follow—,and if it is not done, such and such an evil shall befall us.' And it is only when there is no such source of knowledge available, and the matter is knowable by means of scriptures alone, that it becomes a case of 'Injunction.' As regards the case in question, even infants at the breast know, without being told, that eating brings strength and removes pain. [So that the present text cannot be regarded as an Injunction]. Nor again can it be taken as a Restrictive Injunction, for the simple reason that no such sense of restriction is recognised (as conveyed by the words). (a) For instance, if the *restriction* were in the form 'one must eat what has been consecrated,'—then, since no time is specified the due observance of this injunction would disturb the entire routine of food and rest, and the man may have to be eating constantly; so that an impossible act will have been enjoined in this case. It has been said that—'one who eats not at Shrāddhas etc.',—and again 'the day on which he is remiss etc.' Then again, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* has declared

that a Restriction is always supplementary to an Injunction; so that when there is no Injunction, how can there be any Restriction? What has been 'consecrated' by one man cannot be obtained by another man; so that every man will have to eat all the meat that he consecrates, and this would entail a great calamity. (b) If, on the other hand, the restriction be taken to be in the form of preclusion—'one shall eat *only what is consecrated*, and not what is not consecrated,'—on the ground of its fulfilling the condition of 'Preclusion', that hunger cannot be alleviated except by the eating of both consecrated and unconsecrated food, either simultaneously or one after the other;—even so this would be already implied by what has been said above regarding 'consecrated meat' (in verse 7). (So that in this case also there would be no point in taking the present text as an Injunction.)

Others however find the following fault in the above view :—If all unconsecrated meat were forbidden, birds would fall in the category of 'forbidden food'; specially as there is no authority for any such restricted view that those alone are forbidden in their unconsecrated form, in connection with which consecration has been enjoined (and no consecration has been enjoined regarding birds).

Some people regard this view as improper. Because even so, the text cannot but be regarded as implying (if not directly asserting) the prohibition of (unconsecrated) birds also.

For these reasons, in as much as every Restriction is subservient to some enjoined act, it appears better to regard the present text as purely re-iterative of the eatability of consecrated meat. Just as at sacrifices, one must eat the consecrated meat, and omitting to eat it involves disobedience of the scriptural Injunction, so would it be in connection with all other occasions (on which meat is consecrated). And when the text is purely reiterative, it may also imply a preclusion (as shown above). The rule that 'one shall not eat the unconsecrated meat of the cow, the sheep and the goat' would only be a reiteration of the uneatability of 'unconsecrated meat' (mentioned in verse 7);—this reiteration in the present verse serving the purpose of permitting the eating of

unconsecrated meat also, 'at the wish of Brāhmaṇas', and under certain other circumstances (specified in the present verse).

Others again have taken the following view.—Under 4·213 we have the mention of 'needlessly prepared meat,' and the present verse serves the purpose of explaining what the 'needlessly prepared meat' is ; as in the absence of this it could not be known what is 'needlessly prepared meat'.

Or, it may be that in one verse we have the rule for the eater (who does the consecration himself), while what the other means is that other persons, guests and others, shall not eat the meat belonging to (and offered by) a person who has not performed the worship of the Gods, etc. (and consecrated the meat at it). In the event of the householder being somehow not entitled to worship the Gods, his guests and other persons would be justified in doing that worship for him ; and if the meat has been consecrated at such a worship, then they may eat it. The second prohibition (of unconsecrated meat)—'one incurs no sin by eating meat after having worshipped the Gods and the Pitṛs' (Verse 32)—is meant for those persons who are capable of performing the worship at their own house and have not performed it. What is stated in verse 36—'animals not consecrated by sacred texts etc.'—is meant to be explanatory of what is meant by the term 'consecration.'

Thus we have shown that all the five prohibitive passages have five distinct meanings and serve distinctly useful purposas.

'*At the wish of the Brāhmaṇas*'—'*Brāhmaṇāñcha kāmyayā*'—'. '*kāmyā*' is *kāmanā*, '*wish*' ; the form '*kāmyā*' being a Vedic anachronism.

"If this text permits the eating of unconsecrated meat at the wish of the *Brāhmaṇas*, then what is the sense of this restriction? Does it mean that if one omits to eat at their wish, he incurs the sin of disobeying the scriptures? Or, does the prssent section set forth only a counter-exception? If it is a mere counter-exception, then such counter-exception, setting aside the force of the prohibition, would be available also in the shape of such assertions as 'meat may be eaten at marriages'."

The text does not mean that one *must* eat meat under the circumstances; all that is meant is that if the Brāhmaṇas are very superior persons, then the disobeying of their wish would not be right.

Others again construe the term 'of Brāhmaṇas' with verse 32 also, and take the present text as an Injunction for the eating of meat of the hare and other animals also; the sense being that—'at sacrifices and marriages, or at other large dinner-parties, if the Brāhmaṇas request one to eat meat, then the meat of such animals should not be regarded as forbidden, as they are, by their very nature, consecrated to the Gods'; and it is only under special circumstances that consecration and worship of the Gods etc. may be performed. In fact it is only those kinds of meat that have been forbidden under certain circumstances whose eating is sanctioned, at the wish of Brāhmaṇas; and the sanction does not apply to the eating of 'carnivorous birds' and the rest, or to the case of a man who has resolved to give up meat in view of 'ceasing to eat meat being conducive to highest results,'—irrespective of the fact of the meat being either 'consecrated' or 'unconsecrated,' or 'offered' or 'not offered.'

'*When invited according to law, and when his life is in danger.*'—When invited, at the *Madhuparka* offering, or at a *Shrāddha*, one may eat the meat even without consecration. This is what is meant by being '*invited according to law*'; the rules to be observed by inviters at *Shrāddhas* have been described before (under 3·100); so that havig promised to dine at the *Shrāddha*, no one can say 'I shall not eat such and such a thing,' barring of course anything that may be either unfit to be eaten, or unclean or unwholesome; specially as the food offered at *Shrāddhas* is generally such as is fit for offering to Gods, and also agreeable to the guests. (Thus then, there being no possibility of one refusing to eat the meat offered at the *Shrāddha.*) what is said here must pertain to the *Mdhuparka* offering only.

"But there is no *invitation* for the *Madhuparka* offering."

All that is meant by the present text is that the man who is entitled to receive the *Madhuparka* offering shall eat the unconsecrated meat that may be offered to him; and it does not contain an Injunction of offering the *Madhuparka*. The person meant here as the recipient of the *Madhuparka* is the Guest, and not the king and other honoured persons; just as we find it laid down for the Householder that 'the guest shall not dwell in his house without eating.' From this it would follow that nothing shall be offered to the guest against his desire. As for the notion that one may do what he likes in the matter of receiving an honoured guest and in feeding him,—if this idea were acted up to, then those acts would not have been done 'for the sake of the guest.'

"But the position of the *guest* also is uncertain."

True; but it has been found that the performance of the act brings spiritual merit by producing pleasure in the recipient's mind. Hence it is that by way of a rule it has been laid down for the giver, in accordance with the practice by which the calf is offered, that 'there can be no *Madhuparka* without meat.'

"What is herein laid down may be regarded as pertaining to the case of priests officiating at one's sacrifice."

In that case, this also, like the preceding clause, may be only reiterative of what pertains to the officiating priest and to *Shrāddhas*.

"But in connection with the work of the priests, the eating of the *Iḍā* and such other materials has been prescribed; and the restrictions bearing upon that pertains to the *Sacrifice*, and not to the priests."

True; but if the priests do not eat, they are censured, and also become beset with transcendental evil. Even if they eat, they do not become related to the result following from the act. Servants employed on wages (such as the priests are) perform the details prescribed in the scriptures; and it has been prescribed that 'the priests along with the sacrificer as the fifth eat the *Iḍā* cake,;' so that it is incumbent upon those who have accepted the priestly office to do that eating. And in that case it is only right that this eating should be reiterated, There is however uothing 'scriptual'

in the eating done by persons eating at *Shrāddhas* or by the priests. So that the reiteration is of the eating done by the sacrificer.—It may be asked—"For what purpose is this reiteration?"—But reiteration does not always need a purpose. All that is done is that it reiterates what has been enjoined elsewhere. Similarly in the case in question also, if the owner of the cow has promised to honour the guest with the killing of the cow, then the guest must eat it; for he accepts the offering of *Madhuprka* as a favour to the offerer; so that it is necessary that he should accomplish the act preceding the offering. Otherwise, in the event of the *Madhuparka* not being accepted, the said favour would not be bestowed; consequently in the matter of the eating of forbidden meat, it is necessary for the man at the very outset to accept the *Madhuparka* and the duties of the priest;—similarly in the matter of feeding the Brāhmaṇas. As regards the Student, since certain strict observances have been prescribed for him, meat should be regarded as altogether 'unfit to be eaten.'

'*When his life is in danger*'.—From the context it follows that what is meant is that—'in the event of his not eating meat without worshipping the gods, and no other food being available, if there be a fear of his losing his life, either though disease or through hunger, one may eat the cow, the sheep and the goat.' This rule is based upon the Vedic declaration that 'one shall protect himself from everything.' So that under the circumstances, if one omits to est meat, he becomes his own murderer; and suicide has been forbidden by such text as—(a) 'One shall proteet himself from everything'; (b) 'Hence the man, expecting to live to the fullest extent of human life, shall never kill himself with a desire to proceed to heaven; as such an act would make him unfit for heaven';—all which shows that by eating even forbidden meat to save his life, one does not incur sin. Says the Mantra also (Īshopaniṣad 3)—'Those who kill themselves go, after death, to those regions that are covered by blind darkness and are fit only for demons."

When there is danger to life, even the Student may eat meat; and for him his young age would necessitate the performance of the expiatory rite as prescribed in the text—'If the Student ever

eats meat and honey, etc.' (11·158). Vyāsa has declared that when there is fear of losing one's life through hunger, one may eat even forbidden meat ; and by the instance of the 'dog's thigh' (eaten by Vishvāmitra) it is indicated that such meat may be eaten, but once only.

From this it follows that in the case of serious developments of diseases, where one cannot be sure that the man will certainly recover by eating meat, one shall not eat forbidden meat, such as that of the village-cock and the like : though it is permitted to eat such meat as has been consecrated or offered to the gods.

In the case of disease also one shall not eat meat for the purpose of recovering from a disease that may have just set in ; but in the case of men who have become enfeebled and emaciated through disease, the eating of meat is always permitted ; as asserted in the verse—' Persons daily addicted to wine and women, consumptives, those emaciated through fatigue and disease, as also enfeebled patients, live upon the juices of meat.' It is necessary for these persons to worship the gods in the case of the meat of unconsecrated goat ; there would however be no harm, if on some day this be not found possible.—(27).

VERSE (28).

PRAJĀPATI CREATED ALL THIS AS FOOD FOR THE VITAL SPIRIT ; AND ALL THAT IS MOVABLE OR IMMOVABLE IS THE FOOD OF THE VITAL SPIRIT (28).

Bhāṣya.

' *Vital spirit,*'—the breath within the body, the very seed of life. For the sustenance of this breath, as functioning in the five-fold form of '*Udāna*' and the rest,—and for its maintenance in the body,—' *Prajāpati created all this* '—world—as food.

Having indicated the world in a general way, by means of the pronoun '*this*', the author proceeds to specify it in details—

all that is movable or immovable'. All this, on account of what is said in the first half, is the '*food of the vital spirit*'. The second 'all' is not redundant, since it is added with a view to indicate the various kinds of beings,—beasts, birds, men, reptiles, etc.

Since Prajāpati has ordained all this to be 'food' in times of distress, all of it is the food of the vital spirit. This is also what we read in the dialogue of the Vital Breath contained in the Upaniṣads—'He asked—what shall be my food?—Whatever exists, down to the dogs and down to the insects and worms'—(28).

VERSE (29).

THE IMMOBILE IS THE FOOD OF THE MOBILE; THOSE DEVOID OF FANGS ARE THE FOOD OF THOSE ENDOWED WITH FANGS; THOSE WITHOUT HANDS ARE THE FOOD OF THOSE WITH HANDS; AND COWARDS ARE THE FOOD OF THE BRAVE.—(29).

Bhāṣya

'*Mobile*',—those that are capable of walking and flying and are courageous and active; *e.g.* the kite, the mongoose and the rest.—Of those the '*immobile*'—lethargic animals, such as the pigeon, the serpent and the like—are '*the food.*'

Similarly '*of those endowed with fangs*,'—*i.e.* of the lion, the tiger, etc.,—'*those devoid of fangs*'—the *Ruru*, the *Pṛṣat* and the other kinds of deer—are the '*food.*'

'*Those without hands*,'—*i.e.*, serpents, fish and the like—are the food of '*those with hands*,'—of the mongoose and the fisherman, etc.

'*Of the brave*'—of those that are endowed with great courage—'*cowards*'—those who are over-fond of life—are the food.

The meaning is that those possessed of inferior strength are killed for food—(29).

VERSE (30).

THE EATER INCURS NO SIN BY EATING, EVEN DAILY, SUCH ANIMALS AS ARE EATABLE ; SINCE THE EATER AS WELL AS THE EATEN ANIMALS HAVE BEEN CREATED BY THE CREATOR HIMSELF—(30).

Bhaṣya.

'*Eater*'—one who eats.

'*Eatable*'—which are capable of being eaten. He incurs no sin even by eating them daily.

By the '*Creator*'—Prajāpati—*himself*—have been created both the *eater* and the *eaten*.

For this reason when there is danger to life, meat must be eaten. This is the sense of the three verses, which are purely comemendstory—(30).

VERSE (31)

'THE EATING OF MEAT FOR SACRIFICES'—THIS IS DECLARED TO BE THE DIVINE LAW ; BUT BEHAVIOUR CONTRARY TO THIS IS DESCRIBED AS 'DEMONIACAL PRACTICE'—(31).

Bhāṣya

'*The eating of meat*'—in the form of offerings and oblations—'*for sacrifices.*'

'*This is the divine law*';—this is what has been ordained by the Gods.

'*Behaviour contrary to this,*'—*i. e.* eating meat for the fattening of the body—is '*the demoniacal practice*'; it is only demons that eat meat in this fashion. This is said in deprecation of the practice.—(31)

VERSE (32)

HAVING BOUGHT IT, OR HAVING OBTAINED IT HIMSELF, OR HAVING IT PRESENTED BY OTHERS,—IF ONE EATS MEAT AFTER HAVING WORSHIPPED THE GODS AND THE PITṚS, HE DOES NOT INCUR SIN—(32)

Bhāṣya

The law here laid down refers to the meat of deer and birds. The meaning is that there is no sin incurred in

eating the meat of the *Ruru*, the *Pṛṣat* and other kinds of deer, or the partridge and other birds, if it is done after having worshipped the Gods and the Pitṛs.

In the case of the offering to the Vishvēdēvas, when there is no preparation for it in the house, one may eat rice and other things, even without making the offering; but not so meat; it is with a view to emphasise this that the text repeats—'*having worshipped the Gods and the Pitṛs etc.*' If mere sanction to eat after worship were meant, this has already been accorded before.

What is meant by the 'worshipping of the Gods' here is the offering of the meat on a clean spot with the words 'this is for the Gods'; or that 'the worship of the Gods' should be done in such terms as—'this to Agni, to Vāyu, to Surya, to Jātavedas.' That this must be the meaning of the 'worship' is proved by the fact that 'offering of oblations into the fire' (which could be the other meaning 'worshipping the Gods') is not possible for persons other than Agnihotrins; nor can there be any offering made to the Gods without oblations having been poured into the fire; specially as it has been already shown that the two are distinct actions and involve distinct methods of procedure. This matter may rest here for the present.

Others have explained the 'worship of the Pitṛs' to mean *Shrāddha*; and in *Shrāddhas* we do find worshipping being done. It is the Pitṛs again that are spoken of as the 'deities' of the *Shrāddha*. Hence it is that in connection with the Pitṛs, all writers on *Smṛti* have prescribed the *Shrāddha* only, and no other act.

"How can the *buying* of meat be permissible? The meat obtained from the market becomes '*Sauna*', 'butcher's meat' (which has been forbidden); and as for the meat of animals dying of themselves, and not killed by the butcher, this is 'unfit for eating', on the ground of its causing disease."

Our answer to the above is that one can always 'buy' the meat brought by fowlers and bird-catchers; and these are

known as 'butchers' ; and they wander about from house to house, carrying meat for sale, when it is possible to *buy* it; and it does not become 'butcher's meat.'

'*Having obtained it himself*,'—the Brahmana by begging it' and the *Kṣattriya* by hunting.—(32)

VERSE (33)

IN NORMAL TIMES THE TWICE-BORN MAN CONVERSANT WITH THE LAW SHALL NOT EAT MEAT UNLAWFULLY ; HAVING EATEN IT UNLAWFULLY, HE SHILL, AFTER DEATH, BE DEVOURED BY THEM HELPLESSLY. (33)

Bhāṣya

That is called "*unlawful*' which is done apart from the above-sanctioned occasions—of the worshipping of the Gods, the wish of the Brāhmaṇas and so forth; and in this 'unlawful' manner one shall not eat meat.

This is only a reiteration of what has been said before.

'*In normal times*'.—In abnormal times of distress, when one's life is in danger, he need not wait for the worship of the Gods etc.

"*Danger to life* has already been sanctioned as one of the occasions on which meat may be eaten; so that such eating would be quite *lawful*, not *unlawful*."

True; but what has been said on the previous occasion was in connection with the *consecrated* meat of the cow, the sheep and the goat; and in the present text the phrase '*in normal times*' has been added with a view to extend the sanction to the meat of the hare and other animals also.

It is not the mere *knower* of the law that is called '*conversant with the law*' but one who, in practice acts up to the law. In connection with ordinary worldly acts also the term 'know,' 'be conversant with,' is used in this sense ;

when it is said of a man 'he knows this', what is meant is that 'he acts up to it'.

When the question arises regarding the effect of the act in question, the text says—'*Having eaten meat unlawfully*,'—*i-e.* in a manner not prescribed in the scriptures—'*he shall, on death, be devoured*', by those animals. All that ismeant—is that when a man eats meat in an unlawful manner, he suffers various kinds of pain. If these were not meant by the passage (and if it were taken in its literal sense),—then, in as much as it is the meat of the goat that is commonly eaten by people, and the goat is a not carnivorous animal [how could it 'devour' its eater?]

Or, the meaning may be that the eater, by virtue of the sin of that act, comes to be devoured by carnivorous animals; and as this would be the result of his having eaten the goat, he would be described as being devoured by the goat.—(33)

VERSE (34)

THE SIN OF THE MAN WHO KILLS ANIMALS FOR GAIN IS NOT SO GREAT, AFTER DEATH, AS THAT OF THE MAN WHO EATS NEEDLESSLY-PREPARED MEAT.—(34)

Bhāṣya

The meaning of this verse is well known—(34).

VERSE (35)

BUT WHEN INVITED ACCORDING TO LAW, IF A MAN DOES NOT EAT MEAT, HE BECOMES, AFTER DEATH, A BEAST, DURING TWENTY-ONE BIRTHS.—(35)

Bhāṣya

'*Sambhava*' stands for *janma, birth.*

Except when there is danger to life through hunger, if a man does not worship the Gods, and yet eats meat, he certainly incurs sin.—(35)

VERSE (36)

THE BRĀHMAṆA SHALL NEVER EAT ANIMALS THAT HAVE NOT BEEN CONSECRATED WITH SACRED TEXTS; BUT THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN CONSECRATED WITH SACRED TEXTS, HE SHALL EAT, TAKING HIS STAND UPON THE ETERNAL LAW.—(36)

Bhāṣya

In connection with animals-sacrifice, 'sprinkling with water' and other consecrations have been laid down as to be done with sacred texts; and one shall eat the meat of those animals for whom all these have been performed, and which (thus) are the 'remnants of sacrifices' prescribed in the Vedas. But in the case of the '*Sītā-yajña*' and other sacrifices that are performed solely on the strength of usage (and for which there is no injunction in the Veda),—even though the meat would be the 'remnant of sacrifice', yet, since there would be no 'consecration with sacred texts', it would be 'unfit for eating'.

'*Eternal*'—Vedic.

'*Taking his stand*'—dependent.—(36)

VERSE (37)

IF THERE IS OCCASION, HE SHALL MAKE AN ANIMAL OF CLARIFIED BUTTER, OR AN ANIMAL OF FLOUR; BUT HE SHALL NEVER SEEK TO KILL AN ANIMAL NEEDLESSLY.—(37)

Bhāṣya

People are likely to entertain such ideas as the following—"at the *Sītā-yajña* the *Khañjikā-yāga*, the *Chaṇḍikā-yāga* and the like, which are performed on the authority of usage only, it is right for the man desiring a certain result to kill animals; for it has been found that one obtains a rich harvest by offering sacrifices at which animals are killed."

With a view to set aside such notions the text says—'*If there is occasion*,'—if necessity arises for the offering of an animal in sacrifice,—'*he shall make an animal of*

clarified butter': *i. e.* he shall make clarified butter the sacrificial animal; that is, it being necessary to offer an animal to the Gods, he shall offer, in its place, clarified butter; which is as good a 'sacrificial material'.

'*Or, he shall make an animal of flour*': *i. e.* he shall make the figure of an animal with flour, and offer that figure to the Gods; or, it may be taken to mean that 'instead of the animal he shall offer cakes and other things made of flour'.

"Why is this called *needless animal-slaughter*, when it is sanctioned by the usage of cultured people?"

Since women, and *Shūdras* are ignorant of the Veda, such sacrifices as those mentioned cannot be assumed to have any sanction in the Veda: specially as people have reconrse to these sacrifices for the purpose of propitiating the Gods, and no Vedic act is done for the propitiating of Gods; for the simple reason that in connection with Vedic rites, Gods have been mentioned as subordinate factors. In fact, what they urge in support of the peformance of the sacrifices in question is the argument based upon negative and positive induction, from the experience that there is rich harvest when Gods are propitiated with the sacrifice of animals. For these reasons, these sacrifices cannot be regarded as having the sanction of the Veda. As for the positive and negative induction that also is entirely mistaken.

From all this it is clear that the present verse only reiterates what is already indicated as the right course by al kinds of reasons; and it has been put forward by the author through feelings of friendly kindliness.—(37)

VERSE (38)

AS MANY HAIRS THERE ARE ON THE BODY OF THE ANIMAL, SO MANY TIMES AFTER DYING DOES ITS NEEDLESS KILLER SUFFER VIOLENT DEATH, BIRTH AFTER BIRTH.—(38.)

Beāsya

For so many lives does he suffer violent death.

'*Needless killer of the animal*',—one who kills the animal in a way not prescribed in the *Shruti* or the *Smṛti*; from the context it is clear that this refers to that animal-sacrifice which ordinary people perform on the Mahānavamī.

The term '*pashughna*' is a Vedic form formed with the affix '*ka*'.—(38).

VERSE (39)

ANIMALS HAVE BEEN CREATED BY THE SELF-BORN GOD HIMSELF FOR THE PURPOSE OF SACRIFICE; SACRIFICE IS CONDUCIVE TO THE WELL-BEING OF ALL THIS WORLD; HENCE KILLING AT A SACRIFICE IS NO 'KILLING' AT ALL—(39).

Bhāṣya.

The evil just described does not pertain to the killing of animals at the rites prescribed by *Shruti* and *Smṛti*.

That 'killing' which forms part of sacrifices,—for the due fulfilment of that were animals '*created*'—produced, brought into existence,—'*by the self-born God*'—Prajāpati '*himself*.'

This is a purely commendatory passage.

'*Sacrifice*'—in the form of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and the rest—'*is conducive to the well-being*'—prosperity, development, advancement—'*of all this*'—world.

For this reason the killing that is done at a sacrifice should be regarded as no killing at all. What this means is that it does not involve the sin of 'killing' animals.—(39)

VERSE (40)

HERBS, ANIMALS, TREES, BEASTS AND BIRDS, REACHING DEATH FOR THE SAKE OF SACRIFICES, ATTAIN ADVANCEMENTS.—(40)

Bhāṣya.

"How is it known that killing at sacrifices involves no sin?"

The answer is as follows:—'killing' is the greatest injury that can befall the being killed; because it involves such great evil as the loss of life, involving separation from wife, children

and riches, and all the attendant evil consequences; and also because it carries the entities nearer to the fruition of their sins in the form of hell and the like. But when an animal is killed at a sacrifice, this killing becomes a great benefit conferred upon it, and it is not an injury; because it does not lead it to hell or any such undesirable conditions. That this is so follows from the fact that those '*reaching death*'—destruction—at a sacrifice—'*attain advance-ments*'—higher positions, in regard to caste and so forth; —being born as a God or a Gandharva, or as men born in better countries or continents—such as the Uttarakuru and the like.

The whole of this is a purely commendatory description. We do not find here any Injunction: the verb '*attain*' being in the simple Present tense. Nor is there any justification for deducing an Injunction from the commendatory description,—as is done in the case of the passage '*Pratitiṣṭhanti etc.*' (*vide*, *Mimāmsā-Sūtra*, 4. 3. 17. *et seq*); because in the present case neither there is, nor is there any possibility of, any other Injunction (apart from those already set forth in the text).

The whole of this descriptive section is supplementary to the prohibition of the eating of unlawful meat; and the upshot of the prohibition contained in these verses is that 'one should never seek to kill animals needlessly.' (verse 37) As for the sanction (of killing) implied in the statement—'animals have been created for the purpose of sacrifices' (39),—all this is understood as involving the prohibition of *eating*, which is going to be distinctly emphasised below in verse 48.

Nor can any Injunction (such as 'desiring advancement, the animal shall die at a sacrifice') be deduced from the text. Because such an Injunction could not be intended for the animals; for the simple reason that they would not understand it. And those for whom the Injunction is not intended caonot be the agent; and unless one is an agent, he cannot obtain any reward declared in the scriptures. Specially as in the present case, the result spoken of does not proceed in any perceptible manner from the nature of the thing involved : as there is, for instance, in the

case of the poison, which produces its results even on ignorant persons who take it. There is no such thing in the case of things spoken of in the Veda.

Further, since the herbs and other things spoken of here are unconscious beings, the 'principle of the priests' cannot apply to their case. That is to say, it is found that in the case of sacrificial performances, results are spoken of as accruing to one person (the sacrificer) from the acts that are actually done by others,—*i. e.* the priests officiating for him; *e. g.* in the case of the passage—'he desires one to become worse etc.' In the case of such passages we admit of an Injunction, because what is there stated is not capable of being taken as supplementary to any other Injunction, and secondly because the indication of the Injunction is quite clear, and lastly, because the Injunction indicated is found to be one that pertains to human beings.

In the case of all scriptural statements, we are entitled to deduce just as much as may be reasonably deduced from the actual words of the text. For instance, it has been declared that the Brāhmaṇa joining in the sacrificial bath of other people should have to perform an expiatory rite [and we have to accept this, even though we fail to see any reason for it]. In the present case, however, there is no possibility of any Injunction being addressed to the beings concerned (all of which are inanimate).

'*Herbs*,'—grass and the like.

'*Animals*,'—the goat and other beasts (which are mentioned as fit for being offered at sacrifices).

'*Trees*,'—such as are objects of worship.

'*Beasts*,'—those which, though not ordinarily regarded as fit for sacrificing, happen to be mentioned, in some passages, as to be offered; *e. g.* 'one shall kill *partridges*.' Though at the *Vājapēya* and similar sacrifices, the calves are used only for the purpose of carrying loads, yet they are called 'beasts;' and even though these do not suffer actual *death*, yet the term 'death' in their case stands for all the sufferings that they undergo.

'*Birds*,'—the Kapiñjala and the rest; even though these are sometimes spoken of as 'animals', yet, as a rule, they are not known by that name; for in such passages as 'there are seven tame animals and seven wild animals', the animals meant are the cow and the rest, which are *not birds*; in fact the term '*pashu*', 'animals, denotes *quadrupeds*; or the difference between 'animals' and 'birds' may be regarded as similar to that between the '*go*' and the '*balīvarda*' (the former term being wider than the latter) (40).

VERSES (41—42.)

AT THE MADHUPARKA OFFERING, AT SACRIFICES, AND AT THE RITES IN HONOUR OF THE PITṚS,—AT THESE ALONE SHOULD ANIMALS BE KILLED, AND NOWHERE ELSE; THUS HAS MANU DECLARED —(14)

THE TWICE-BORN PERSON, KNOWING THE REAL IMPORT OF THE VEDA, KILLING ANIMALS ON THESE OCCASIONS, CARRIES HIMSELF AND THE ANIMAL TO THE MOST EXCELLENT STATE.—(42).

Bhāṣya.

The present text sums up in brief those occasions on which the killing of animals is sanctioned by the scriptures.

'*Madhuparka*'—has been already described. At this the killing of the calf has been enjoined.

'Sacrifice'—such as the Jyotiṣṭoma and the like; the eleventh stage of which consists of the animal-sacrifice; as also the *Pashubandha*, at which the sacrificing of the animal forms a sacrifice by itself.

'*Rites in honour of the Pitṛs*,'—*i.e.*, those of which the Pitṛs are the 'deities'; what are meant are the *Aṣṭakā* and other offerings of the kind, and not *Shrāddhas*; because these latter are laid down as to be performed with *cooked* meat, (for which the meat could be obtained otherwise than by actually killing the animal at the rite itself); and in connection with this the killing of animals has not been enjoined; nor will it be right to regard this (injunction regarding the offering of *cooked* meat)

as implying the killing of animals : because the original injunction of the *Shrāddha* does not lay down such *killing*. Further, the present verse also does not clearly enjoin it; specially as what is here mentioned is capable of being taken as pertaining to the *Aṣṭakā* offerings. If the present verse were an injunction, it would involve the necessity of seeking for its basis (in some Vedic text); while, as we shall explain later on, it is capable of being construed as supplementary to another Injunction.

Some people explain the term '*pitṛdaivatakarma*' as standing for *the rites performed in honour of the gods and the Pitṛs i.e.*, the Great Sacrifices (daily).

Animals are to be killed by Brāhmaṇas for the 'support of their dependents,' and the killing of animals is also permitted at times of distress, when life may be in danger.—(41—42).

VERSE (43).

LIVING IN HIS HOUSE, OR WITH HIS TEACHER, OR IN THE FOREST, THE SELF-CONTROLLED TWICE-BORN PERSON SHALL NOT, EVEN IN TIMES OF DISTRESS, DO THAT KILLING WHICH IS NOT SANCTIONED BY THE VEDA.—(43).

Bhāṣya.

This verse forbids such killing as is not sanctioned by the Veda, it is not meant to sanction that which is already sanctioned by it.

As a matter of fact, no other killing (save what is sanctioned) is possible in the case of the Student 'living with his teacher,' or of the man performing austerities 'in the forest;' even though some sort of killing may be possible for the *incontinent* Student, yet for the Hermit in the forest it is not possible in any case. Even for the Student, an absolute indifference to life (and livelihood) is not considered desirable. Hence the present verse should be treated as the Injunction of killing at *Shrāddhas*; and the men-

tion of the 'house' is a mere reiteration (Shrāddhas being performed only by the Householder).

Some people argue here as follows :—"If this were such an Injunction, what would be the meaning of the terms '*in the forest*' and '*in times of distress*'? For the Recluse in the forest, even though keeping up his Fire, there are no animal-sacrifices; as we shall show under 6·11."

Our Teacher however gives the following explanation:—What is urged may be true of the Student; as regards the Recluse, even 'self-abandonment' has been enjoined by such texts as 'having recourse to the Aparājitā, etc. etc.' So that for him there can be no killing for saving his life; all this we shall clearly explain under 6·31.

"The present verse puts forward the *prohibition* of killing even in *times of distress*; how then is it that you take it to mean the permission of it at such times?"

True; but otherwise (if the text were not taken as permitting killing as sanctioned by the Veda), it would be useless. It might be argued that it could serve the purposes of a commendatory text. But even for a commendatory text, some sort of basis (some injunctive text to which it is supplementary) will have to be sought out. Hence we conclude that the prohibition contained in the verse relates to normal times—other than those of distress; and there is nothing incongruous in its being sanctioned in connection with abnormal times of distress. Further, there are various degrees of 'distress'; and under the lesser forms of it, if one would take to 'killing' animals for food under the consideration that his food-supply was sufficient only for a month or a fortnight (after which he will have nothing to eat),—then such killing (even though at an abnormal time of distress) would be what is forbidden by the present text; on the other hand, if the man fears that he would die now if he did not kill for food,—or if a desperado with uplifted weapon were attacking him,—then the killing has to be done; and it is this killing in abnormal times of distress that is permitted by the text.

In this manner the Vedic text 'one should protect himself from all things' also becomes reconciled. (43).

VERSE (44).

THAT KILLING WHICH IS SANCTIONED BY THE VEDA HAS BEEN ETERNAL IN THIS WORLD OF MOBILE AND IMMOBILE BEINGS; IT IS TO BE REGARDED AS NO KILLING AT ALL; SINCE IT WAS OUT OF THE VEDA THAT THE LAW SHONE FORTH.—(44).

Bhāṣya.

The killing of creatures which has been prescribed in the Veda, '*has been eternal*'—without beginning—'*in this world of mobile and immobile beings*;' on the other hand, that which is laid down in the *Tantra* and other works is modern, and based upon mistaken induction. Hence it is only the former that is to be regarded as '*no killing at all*'; and this for the reason that it does not involve any sin in reference to the other world. When this killing is called 'no killing,' it is only in view of its effects, and not in view of its form (which of course is that of *killing*).

"Since both acts would be equally *killing*; how can there be any difference in their effects?"

The answer to this is—'*because it was out of the Veda that the Law shone forth*';—the promulgation of what is lawful (right) and what is unlawful (wrong) proceeded from the Veda; human authorities not being at all trustworthy. And as a matter of fact, the Veda is found to declare that in certain cases, killing is conducive to welfare. Nor is there an absolute identity of form (between the two kinds of killing); because firstly there is the difference that, while one is done for the sake of accomplishing a sacrifice, the other is done for entirely personal motives; and secondly there is difference in the intention also; that is, ordinary killing is done either by one who desires to eat meat, or by one who hates the creature (killed), while the Vedic killing is done because the man thinks that 'it is enjoined by the scriptures'.

'*Shone forth*'—Shone fully ; *i. e.*, became manifested.—(44).

VERSE (45).

HE, WHO KILLS HARMLESS CREATURES FOR THE SAKE OF HIS OWN PLEASURE, NEVER ATTAINS HAPPINESS, LIVING OR DEAD—(45).

Bhāṣya

A half-syllable—'a'—should be understood to be present (between '*yo*' and '*himsakam*'). The prohibition regarding 'harmless creatures' indicates that there is no prohibition regarding dangerous animals, such as serpents, tigers and the like.—(45).

VERSE (46).

HE, WHO DOES NOT SEEK TO INFLICT SUFFERINGS OF CAPTURE AND DEATH ON LIVING BEINGS, IS THE WELL-WISHER OF ALL AND OBTAINS PERFECT HAPPINESS.—(46).

Bhāṣya

"*Capture*" and '*death*' are the '*sufferings*' meant ; or *sufferings*' may be taken separately, as standing for 'doing pecuniary harm', etc.

He who *seeks* to do all this,—*i.e.*, who not only desists from such acts, but who never has any desire to do it ;—such a person does not merely cease to do harm to others, he actuallybecomes their '*well-wisher*',—he is anxious to do good to them ; and '*he obtains perfect happiness.*'—(46).

VERSE (47.)

HE WHO DOES NOT INJURE ANYTHING OBTAINS, WITHOUT EFFORT, WHAT HE THINKS OF, WHAT HE UNDERTAKES, AND WHAT HE FIXES HIS HEART UPON.—(47),

Bhāṣya.

What he thinks of',—in the shape of profit and honour, &c.

What he fixes his heart upon',—whatever desirable thing he has longing for;—all this '*he obtains without effort.*'

'*What he undertakes*'— whatever act he does, the reward of that he obtains, without and difficulty, immediately after the accomplishment of that act.—(47)

VERSE (48)

MEAT IS NEVER OBTAINED WITHOUT HAVING ENCOMPASSED THE KILLING OF ANIMALS: AND THE KILLING OF ANIMALS DOES NOT LEAD TO HEAVEN: HENCE ONE SHOULD AVOID MEAT.—(48)

Bhāṣya

This verse shows that all the verses forbidding the killing of animals are auxiliary to the prohibition of meat-eating.

As a matter of fact, until animals have been killed, meat cannot be obtained; and killing is very painful. Hence one should avoid meat.

"Meat can be obtained from animals that die of themselves; how is it then that it is said that it cannot be obtained *without encompassing the death of animals?* "

The verse is a purely commendatory exaggeration. Further, there can be no idea of any one eating the meat of animals dying of themselves, for the simple reason that such meat is the source of disease. Meat is never eaten without being offered, and what is a source of disease can never be offered as gift.

'*Utpadyatē*';—the meat is brought about by *killing*; hence the nominative of *killing* and of *obtaining* may be regarded as one and the same; so that there is nothing incongruous in the expression '*nāḳṛtvā utpadyatē*'. Or, '*utpadyatē*' may be construed along with '*does not lead to heaven.*', What is meant is, not only that it does not lead to heaven, but also that it leads to hell and other evils.—(48)

VERSE (49)

HAVING DULY PONDERED OVER THE ORIGIN OF MEAT, AND OVER THE FETTERING AND KILLING OF LIVING BEINGS, ONE SHOULD ABSTAIN FROM THE EATING OF ALL MEAT.—(49)

Bhāṣya

The fœtus grows in the womb, which is an unclean place: and it is produced from semen and ovule, both unclean things.

'*Fettering and killing*'—involved in the obtaining of meat.

'*Having duly pondered over*'—carefully considered with an alert mind;—'*all this,—one shall abstain from the eating of all meat*'—*i.e.* also of that which is not forbidden; what to say of what is actually forbidden?

The present text is a commendatory exaggeration; it is not meant that meat should be always regarded as *unclean*; the sentence does not mean to lay down that all meat is actually unclean.—(49)

VERSE (50)

HE WHO DOES NOT EAT MEAT LIKE A FIEND, DISREGARDING THE PROPER METHOD, BECOMES POPULAR AMONG MEN AND IS NOT AFFLICTED BY DISEASE.—(50.)

Bhāṣya.

'*Proper method*'—*i.e.* of worshipping the Gods and so forth; if one does not eat meat, regardless of this manner, but eats it only in the right manner,—'*he becomes popular*'—loved by the people; he becomes dear to all.

'He *is not afflicted by disease.*'—Diseases are produced if a man eats the flesh of lean and enfeebled animals. For this reason also one should eat meat only in the right manner; and by eating it thus, he '*is not afflicted by disease.*' By eating meat in any other way, he is always afflicted by disease.

'*Like a fiend*'.—The term 'fiend' stands for a species of lower animals, which eat flesh always in the wrong manner; hence every one who eats it in the wrong manner becomes like a fiend;—this is the sense of the deprecatory simile.—(50).

VERSE (51.)

HE WHO APPROVES, HE WHO CUTS, HE WHO KILLS, HE WHO BUYS AND SELLS, HE WHO COOKS, HE WHO SERVES AND HE WHO EATS IT ARE 'SLAYERS'—(51).

Bhāṣya.

When some one is killing an animal, if another person should come, and for his own selfish purposes show his approbation, by such words as 'he is doing well in thus killing the animal,'—this latter man is called the '*approver*'.

'*He who cuts*.'—he who quarters the dead body.

'*He who serves*'—places it before persons eating.

'*He who eats it*'.

All these are '*slayers*'.

What is meant by attributing the character of the '*slayer*' to those who do not actually *slay*, but do the other acts of eating, preparing, selling, &c.,—is the deprecation of all these acts; all these persons do not actually become '*slayers*.' The ordinary act of 'slaying' is that which results in loss of life; so that it is only one who does this act that is the 'slayer.' In accordance with the rule that 'the nominative agent of an act is one who does it independently by himself,' that person alone is called the 'slayer' who deprives living beings of their life; those who do the acts of buying, selling, etc., are other than that person.

"But the statement that the approver and the rest also are *slayers* also emanates from the *Smṛti* (and as such must be accepted as true)."

The authority of this *Smṛti* does not extend to the subject of words and their denotations; it is confined to the subject of right and wrong,—what is lawful and what unlawful. More authoritative on the subject of words and their meanings is the revered Pāṇini. In fact Manu and otther writers on *Smṛti* only make use of words in accordance with ordinary usage, and they do not lay down rules bearing upon words and their meanings; they use the words, they do not regulate them.

"But as a matter of fact, we do find these writers making such assertions as 'such aud such a person is called a *Preceptor*' and so forth (which lay down the denotation of words)."

True; but in such cases there is no inconsistency between what the *Smṛti* says and what we learn from the treatises bearing upon the subject. Nor again is there any other useful purpose found to be served by those passages (that explain the meaning of the term 'preceptor' (for instance). In the present case, however the passage is capable of serving an auxiliary purpose by being taken as a commendatory statement; so that it is not possible, on the strength of the present text alone, to regard all these persons as 'slayers.'

Some people argue as follows:—"If there is no one to *eat*, there would be no one to kill; so that the *killing* is really prompted by the *eating*; and the prompter of an act also has been regarded as its *doer*; so that the *eater* is the *slayer*, even in the direct sense of this term; and it is only right that the *eater* should have to perform the same Expiatory Rite as the *slayer*."

This, we say, is not right; because as a matter of fact, a different expiatory rite has been prescribed, under Discourse xi for the *taster* of the meat of the animals killed (by others).

What has been stated above regarding the *prompter* being the *doer*, that also is not true. The *prompting agent* has been thus defined—'He who by means of direction and request, prompts the independent agent, is also an auxiliary agent. the other being the principal one.' And as a matter of fact when he *slayer* kills the animal, he is not ordered to do so by the eater;

he does it as a means of living, with the motive that he shall live by selling the flesh.

If *prompting* means *abetting*,—*i.e.* if it be held that when a man proceeds to do a certain act, if another person abets him and co-operates with him, the latter is to be regarded as the *prompter*—then, this definition also is not applicable to the present case. In the act of *killing*, the 'abetting' would consist in such acts as—(*a*) collecting the weapons, etc. (*b*) the sharpening of the blunted axe, (*c*) the bringing up of the sword, and so forth ; as without these the act of *killing* could not be accomplished, [and none of these acts is done by the *eater*].

If, however, the *prompter* be defined as 'that person for whose take the work is done,'—then, in the case of the 'teaching of the boy,' the boy would have to be regarded as the *prompting agent* in the act of 'teaching' : and yet 'teaching' does not mean 'reading' (which is what the boy actually does).

Then again, when the slayer does the *killing*, he does not do so for the benefit of any particular person, by virtue of which the latter's action of *eating* could be regarded as sinful. In fact, all these persons undertake these acts for their own benefit ; and not one of them is troubled by the idea of benefitting any other person.

"Even when the man undertakes the killing for his own benefit, such action would be absolutely useless if there were no *eater* : it is only when there is an *eater*, that the man's action is fruitful ; and the *fruit* of an act is the motive, the prompting force ; and as this depends upon the eater, the eater also is an indirect prompter."

If this be so, then, when a person is murdered on account of enmity, since the enemy would be the prompter of the act of killing, the murdered man could become the murderer ! For without enmity, the act of murder would not be possible. Similarly when in the case of Brāhmaṇa-murder, the murderer (in course of the Expiatory Rite) gives away his entire property, the act of giving will have been prompted by the *murder* : and, as

there could be no *recipient* without the giver, it is not only the rechastity, but the giver also that would become tainted with the sin. Similarly a beautiful woman would incur sin by guarding her chastity against the lover who has his heart burning with the arrows of love and who has expressed his longing for her.

From all this it follows that what has been suggested cannot be the definition of the *prompter*.

As a matter of fact, both the *slayer* and the *eater* do their respective acts for their own special benefit ; but they become helpful to one another in the manner of two persons one of whom has lost his horse and another his cart ; and there can be no question of one being the *prompter* of the other.

This has been fully discussed under 8·104.—(51).

VERSE (52).

IF A MAN, WITHOUT WORSHIPPPING THE GODS AND PITṚS, SEEKS TO INCREASE HIS OWN FLESH BY THE FLESH OF OTHERS,—THERE IS NO SINNER GREATER THAN THAT PERSON.—(52).

Bhāṣya.

This deprecates the man who eats meat for the purpose of fattening himself, and not one who does it for averting disease. That this is so is clear from the words of the text '*he who seeks to increase.*' In him also, only if he does it '*without worshipping the Gods and Pitṛs.*' But if the man is ill, and recovery is not possible without eating meat, then there would be no harm, even if the said worshipping were not done.—(52).

VERSE (53.)

IF A MAN PERFORMS THE ASHVAMĒDHA SACRIFICE EVERY YEAR, FOR A HUNDRED YEARS,—AND ANOTHER DOES NOT EAT MEAT,—THE MERIT AND REWARD OF BOTH THESE ARE THE SAME.—(53.)

Bhāṣya.

The eating of the meat of the Hare and other animals,—in the form of remnants of the worship of Gods and Pitṛs—has been

sanctioned. If one abstains from this eating, he obtains the fruits of the *Ashvamēdha* sacrifice : and the fruits of this sacrifice have been described in the words 'he obtains all desires, etc., etc.'

In this connection it would not be right to urge the following objection :—" How can mere abstaining from meat be equal to a sacrifice involving tremendous labour and much expense? "—Because the said abstention also is extremely difficult. Further, the principle enunciated in the Sūtra.—'The particular result would follow from development as in the ordinary world'—is operative here also. Hence there can be no objection against the asserting of results or fruits of actions.

Our answer however is as follows :—What is said in the text is a purely commendatory exaggeration ; specially because the statement of the sacrifice being performed 'every year for one hundred years' can be regarded only as such an exaggeration ; for it is not possible for the *Ashvamēdha* to be performed every year ; nor can it be performed 'for a hundred years,' as no performer would live so long,

'*Puṇyaphalam*' is a copulative compound, it being impossible to take it as a Genitive *Tatpuruṣa*.—(53).

VERSE (54).

BY SUBSISTING UPON SACRED FRUITS AND ROOTS, AND BY EATING THE FOOD OF HERMITS, ONE DOES NOT OBTAIN THAT REWARD WHICH HE DOES BY ABSTAINING FROM MEAT—(54).

Bhāṣya.

'*Sacred*'—fit for Gods.

'*Food of hermits*'—*i.e.*, such grains as are got without cultivation ; *e.g.*, the *Nivāra* and the like.

This verse also is a purely commendatory exaggeration—(54).

VERSE (55).

'ME HE (MĀM-SA) WILL DEVOUR IN THE NEXT WORLD, WHOSE MEAT I EAT IN THIS'—THIS IS THE 'MEATNESS' (MĀMSATVA) OF THE 'MEAT' (MĀMSA), AS THE WISE ONES DECLARE.—(55).

Bhāṣya.

This explanation of the name is a commendatory description. '*Mām sa bhakṣayitā*',—'*He will eat me.*'—The general pronoun '*saḥ*,' 'he,' has its particular character pointed out by what follows—'*whose meat I eat here.*'—(55).

VERSE (56.)

THERE IS NO SIN IN THE EATING OF MEAT, NOR IN WINE, NOR IN SEXUAL INTERCOURSE. SUCH IS THE NATURAL WAY OF LIVING BEINGS ; BUT ABSTENTION IS CONDUCIVE TO GREAT REWARDS.—(56).

Bhāṣya.

From verse 28 to this we have a series of purely commendatory texts ; there are only two or three verses that are injunctive in their character.

'*There is no sin in the eating of meat.*' This assertion stands on the same footing as verse 32 above. What we learn from the present verse (in addition to what we know already) is that '*abstention is conductive to great rewards.*' By various deprecatory texts the impression has been produced that 'no meat should be eaten.' But by way of providing a means of living for living beings it has been asserted that '*there is no sin in the eating of meat*' ; which means that there is no sin if one eats such meat as is the remnant of the worship of Gods, etc., or what is eaten at the wish of Brāhmaṇas, and under such similar circumstances specified above ; but this only if he wish to eat it.

'*Abstention*'—taking the resolve not to eat meat and then to abstain from it—this is '*conducive to great reward*'. In the absence of the mention of any particular reward, *Heaven* is to be regarded as the reward. . So say the *Mīmāmsakas.*

Similarly in regard to 'wine', for the *Kṣattriyas*,—and to '*sexual intercourse*', for all castes; but apart from that which may be alone (a) 'during the day' or (b) 'with women in their courses', or 'on sacred days', (in connection with all of which sexual intercourse has been forbidden).

The three things mentioned here, in their very restricted forms, constitute the 'natural way of living beings', sanctioned by the scriptures with a view to the maintenance of the body. Says the author of the Science of Medicine (*Āyurveda*) —'Food, continence and sleep—these three, intoxicants and women, tend to prolong life.'

If, however, one can manage to live without these, for him '*abstention is conducive to great rewards.*' This is said merely by way of illustration ; same being the case with all 'abstentions' from such things as are neither prescribed nor forbidden. Where however a certain act is definitely prescribed, there is nothing reprehensible in the man's doing it, even if it be done only for the sake of the pleasure that it affords him; in fact *abstention* from such an act would itself be reprehensible, as done with a view to 'great rewards'; e. g. the eating of honey, having a full meal, wearing a woolen garment and so forth. Such also is the practice of cultured people; the revered Vyāsa also says the same. Those acts, on the other hand, to which people have recourse only through desire,—even though these be neither permitted nor forbidden,—e.g. laughing, scratching of the body and so forth,—abstention from these would be conducive to great rewards.—(56)

SECTION (7)

Impurity due to Death.

VERSE (57)

I AM GOING TO DESCRIBE, IN DUE ORDER, PURIFICATION ON DEATH, AS ALSO PURIFICATION OF SUBSTANCES, AS PRESCRIBED FOR ALL THE FOUR CASTES.—(57)

Bhāṣya.

'*For all the four castes*'.—This is meant to imply that the duties of the *Shūdra*, generally laid down only in a vague form, could not be known without special effort.

'*Prētashuddhi*',—the purification of the living after the death of other persons. This compound is according to the general rule 'A noun with a declensional ending is compounded with anther noun with a declensional ending'.

Though the author announces that he is going to describe the *purification*, yet, in as much 'purification is dependent upon, and relative to, 'impurity', and as it is the function of the treatise to provide information regarding both, the author is going to describe first the occasions of 'Impurity'.—(57).

VERSE (58)

WHEN A CHILD DIES THAT HAS TEETHED, OR ONE YOUNGER THAN IT WHEN ITS TONSURE HAS BEEN PERFORMED, ALL ITS RELATIVES ARE 'IMPURE'. THE SAME IS DECLARED TO BE THE CASE WITH BIRTHS ALSO.—(58).

Bhāṣya.

'*Anujāta*'—is taken to mean *younger than the child that has teethed.*

The present verse mentions the several stages only by way of illustration, and much emphasis is not meant to be laid on them ; since the exact period of 'impurity' in regard to the various stages is going to be prescribed later on ; *e.g.*, in another *Smṛti-text* we read—(*a*) 'Till the appearance of teeth etc.'—(b) 'When a child dies in a foreign country, etc., etc.' (5·77),—there is '*immediate impurity*' ;—where the term 'child' is to be understood as standing for *one that has not teethed.* Thus too it is that what the text (5·67) says regarding the 'one night's impurity' in connection with the death of 'persons whose tonsure has not been performed etc.' is taken to be applicable also to one who has teethed. It is in this way that the rules laid down by the two *Smṛti-texts* in connection with the 'child' become reconciled. In fact the 'one night's impurity' pertains only to children till the performance of the Tonsure ; since in connection with those whose Tonsure has been performed, the period of impurity is going to be prescribed as to last for three days ; and this applies to the case of boys before their Initiatory Ceremony ; after which the period would be ten days and so forth, as laid down in the text—'The Brāhmaṇa is purified in ten days, etc.' (5·83).

Some people interpret the several alternative rules laid down in verses 5.59 *et seq*—'Impurity due to death lasts for ten days' etc., etc.,—as pertaining to the different ages (of the dying person), and construe them differently from their natural order—on the strength of usage and of other *Smṛti-texts* ; by which (*a*) the impurity in connection with the Initiated child lasts for ten days, (*b*) in connection with the uninitiated for four days, (*c*) in connection with one whose Tonsure has been performed, three days, (*d*) in connection with one who has teethed, one day, and (*e*) in connection with younger children, it is to be only 'immediate' ; and so forth. In this way there would be an option between 'three' and 'four' days, in connection with one whose Tonsure has been pesformed.

But in accordance with these views, there would be no notice taken of the rule that has been prescribed in another *Smṛti*-text,

in connection with the death of the boy 'who has completed his Vedic Study. All this we shall explain later on.

A person is called 'dead' when all his functions have ceased, and the root '*sthā*' with the preposition '*sam*,' denotes *cessation of functions*, [Hence '*samsthita*' means *dead*].

'*Relations*',—*i.e.*, *Sapiṇḍas* (sharers in the ball-offering) and *Samānodakas* ('Sharers in the water-offering').

'*Jātaka*' is the birth of a son, etc.

'*The same is declared to be the case*'; i. e., all relations are impure.

Question: "Whence is any notion of *age* obtained, by which the text is interpreted as applying to one whose Tonsure has been performed, and thus refering to a particular sacramental rite? In a later text, the connection of the Initiatory Rite has been directly mentioned. But we do not find it anywhere stated upto what age a child may be called 'tonsured."

Our answer to the above is as follows: By reason of its having been mentioned along with 'one who has teethed,' the term 'tonsure' is understood as indicating a definite age; and this age is to be taken as extending upto the third or the fourth year.

It has been argued that—"Since there is the option of performing the Tonsure during the first year, if one adopts this option, the present rule (which extends the 'impurity' in the case of the 'tonsured' child to one day) would be contrary to the rule that 'upto the period of teething, the impurity is only *immediate*.'"

This is not right. As a matter of fact, what is the extent of the 'tonsured' age [we learn from the juxtaposition of the epithets 'tonsure' and 'initiated', which indicates that the new name becomes applicable only upon the performance of the next sacramental rite [so that the boy could be regarded as 'tonsured' only till the performance of the Initiatory Rite]. In this way, the

present text would become reconciled with such texts as 'Till teething, impurity is to be immediate.' Similarly in the *Smṛti*-text—'Till the ceremony of Initiation it is to be for three days'—the Initiatory ceremony is mentioned only as indicative of a particular age. It might be argued that—"there would, in this case be no age specified for the *Shūdra*, in the way in which it is for the *Brāhmaṇa*, the *Kṣattriya* and the *Vaishya*, in connection with whom, the Initiation has been more or less strictly prescribed, as being the eighth year and so forth."—But in this case also, the age would be understood as when the period of 'childhood' is passed; in accordance with the law that 'for all there is a full period of impurity.' Thus then, *after the eighth year*, in case of all the four castes, the period of impurity would be the 'full term', and this age is applicable to the case of the *Shūdra* also. In accordance with the view by which the 'Initiation' in the present context is taken as indicating the eleventh (and twelfth) year in the case of the Kṣattriya and the Vaishya,—there would be no age mentioned in connection with the *Shūdra*. Though in his case also the period of impurity extends to the full time, in the case of one who has passed his childhood; before which the period extends to three days only; and the passing of childhood has been defined in another *Smṛti*-text, which says—'Upto the eighth year one is called a *child*', while others declare that 'one is a *child* till his sixteenth year.' Those who hold that 'childhood' ceases after the sixteenth year,—according to those also *purification* takes place only after a month (the full term). It has also been declared that 'after six years, the purification of the Shūdra comes after a month'; and in another text—'one month in the case of the eight-year-old child'.

Objection—"The rules regarding the several ages are obtained from the verses that follow; why then should the 'teething', etc., have been specified in the present verse?"

Answer—True; but it has been answered here also for the purpose of making the rules more intelligible.

VERSE [59).

AMONG 'SAPINDAS'. THE PERIOD OF IMPURITY DUE TO DEATH IS ORDAINED TO LAST FOR TEN DAYS ; OR TILL THE COLLECTING OF THE BONES, OR FOR THREE DAYS, OR FOR ONE DAY ONLY—(59).

Bhāṣya.

The qualifications of the '*Sapiṇḍa*' shall be described later on.

'*Till the collecting of the bones*' ;—this is meant to indicate the period of *four days* ;—since there is the text—'The bone-collecting of one who has set up the fire shall be done on the fourth day'.

The alternatives here laid down are in consideration of the man's charaeter and Vedic learning, or of his character only ; as says another *Smṛti*-text,—'The Brāhmaṇa who is equipped with the Veda only, in three days, and he who has no qualifications ,in ten days.' The period of 'one day' is meant for the man who knows *three Vedas* and has set up the Fire ; that of 'three days' far one who knows *one Veda* only ; and that of ten days for one who has no such qualifications.

Gautama (14·44) has spoken of 'immediate purity.' But this is for a special purpose ; all that is meant it that Vedic Study shall not cease. During the period of Impurity, several acts are discontinued,—e. g. for ten days, the food of the two families is not eaten ; the making of gifts, the receiving of them, the offering af oblations and Vedic Study are discontinued ; so that ordinarily all these acts would cease during the period ; but so far as the Student of several Vedas is concerned, if he were not to repeat them regularly, he would forget them ; hence in his case Vedic Study shall not cease.

Similarly it is only right that an alternative should be provided, in consideration of the mourner's livelihood. For instance, for the man who lives by the 'six acts' (of giving and receiving gifts, of sacrificing and officiating at sacrifices, and Reading and Teaching), the impurity lasts for ten days ; for him who lives by the

'three acts' (of receiving gifts, officiating at Sacrifices and Teaching), it lasts for four days, and for him who lives by 'two acts,' it lasts for three days. If, for all these, the Impurity were to last for ten days, then, as the man would not be entitled to receive gifts and officiate at sacrifices, his living would become extremely difficult for him.

Some people hold that—"there are four age-stages, and four periods of Impurity; so that each of the latter is to be taken along with each of the former."

But according to this view, there would be ten days' impurity in the case of the child that has teethed; while in the case of the death of the initiated boy, it would be for a single day only; and this would be contrary to usage and other Smṛti-texts.

In order to avoid this incongruity, the connection may be made in the reverse order; *i.e.*, the death of the *initiated* boy entailing *ten* days, and that of the *tonsured* child four days, the *teething* child three days, and a still younger child only one day.

Even so in view of the incompatibility (of this view) with the Smṛti-text, that—'in the case of the *tonsured* child, the impurity lasts for three days',—it would be necessary to regard the two (three and four days) as optional alternatives; specially as the term '*sva*' refers to 'three days,' and the period of 'four days' would apply to the particular livelihood of the mourner, or to the particular day on which the bones are collected. In this manner all this becomes reconciled with the other Smṛti-texts, which speaks of 'one day, &c.' If, on the other hand, the option were explained as based upon the diversity of age,—then, with what would Manu's declaration regarding 'conduct' and 'study' be taken as optional?

From all this it follows that on the strength of Gautama's assertion, there is to be 'immediate purification,' only so far as Vedic Study is concerned—for the man who, like the person possessing a 'granary', has other means of living than the receiving of gifts, and who is very much learned in the Vedas. In the case of the other alternatives, of 'three days' and the rest, the purification is meant simply to qualify the man for the receiving of gifts

for purposes of a living. This is according to the view of Gautama. If this were not his meaning, then, he would have said simply—'for the Brāhmaṇa learning the Veda,'—and not 'for the purpose of avoiding discontinuance of study.'

Thus, though purification has been laid down in a general way, as to be accomplished in a single day,—yet it should be understood as pertaining to certain special acts only. So that the ordinary period for the Brāhmaṇa being 'ten days' (according to 5·83), there is no need for saying anything else; from which it is clear that the option should be admitted in the manner described above. In the case however of 'purity' being immediate, in the case of newborn infants, and the period of impurity lasting for 'three days' in the case of tonsured children,—sinece there is no option, the purity must pertain to all acts.—(59).

SECTION (8)

Sapiṇḍa—relationship as bearing on 'Impurity'.

VERSE (60.)

THE 'SAPIṆḌA-RELATIONSHIP' CEASES WITH THE PERSON IN THE SEVENTH-DEGREE AND THE 'SAMĀNODAKA-RELATIONSHIP,' WHEN THE ORIGIN AND THE NAME BECOME UNRECOGNISABLE—.(60).

Bhāṣya.

Inasmuch as the present context is meant to provide information regarding the exact signification of the term '*anvaya*', 'family',—and as the term '*bāndhava*', 'relation' (of the preceeding verses) is meant to be construed with the present text also,—the meaning of the present verse is that persons born of the same family are called '*Sapiṇḍas*' upto the person in the seventh grade. In view of the assertion—'the son shall make offerings to those to whom his fathers make them',—which lays down offerings to be made also by a person whose father is living, six persons become recognised as '*Sapiṇḍas*' (the seventh being the offerer himself).

Further, according to the statement—'offerings are made to forefathers, counting one's own self as the seventh'—the grandfather, the great-grand-father and other ancestors are called '*Sapiṇḍas*'; and yet, while the six ancestors are called '*Sapiṇḍas*,' the six descendants, beginning with the son, are also called '*Sapiṇḍas*.' Because the 'offering of the ball' is a single act, upon which, and in connection with which, the title '*Sapiṇḍa*' becomes applicable,—the 'son' and other descendants also become associated with this 'act as performed by the grandson, and other descendants respectiveiy; consequently the person to whom one makes the offering, and along with whom he becomes the recipient of the offering—all these come to be called '*Sapiṇḍa*;' and the reason for this lies in the fact that the 'ball-offering' is the only indicative in the present case; just as in the case of the

assertion 'you should come at conch-time (gun-time)' the 'conch' is the only indicative of the time that is meant. Thus it comes to this that all descendants upto the seventh grade of the great-grandfather of one's great-grandfather are his '*Sapiṇḍas*'; and similarly the descending line of one's descendants, and the descendants of his father, grand-father and the rest. The degrees are to be counted from that person from whom the two lines bifurcate. For instance, among persons who have a common grandfather, the seven degrees should be counted from that grandfather, and persons falling within those seven degrees would be the '*Sapiṇḍa*'. Similarly in all cases.

In dealing with the question of '*Sapiṇḍa*', all that the text speaks of is 'person born of the same family,' and no mention of the caste is made; consequently persons belonging to the *Kṣattriya* and other castes also become '*Sapiṇḍa*' of the Brāhmaṇa. It is for this reoson that on the birth of such persons also the Brāhmaṇa remains 'impure' for ten days; while in their own case the period lasts for twelve days (for the *Kṣattriya*), thirteen for the *Vaishya* and so forth. Thus then, in the case of the birth or death of the person of a different caste, or in that of the *Sapiṇḍa* of a different caste, the purification is governed by the period prescribed for the caste of the person concerned.

In the case of the Kṣattriya and other castes, their 'Sapiṇḍa'-relationship to the Brāhmaṇa extends to three degrees only; as says Shaṅkha—"If of one person there are born several persons, of different mothers and diverse castes, these are 'Sapiṇḍas', with varying periods of purification; but the ball-offering extends over three degrees only." In this passage the term 'of different mothers' means '*born of mothers of different castes*'; the term 'of diverse castes' has also been added in view of the fact that persons born of mothers of the *same* caste also are 'born of different mothers'.—These are '*Ekapiṇḍa*', *i.e.*, *Sapiṇḍa*; but 'with varying periods of purification'; *i.e.*, the purification of each person is in accordance with his own caste; for instance. for the Brāhmaṇa in the case of the birth, etc,, of his *Sapiṇḍa* of the *Kṣattriya* and

other castes, the purification takes *ten* days; while for the *Kṣattriya*, in the case of the birth, &c. of his *Brāhmaṇa Sapiṇḍa*, it takes twelve days;—there is the further peculiarity in this case that 'the ball-offering extends over three degrees only'; *i. e.*, it is offered to persons within three degrees only.

Within the pale of their own castes however, for the *Kṣattriya* and other castes also the 'Sapiṇḍa-relationship' extends over seven degrees, exactly as for Brāhmaṇas; specially as in the words of Shaṅkha justed quoted, we find the qualifying terms '*born* of *one person from different mothers*'—it is only in relation to other castes that their 'Sapiṇḍa-relstionship can be understood to extend over three degrees only. This same fact is still more clearly stated in the following *Smṛti*—text—'In the case of impurity due to the death of those relations of the Brāhmaṇa who are descendants from the *Kṣattriya*, the *Vaishya* and the *Shūdra*, the purification of the Brāhmaṇa comes after ten days, upto six, three and one stage respectively.'

In the case of the wives of different castes, if the husband is alive, the purification is determined by the time laid down for the husband. To this end it is said—'In the case of birth and death among slaves, and among one's wives of lower castes, the purification would be similar to that of the master or husband, but if the husband is not living, it shall be similar to that of their fathers.'

In place of the fist quarter of the text (instead of the words '*sūtē mṛtē tu dāsānām*'—'in the case of birth and death among slaves') some people read '*asavarṇāsutānām*' ('of sons born of other castes'). If such be the reading, then such Shūdra-sons as live in the house of the Brāhmaṇa-father would be controlled entirely by the ways of the father, and hence their time of purification would be *ten days* in consideration of their father's caste.

The term '*dāsa*,' 'slave', in the text just quoted are meant to be those that have been hired; because for born slaves we have another rule,—viz:—'Artisans, mechanics, female and male slaves, and king's officers have been declared to be capable of immediate

purification'. But this 'purification' should be understood to consist only in their touchability, and not as entitling them to the acts of offering gifts, feeding Brāhmaṇas and so forth ; and the reason for this lies in the fact that all the names here mentioned are such as are based upon *professions*; which gives rise to the following questions—(a) Is the purification here laid down subversive of all the rules that have been laid down before ?—Or (b) does it entitle the man to all acts?—Or (c) does it entitle him to a few of these only? And the conclusion that suggests itself is that the man is entitled to just those acts that may be necessary for the proper carrying out of the King's business. Such also is the usage.

Objection.—"In the present context we do not find any prohibition of touching [how then can the text just quoted be taken as pertaining to *touchability* alone]?"

But in another *Smṛti-text* we read—'The touching of the body is permitted after the bones have been collected;' and also elsewhere—'The Brāhmaṇas become touchable in three or four days; while at birth or death, purification comes in eleven days; in the case of the *Kṣattriya* there is touchability on the sixth or seventh day, ond their food becomes pure in twelve days; in the case of the *Vaishya*, touchability comes on the eighth or ninth day, but their food is pure in a fortnight; the *Shūdra* becomes touchable on the eleventh or twelfth day and the purification of his food comes about in a month.' So says *Hārīta*; and yet another text also—'The touchability of the different castes comes about in three, four, five and six days respectively; the food of the Brāhmaṇa becomes eatable in ten days, and that of the other castes two, three and six days later'.

The several alternatives mentioned in the above texts are to be taken as based upon the exigencies of individual cases, as also upon the higher or lower qualifications of the persons concerned ; e. g. the hired slaves of the Brāhmaṇa remain untouchable for three or four days, while their born slaves become touchable immediately. Similarly. in the case of the other castes also.

Wherever 'immediate purification' is mentioned, there shou ld be bathing with all the clothes on.

As regards the purification of material substances,—all details are going to be explained later on.

Among girls also, the '*Sapiṇḍa-relationship*' extends to three degrees. As says Vashiṣṭha—'For women who have got sons it is known to extend to three degrees.' This limited '*sapiṇḍa*-relationship' in the case of women however refers only to Impurity; as regards *marriage* what its extent should be has been already indicated before.

The final conclusion thus is that the seventh degree is the limit, and the persons up to and including the sixth degree are '*Sapiṇḍas*'. This is what is meant by the words—'*it ceases with the person in the seventh deree.*'

'*The Samānodaka*' *relationship—i.e. the name* '*Samānodaka*'—'*when the oriyin and the name become unrecognisable.*'—'Origin'—'such a person is born in my own family';—'*name*'—'he is descended from the father named so and so, and the grandfather named so & so';—when both these are '*unrecognisable.*' That is, when either of these happens to be unknown, then also, the name in question is not applicable.

In the case of persons within the limits of 'Samānodaka-relationship,' all that people should do is to enter a river or some other water-reservoir, till the water reaches up to the navel,—they should face the south and, having offered water with the right hand upward, without looking back, should return home.—(60)

VERSE (61.)

THUS ALSO SHOULD IT BE AT A BIRTH; BUT THE PARTURIENT DISABILITY ATTACHES TO THE PARENTS ONLY; OR, THE PARTURIENT DISABILITY WOULD ATTACH TO THE MOTHER ALONE, AND THE FATHER WOULD BECOME PURIFIED BY BATHING.—(61.)

Bhāṣya.

The same rule holds good regarding '*birth*' among *Sapiṇḍas.* Just as in connection with death several alternative periods of

impurity have been laid down, in consideration of one's livelihood depending upon the six acts (of giving and receiving gifts and so forth), and also upon the vastness or purity of one's Vedic learning,—exactly the same holds good regarding cases of birth also; all that is meant to be applicable to the case of birth is *impurity* pure and simple, without any qualification of time; so that no specifications being found to be indicated here, the case of birth, through its own inherent aptitude, becomes connected with all that has been said (in the way of qualifications and limitations) in connection with *death*. On the other hand, if the words of the text were taken to indicate the application, to the case of birth, of impurity as specially limited by a particular period of time, then it would be connected only with the period of ten days, which is the principal alternative laid down; and in that case this same period would apply to the case of Vedic Study &c. also. Or, by the closer proximity of the mention of the alternative of the single-day-period, the case of birth would become connected with this latter period only; and thus having its wants supplied by this, it would have no connection with the other alternative periods of 'three days' and the rest. And in that case, even in the face of the limitations and restrictions due to livelihood and study, the present text would lay down the same single alternative in connection with both death and birth, and would, irrespective of all qualifications of the persons concerned, become conditioned by their caste only, and thus become incongruous and opposed to usage.

"Under this explanation, the alternative periods of *three days* and the rest would become applicable also to the women that have been delivered; and this would be contrary to all usage."

The answer to this is as follows:—This would be the case only if what is laid down in the present verse (regarding the delivered woman) were an optional alternative. As a matter of fact however, the rule laid down is absolutely fixed. It is only thus that the use of the term *tu* "*but*" becomes justified.

Then again, the term '*sūtaka*' used in the text does not directly denote *impurity*; it could only indirectly *indicate* the *impu-*

rity as related to parturition (which is what is directly expressed by the word). But through indirect indication it would be far more reasonable to make it express *untouchability*, which is more nearly related to parturition. If all kinds of impurity were meant, then the author would have used the word '*āshoucha*' 'impurity', itself; and the line would have read '*āshaucham māturēva syāt.*' From all this it follows that another *Smṛti-text* having laid down three days (for both parents), and the present text making no mention of any such period, what is here said regarding the 'parturient disabiliy' attaching 'to the mother only' is an optional alternative. So that between the father and the mother the option applies to the father only.

The father becomes pure after having bathed. This is only by way of a prefatory statement; from what follows in the next verse the father also remains untouchable for *three days*. (61).

SECTION—(9)

Other forms of Impurity.

VERSE (62)

THE MAN, HAVING EMITTED SEMEN BECOMES PURE BY BATHING; HENCE, ON ACCOUNT OF SEMINAL FILIATION HE SHOULD OBSERVE IMPURITY FOR THREE DAYS.—(62)

Bhāṣhya.

While laying down purification after three days, the author permits the purification by bathing, which has been spoken of above. If it be asked—"why should this be stated?"—the answer is that it is stated in the form an injunction; by way of a commendatory assertion, and not a regular injunction, just as in the case of the Vedic passage '*jartilayavāgvā va juhuyāt.*'

'*Having thrown out semen*',—after emission during the act of sexual intercourse,—the man becomes pure by bathing.

'*Hence, on account of seminal filiation*';—'*Seminal*' means *pertaining to the semen*;—*filiation* means *begetting of the child*; and in the event of this, why should he not '*observe*'—keep up—'*the impurity for three days.*' The impurity due to child-birth is not of the same kind as that which attaches to the man who has emitted semen and has not taken a bath; in fact it lasts for three days. The period of 'three days' mentioned here is a reiteration of the same as occurring in the preceding verse. For this same reason

the '*upaspṛshya*' in the present verse is taken to mean *bathing* and not merely *water-sipping* ; specially in view of the assertion that '*snāna*, 'bathing,' has been enjoined for the man who has had *sexual* intercourse.

Some people hold that when a son is born to a man, he becomes touchable on that same day. As says Shaṅkha—At the birth of a boy, before the placenta has been severed, there is nothing wrong in the man receiving, on that same day, the gift of sugar, sesamum, gold, cloth, clothes, cows and grain,—so say some': and again—'for this reason that day is sacred, enhancing as it does the pleasure of the forefathers : and because it reminds one of his ancestors, there is no impurity attaching to that day.' In fact some people even go to the length of performing *shrāddhas* on that day. From this it follows that in such cases there is no impurity attaching to the father at all.

In fact the two *Smṛti*-texts just quoted are to be taken as providing optional alternatives, in consideration of the man having, or not having, means of living (other than the receiving of gifts).—(62).

VERSE (63).

THOSE WHO TOUCH THE CORPSE BECOME PURE AFTER ONE DAY AND ONE DAY ALONG WITH THREE THREE-DAY PERIODS; THOSE WHO OFFER WATER, AFTER THREE DAYS.—(63).

Bhāṣya.

'*Three three-day periods*'— i. e. nine days;—along with one day and one night,—make up *ten days*. The period has been mentioned in this fashion in view of metrical exigencies.

'*Those who touch the corpse*'— i. e. those who wash and adorn the dead body. Mere bathing is going to be laid down later on, for the other persons touching the body, as also for those who carry it; as will be made clear from the next verse.

All this refers to the *Samānodaka* relations as also to those who carry the body for wages received. In regard to the carrying of the dead of helpless and forlorn persons, we have another *Smṛti*—text, which says—'For such persons who do the excellent

deed (of carrying the dead body of a helpless man), there is nothing wrong, nor is there any impurity involved, for them it has been ordained that they are immediately purified by bathing in water.'

As regards the assertion of the text under 5. 100— 'He who carries the dead body of a Brāhmaṇa, who is not his Sapiṇḍa-relation, becomes purified in three days'—what this means we shall explain under that verse.

'*Those who offer water*'— i. e. the '*Samānodaka*' relations. In connection with these, 'immediate purification' also is going to be laid down under verse 77. Hence the two should be regarded as optional alternatives.

What is said here is in connection with 'sapiṇḍa' relations and refers to persons not engaged in Vedic study.—(63)

VERSE (64)

THE PUPIL PERFORMING THE 'PITṚMĒDHA FOR HIS DEAD TEACHER BECOMES PURFIED IN TEN DAYS; JUST AS THOSE WHO CARRY THE DEAD BODY.—(64)

Bhāṣya.

'*Pitṛmēdha*'—i. e. the final sacrificial offering; others hold that the term stands for the entire procedure (of the Shrāddha);—performing this, the pupil *becomes purified in ten days.* This same rule applies to the Student also.

'*Just as those who carry the dead body*';—for those who take out the dead body, the period is ten days; and so it is for the pupil also.—(64).

VERSE (65).

IN THE CASE OF MISCARRIAGE, THE WOMAN BECOMES PURE IN SO MANY DAYS AS THERE HAVE BEEN MONTHS; AND THE WOMAN IN HER COURSES BECOMES FIT BY BATHING AFTER THE CEASING OF THE MENSTRUAL FLOW.—(65)

Bhāṣya.

In the case of miscarriage, the purification, that comes after as many days as the months of pregnancy, can pertain only to

the woman: as it is the *woman* that is directly spoken of in the verse. The rule for the purification, in this case, of her Sapiṇḍa-relation has to be sought from other *Smṛtis* and from usage. Vashiṣṭha (4. 34) however has laid down the period of *three days* for all Sapiṇḍas—'In the case of the death of a child less than two years old, and also in the case of miscarriage, the impurity lasts for three days.'

It is regarded as a case of 'miscarriage,' when it happens after three months and before the tenth month; others hold that it is to be so regarded when it happens before the ninth month. What is called '*srāva*' (*lit. flowing out*) here is *discharge before the right time*, and not necessarily the *flowing out* of a liquid substance.

In connection with miscarriage, Gautama also has declared that 'the period lasts for as many days as there have been months' (14-15).

As a matter of fact, children born in the seventh month live; hence if miscarriage takes place in the seventh month, the period of impurity is full (ten days). But this is so only if the child is born alive; otherwise it is to be as many days as there have been months.

For the woman in her courses it has been ordained that she is purified by bathing after the flow has ceased; while another Smṛti text says that she becomes pure in *three days*. On this point the final conclusion is as follows: 'Before three days, even though the flow may cease, she is not pure; while after three days she becomes pure even though the flow may not have ceased.' In the text however, though the term used first is 'becomes pure', we find word '*śuci*' (*sādhvi*) used in connection with the menstruating woman; and this means that so long as the flow has not ceased, she is not *śuci* for participating in the Vedic rites; and it does not mean that she is *untouchable*; as it has been declared that 'the first four days have been condemned.' The construction thus is—'The woman in her courses, on the ceasing of the flow, by bathing, becomes śuci'—i. e., fit for participating in religious rites.

The term 'woman' has been used with a view to include women of all castes; the foregoing verses having been explained as applying to the Brāhmaṇa. The text has used the term 'woman' in this verse with a view to guard against the idea that what is here laid down also applies to the Brāhmaṇa only. In the following verses also, where there is nothing to indicate the restriction of a rule to any particular caste, it is to be understood as applying to all castes; as for instance, the next verse which speaks of 'persons whose tonsure has not been performed.'—(65).

VERSE (66).

IN THE CASE OF PERSONS WHOSE TONSURE HAS NOT BEEN PERFORMED PURIFICATION HAS BEEN DECLARED TO COME AFTER A NIGHT; BUT IN THE CASE OF THOSE WHOSE TONSURE HAS BEEN PERFORMED, PURIFICATION IS HELD TO COME AFTER THREE DAYS.—(66).

Bhāṣya.

The genetive endings in this verse some people explain as having the sense of the Nominative, according to Pāṇini's *Sūtra* 2,3, 65; and in that case the meaning would be—'the person whose tonsure has not been performed is purified in one day;' and it has already been explained that some options in this connection are also based upon the age and condition of the person observing the impurity; and the present verse lays down specific rules in accordance with the general principle there enunciated.

Others, however, explain the genetive ending as denoting relationship; and in this case they have to supply some words; the meaning being—'the Sapiṇḍa relation of persons whose tonsure has not been performed etc., etc.?

This latter view is what is in keeping with usage.

Another Smṛti text has declared immediate purification; and the same text has laid down the exact scope of that rule—'Till the appearance of teeth, it is immediate; till the performance of the Tonsure, it comes after one day; and in the case of those whose Tonsure has been performed, it lasts for three days.'—(66)

VERSE (67)

THE CHILD THAT DIES WHILE LESS THAN TWO YEARS OLD, THE RELATIONS SHOULD, AFTER HAVING DECKED IT, PLACE OUTSIDE, UNDER THE GROUND THAT IS CLEAN AND NOT DEFILED BY HEAPS OF BONES.—(67)

Bhāṣya

The child whose sacramental rites have not been performed, and since whose birth less than two years have elapsed, is called *'less than two years old'*. Such a child, when it dies, *'the relations should place outside'*—the village—*'under the ground,'* that has been dug out.

Another *Smṛti*-text contains the word *'nikhanēt'*, should bury'.

'Having decked'—with ornaments befitting the dead. The *'decking'*, mentioned here in connection with the child *'less than two years old'*, should be understood, on the strength of usage, to apply to those also whose sacramental rites have been performed.

'Clean'—where there are no bones. That is, the ground that is clean by reason of the absence of heaps of bones,—under such a ground should the child be placed. As a rule, the crematorium abounds in heaps of bones; hence what the present text means is that the child should be buried in a place other than the crematorium; and it does not mean that in this case the rite of 'bone-collecting' shall not be performed; because this later fact is already implied by the absence of burning in the case.—(67)

VERSE (68)

FOR THIS CHILD NO SANCTIFICATION BY FIRE SHALL BE PERFORMED; NOR SHALL WATER-OFFERING BE MADE TO IT: HAVING LEFT IT LIKE A LOG OF WOOD, IN THE FOREST, ONE SHALL KEEP ALOOF FOR THREE DAYS.—(68)

Bhāṣya

'Like a log of wood;'—this signifies absence of attachment, indifference.

The meaning is that in this case no *Shrāddha*, nor any water, is to be offered; the prohibition of 'water-offering' implying that of the *Shrāddha* also, through the relation of whole and part. It is thus that we have to get at the omission of *Shrāddha*, which is in accordance with usage.

Others explain this to mean the prohibition of burial laid down in other *Smṛti*-texts. And in this case there would be option.

'*Keep aloof*'—abstain from all religious acts prescribed in the scriptures.—(68)

VERSE (69)

FOR THE CHILD UP TO THREE YEARS OF AGE, THE RELATIONS SHALL NOT MAKE WATER-OFFERINGS; BUT FOR ONE WHOSE TEETH HAD APPEARED, OR WHOSE NAMING HAD BEEN DONE, IT MAY BE DONE OPTIONALLY.—(69)

Bhāṣya

'*Upto three years of age*';—this prohibition applies till the end of the third year; and not from the fourth year upwards. It is in this sense that some people read an '*ādi*', the line being read as—'*trivarṣādēva kartavyā*'. Such also is the ordinary usage.

'*For one whose teeth had appeared it may be done optionally.*'—By association with the 'water-offering', *burning by fire* also becomes permitted.

Objection—"When there is *option*, one may do what he likes; under the circumstances, who would ever have recourse to that alternative which involves much effort and expenditure of wealth? Thus then, the laying down of such a course of action is absolutely useless."

The answer to this is as follows:—What is mentioned here is for the parents, as distinguished from all other persons; the offerings that are made are for the benefit of the deceased; and being of the nature of an 'occasional duty,' it is one that must be done, as we have explained before. So that the option mentioned

in the present verse is clearly understood as containing, on the one hand, the prohibition of a necessary duty ; while, on the other, it permits its performance on the ground of its being beneficial to the deceased. So that if one omits the act, it does not involve the transgression of an injunction ; while by performing it, one confers a benefit upon the deceased ; so that there is no incompatibility between the Injunction and the Prohibition.—(69)

VERSE (70)

ON THE DEATH OF A FELLOW-STUDENT, THE IMPURITY HAS BEEN DECLARED TO LAST FOR ONE DAY. IN THE CASE OF A BIRTH, THE PURITY OF THE 'SAMĀNODAKA' RELATIONS IS HELD TO COME AFTER THREE DAYS.—(70)

Bhāṣya

'*Fellow-student*'—professing the same Vedic Rescension.

'*Samānodaka relations*;'—those meant here are to be counted from the point where the 'Sapiṇḍa-relationship' ceases. Among these, when there is a birth, the impurity lasts for three days.

The option of 'immediate purity' is also laid down in another Smṛti-text, for '*Samānodaka*' relations.—(70)

VERSE (71).

IN THE CASE OF WOMEN WHOSE SACRAMENTARY RITE HAS NOT BEEN PERFORMED, THE MARITAL RELATIONS BECOME PURE AFTER THREE DAYS ; AND THEIR PATERNAL RELATIONS ALSO BECOME PURE ACCORDING TO THE RULE PRESCRIBED BEFORE—(71).

Bhāṣya.

'*Whose sacramentary rite has been performed;*'—*i.e.*, those who have been accepted verbally, but have not been actually married ; at the death of such women, their '*marital relations*'—on her husband's side, &c., &c.

'*Their paternal relations*'—on the father's side—are purified '*according to the rule prescribed before*'—in verse 66 ; *i.e.*, in

three days ; this rule being laid down with reference to a particular caste.

Others have explained the second half as referring to the rule that 'uterine brothers and sisters are purified in ten days' (the word '*sanābhi*' being taken to mean 'uterine'). The view of these persons is as follows :—It has been laid down that a girl should be given away in her eighth year ; so that one who has been given away is not spoken of as 'one whose tonsure has been performed',—just as the 'initiated boy' is not so spoken of; and in as much as no other rule has been laid down, the only right course to adopt is to observe the impurity for *ten days*.

Others again have read (the second half) as—'*ahastvadatta-kanyāsu bālāsu cha vishodhanam*' ; and people have explained this to mean that, even in the case of a girl that remains unmarried till she is nearly fifteen years old, the impurity shall last for one day only; and this on the ground that there is no justification for rejecting the direct injunction and observing a longer period of impurity.

Our answer to this is as follows :—What is the use of the expression '*bālāsu cha*', when it has been already asserted that 'upto the appearance of teeth, the purity is immediate' ? It is not right to have this assertion set aside by the present later declaration ; because the present declaration is a general one, while the former is more specialised. Hence the 'one day' rule, even though laid down, can only be taken as referring to children till the performonce of their Tonsure ; specially as a general statement is always dependent upon (and controlled by) particular ones. For these reasons the suggested reading of the second half of the verse must be rejected as not emanating from the sage. But it may be taken as refering to *touchability*. There is untouchability due to the birth or death of a child, exactly as in the case of grown up men ; and it is only with reference to this that there could be the assertion that—'there is purity (*i.e.*, touchability) after one day in the case of unmarried girls and young children, (*i.e.*, these become touchable in one day)'; and it is in this sense that the Locative ending (in '*bālāsu*' and '*kanyāsu*') be-

comes justified as being the correct one ; since it is a regular case-ending. If the words were taken in any other sense (*e.g.*, as meaning 'at the death of girls and boys, &c.'), it would be necessary to have elliptical construction and to take the Locative ending in the 'absolute' sense :—'girls and boys having died, the purity of those living comes about after one day' ; and we could not get at the sense that the impurity spoken of results from the touching of the dead ; specially as the former (the sense obtained by construing the line as Locative Absolute) has its sphere of application elsewhere, in the case of burial under-ground ; and no *touching* is possible in the case of the body being placed under the ground.

"Since the assertion is a general one, wherefore is it restricted to a particular case.'"?.

As a matter of fact, we find a rule regarding the *sipping of water* in the same connection ; and in connection with this, it is only the said kind of *touch* that is possible. It is for this reason that people do not consider it desirable to touch the child that has touched a menstruating woman ; and this may be regarded as the qualifying factor in the present case ; as has been declared by Gautama in his Smṛti ; it is only right for such a person to set up the fire ; hence it is only right that it should be taken as pointing to the time of setting up the fire.—(71).

VERSE (72.)

FOR THREE DAYS THEY SHOULD EAT FOOD FREE FROM SALINES AND SALTS, SHOULD BATHE, SHOULD NOT EAT MEAT-FOOD AND SHOULD SLEEP APART ON THE GROUND.—(72).

Bhāṣya.

'*Salines and salts.*'—The term '*salines*' stands for nitrate of potash and such substances, and '*salts*' for rock-salt and other salts. These they should not eat,

Or, the term '*saline*', '*kṣāra*', may be taken as qualifying '*lavaṇa*', 'salt.' In that case the prohibition (applying to only *saline salts*) would not apply to rock-salt.

The 'bathing' laid down is to be done in a river or a tank or such other reservoirs of water as are not regarded as specially 'sacred'; and it is to be done without scrubbing the body.

'*Meat-food*'—is prohibited during the period of impurity, on the basis of other *Smṛti* texts; where we read—'They shall not have recourse to women, they shall not scrub their body and they shall not eat meat.' The *Gṛhyasūtra* however says—'For three days they shall remain without food, or still live upon food obtained by purchase.'

"*Should sleep*'—upon the bare platform, without company.

Another Smṛti-text has prescribed abstention from sexual intercourse during impurity due to *births* also.—(72).

VERSE (73).

THIS RULE REGARDING IMPURITY DUE TO DEATH HAS BEEN DESCRIBED IN RREFERENCE TO CASES WHERE THE PARTIES ARE NEAR ONE ANOTHER. IN REFERENCE TO CASES WHERE THEY ARE NOT NEAR, KINSMEN AND RELATIONS SHOULD OBSERVE THE FOLLOWING RULE.—(73).

Bhāṣya.

'*Near*'—*i.e.*, when the relations are close by the place where their kinsman has died.

Others have explained the text to mean that the rule applies to those who were near the man at the time of his death.

'*Kinsmen*'—*i e.*, *Samānodakas*;—'*bāndhava*'—*Sapiṇḍas*.

Others have explained this 'non-nearness' to stand for men who may be living in another village or town.

In the case of these, we have the following rules :—(73).

VERSE (74).

HE WHO HEARS, WITHIN TEN DAYS, OF A RELATION RESIDENT IN A FOREIGN LAND HAVING DIED, SHALL REMAIN IMPURE FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE PERIOD OF TEN DAYS.—(74).

Bhāṣya.

'*Foreign country*'—means *another village*, &c., as before.

'*Vigatam*'—dead.

'*Within ten days*'.—This is only by way of illustration; what is meant is the period of impurity that has been prescribed in each case;—the remainder of that period would be the period to be observed in the special case mentioned. The repeated mention of '*ten days*' is for the purpose of filling up the metre.

The period of impurity due to birth and death is determined by their origin; so that the periods of 'ten days' and the rest are to be counted from the day on which the birth or the death may have taken place, and not from the day on which it may become known to the relations. As a result of this, if the guest happen to know of the birth, &c., having occurred in the house, he should not take his food in that house, even though the master of that house himself may still be ignorant of it. Thus in both cases (of death and birth) the counting is to be done from the day of origination.

Thus those who are subject to impurity for 'ten days' shall remain impure for the remainder of that period; and for those who are subject to a period of 'three days', purification is obtained immediately, by bathing along with all the clothing that may be on them.—(74).

VERSE (75).

IF THE PERIOD OF TEN DAYS HAS ELAPSED, HE SHALL REMAIN IMPURE FOR THREE DAYS; BUT WHEN A YEAR HAS ELAPSED, HE BECOMES PURE BY MERELY TOUCHING WATER.—(75).

Bhāṣya.

In cases where the period of impurity ordained lasts for ten days or more,—if this period has elapsed, the impurity shall last for

KATESWARA U/ TIRUPE

three days. But in cases where the period ordained lasts for three days, or one day, or less,—if this period has elapsed, one has simply to bathe along with his clothes ; as is going to be laid down later—(Verse 77.)

'*When a year has elapsed*'—one becomes pure '*by touching water*',—i.e., by bathing. From what has been said elsewhere regarding 'touching water with the hands and feet &c., &c.', it is clear that the whole body is to touch water : and this is what constitutes 'bathing'.—(75).

VERSE (76).

HEARING OF THE DEATH OF A KINSMAN, OR OF THE BIRTH OF A SON, AFTER THE TEN DAYS HAVE ELAPSED, THE MAN BECOMES PURE BY PLUNGING INTO WATER WITH HIS CLOTHES—(76).

Bhāṣya.

This rule refers to *Samānodaka* relations ; and also to *Sapiṇḍa* ones, but only when the option of three or one day is accepted.

'*With clothes*'—along with his garments.

'*Plunging into water*'—bathing.—(76).

VERSE (77).

IN THE EVENT OF A CHILD, RESIDENT IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY, WHO IS A NON-SAPIṆḌA RELATION, DYING,—ONE BECOMES PURE IMMEDIATELY, BY PLUNGING INTO WATER WTH HIS CLOTHES ON.—(77).

Bhāṣya

'*Child*'—*i.e.* a son that has not yet teethed ;—'*resident in a foreign country*'—'*who is a non-sapiṇḍa relation*'—'*dying*',—all these terms are in apposition.

'*Non-Sapiṇḍa*'—*i.e. Samānodaka.*

When such a person dies while residing in a foreign country, the purification is 'immediate.'

When such a person dies near at hand, then the purification comes after 'three days'—as declared in verse 63 above—(77).

VERSE (78).

IF, WITHIN TEN DAYS, ANOTHER BIRTH OR DEATH HAPPEN TO BEFALL, THE BRĀHMAṆA SHALL REMAIN IMPURE UNTIL THAT PERIOD OF TEN DAYS SHALL HAVE ELAPSED.—(78).

Bhāṣya

Here also the mention of 'ten days' is meant to stand for the period of impurity ordained in each individual case. The meaning thus is that—'before the expiry of the period of impurity ordained for a particular case, if another cause of impurity should come about, then purification comes with the lapse of the remainder of that period; and the second period of impurity is not to be counted from the day on which the cause shall have arisen.' Says Gautama (14·5)—'If an impurity should occur again during the interval, the purification comes with the remainder of the former.'

'Birth and Death' being mentioned in a compound,—and it being not easy to find out in which order of sequence these are to be taken,—and intervention being possible by unlike causes of impurity also,—it is to be understood, on the authority of usage, that what is meant is intervention by a *like* cause of impurity (*i.e.* of impurity due to death by another due to death and so forth). It is in this sense that the use of the term 'another' becomes more justifiably significant.

The term '*Brāhmaṇa*' also is meant to stand for *persons observing the impurity*.

In another *Smṛti-text* it has been laid down that—'if it happens at the close of the night, then it is in two days; and if it happens at dawn, then three days'; and having begun with the statement—'when the Brāhmaṇa dies, the impurity lasts for ten days',—it goes on to say—'if no one dies or is born

in the interval, he becomes pure after the remaining days.' And this takes no account of any distinction between like and unlike sources of impurity.—(78).

VERSE (79).

ON THE DEATH OF THE TEACHER, THEY DECLARE THE IMPURITY TO LAST FOR THREE DAYS; ON THE DEATH OF HIS SON OR WIFE, IT LASTS FOR ONE DAY AND NIGHT; SUCH IS THE LAW.—(79).

Bhāṣya

'*Teacher*', '*Ācārya*', here stands for the *Initiator*;—on his death—the impurity of the pupil lasts for three days.

On the death of the Teacher's son or wife,—it lasts for one day and night.—(79).

VERSE (80).

IN THE CASE OF A LEARNED COMPANION, ONE SHALL REMAIN IMPURE FOR THREE DAYS; IN THE CASE OF A MATERNAL UNCLE, A PUPIL, AN OFFICIATING PRIEST AND RELATION, FOR A NIGHT ALONG WITH THE TWO DAYS (PRECEDING AND FOLLOWING IT).—(80).

Bhāṣya

'*Learned*'—Who has studied the Vedic text.

'*Companion*'—who, through friendship, has been living with one. Or '*upasampanna*' may mean *endowed with good character*.

What has been said before (Verse 70) regarding the case of 'fellow-students' pertains to those who have not yet got up the entire Veda.

In lexicons the term '*upasampanna*' appears as a synonym for 'dead'; but in view of the long period of impurity laid down (which would not be compatible with the case of a *stranger*), the former explanation is the better of the two.

Others construe the text otherwise—explaining it to mean that 'the impurity lasts for three days in the case of the *learned maternal uncle*' and 'for a night along with the two days in the case of the pupil, etc.'

The term '*relation*' stands for the wife's brother, the son of the maternal aunt and so forth.

When we connect the 'maternal uncle' with 'the night along with the two days',—then, since this period would be already applicable to the case of the maternal uncle by reason of his being a '*relation*', the separate mention of him should be taken as making the rule compulsory in his case; and this would mean that in the case of other *relations*, it would be discretionary.—(80)

VERSE (81)-

ON THE DEATH OF THE KING IN WHOSE REALM HE LIVES, IT LASTS TILL THE LIGHT; IN THE CASE OF A NON-LEARNED TEACHER, FOR THE WHOLE DAY; AS ALSO IN THE CASE OF THE (ORDINARY) TEACHER.—(81).

Bhāṣya.

The name '*rājan*' is really applied indirectly to the man of a particular caste as endowed with the qualifications of *anointment* and the rest; that it is so is clear from the clause '*in whose realm he lives.*' In fact when the word signifies the lord of a country belonging to a particular caste, it does so only by indirect indication, and not by direct denotation.

'*Till the light*'—*i.e.*, it continues along with the light. That is, if the death occurs during the day, the impurity lasts during the day only, and it does not go on into the night; similarly if the death occurs at night, it lasts during the night only, and does not extend to the day. The fact that the text has used this peculiar expression—'*sajyotiḥ*', '*till the light*'—in the present context (when *only* day, and *only* night are meant),—is indicative of the fact that whenever the term 'day' or 'night' is used, it

means *both day and night* ; *e.g.*, in verses 5·66 and 5·59. In 5·64 also, where the term 'night' is used in addition to the term 'day', it is added only for the purpose of filling up the metre.

At night, the 'light' is that of fire, as we read in the Brāhmaṇa-text bearing upon the *Agnihotra*—'The night becomes resplendent with the light of fire, not with the light of the Sun.'

In the case of the '*non-learned*'—who does not study the Veda—'*teacher*'—it lasts during the whole day ; it does not extend to the night even when the cause of impurity happens during the night.

"How can a 'non-learned' man be a 'teacher'? In fact it is only one who has learnt the Veda along with its subsidiary sciences that is entitled to do the work of *teaching*."

True ; but a mere *expounder* is also called a 'teacher.' Hence what is meant is that 'in the case of the person who has, somehow, learnt the subsidiary sciences (without learning the Veda) and expounds them, the impurity lasts during the day.' That this must be the meaning is indicated by the fact that there is a distinct rule in reference to the Teacher who is properly qualified, or to the Initiating Preceptor, who is the principal object of reverence.

Some people connect the negative prefix in '*non-learned*' with the term 'teacher'; and explain the rule laid down as referring to 'the learned man who is the teacher of other persons, and bears no relation to the person concerned'. —(81

VERSE (82).

THE BRĀHMAṆA BECOMES PURE IN TEN DAYS, TWELVE DAYS, THE VAISHYA IN FIFTEEN DAYS AND THE SHŪDRA IN A MONTH.—(82).

Bhāṣya

The alternative rules—limiting the period of impurity to 'three days', 'four days' &c.,—have been laid down above, in consideration of the character and learning of the persons concerned ;

and the present verse is added with a view to preclude those alternatives from the *Kṣattriya* and other castes. The mention of 'ten days' in regard to the *Brāhmaṇa* however is a mere reiteration.

In this connection the following question is likely to arise—"What is the text that restricts the period of impurity for the *Kṣattriya* to *twelve days* (or of the *Vaishya* to fifteen days, and so forth) compulsorily, on the strength whereof the present verse is taken as precluding the other alternatives from them?"

This present text itself serves to indicate the time mentioned as applying to those castes. And in the face of this text, the other periods of 'ten' days and so forth, wherever mentioned, are understood to be merely indicative of the period specified for each caste. As a matter of fact, however, even in the presence of the present verse, the mention of 'ten days' need not be taken to be indicative (as just stated). For even though the section as a whole may pertain to all four castes, yet the alternatives mentioned can pertain only to that caste for whom the period of 'ten days' has been laid down. In another Smṛti-text it is with special reference to the *Brāhmaṇa* that it has been asserted that—'the *Brāhmaṇa* may resume Vedic study after one day'; and it is to this that all the other alternatives mentioned in other Smṛti texts have to be taken as optional. In any case, on the eleventh day there is no impurity at all.

The author of the *Vivaraṇa* says that in the present verse special significance is meant to be attached to the use of the term 'day' (and it is the *day* that is meant, as distinguished from the *night*); so that there is no impurity on the tenth *night*; and hence it is only right and proper that invitations to the *shrāddha* on the eleventh day should be issued on the previous day. When a person is going to set up the Fire, the impurity shall be wiped off by the vigil kept during the previous night.

This however is not right. If the term 'day' meant the *day* only, then on the other days also there would be no impurity during the *nights*. It might be argued that those intervening *nights*

would fall within the period of impurity by virtue of the general rule that 'impurity due to death *lasts for ten days*' (5·59). But what is the authority for denying a similar significance to the term 'day' in this context also ?

Is is for these reasons that we have explained that throughout this context the word 'day' stands for the *day and night*. It is for this reason that in the preceding verse, where the day only is meant, we have the epithet '*whole*', '*kṛtsnam*' added to it.—(82).

VERSE (83).

ONE SHOULD NOT PROLONG THE DAYS OF IMPURITY ; NOR SHOULD HE INTERRUPT THE RITES PERFORMED IN THE FIRES ; BECAUSE HE WHO PERFORMS THOSE RITES, EVEN IF HE BE A SAPIṆḌA, WOULD NEVER BE IMPURE.—(83.)

Bhāṣya.

Some people may entertain the following notion :—"The various alternatives that have been laid down regarding the period of impurity extending to three days, &c., all stand on an equal footing with the alternative of 'ten days,'. and their adoption is not regulated by considerations of character and study, etc.; so that the observing of the longer period being open to me, why should I have recourse to the alternative of 'one day', which would entail the trouble of resuming my studies sooner ? I shall have recourse to the alternative of 'ten days', and shall enjoy the pleasure of having nothing to do for a longer period."

It is for the benefit of such a person that the author, moved by sympathy, makes it clear that the optional alternatives are regulated by other considerations ; and that they do not all stand on the same footing. In what way they are regulated has been already shown by us.

If this be not the meaning of the present advice, and if it mean something else,—what possibility would there be of any

prolongation of the period that has been specifically fixed for each individual ? And it is only with such a possibility that there could be room for the advice contained in the present verse. What harm could there be in the author making still clearer what he has already said before (regarding the regulation of the optional alternatives) ?

Some people hold that—even after the prescribed number of days have elapsed, purification is not accomplished until bathing and other rites have been performed ; as it is going to be asserted that 'the *Brāhmaṇa* becomes pure after touching water, etc.' (Verse 98) ; and some one may think that so long as he remains impure he would not incur any sin by the omission of religious duties, and hence he may not proceed to take the bath or other rites ; —and it is in view of such cases that we have the injunction that '*one should not prolong the days of impurity*,'—the meaning being that the stipulated days having elapsed, one should not delay the external purifications.

As regards the assertion that—"the use of the term *day* implies that there is no impurity on the *night* of the tenth day,"—it has already been pointed out that this view is not correct. Says Gautama (14·6)—'If during one impurity another source of impurity should arise, there is purification after the remainder of the former' ; and having said this, he thought that people might be led to think that if the second impurity should arise about the end of the last night, there would be purification after that night, and in order to guard against this he has added—'if it happens about the end of the night, then after two nights' (14·7) [From which it is clear that the last *night* also falls within the period of impurity].

'*Nor should he interrupt the rites performed in the fires.*'—This is said in view of the fact by reason of impurity all the rites prescribed in the *Shruti* and the *Smṛti* become precluded. The meaning is that the rites that are performed in the fires,—such as the Evening-libation and the rest—should not be *interrupted*,—*i.e.*, shall not be omitted. '*Interruption*' means *omission, non-performance.*

But this does not mean that the impure man should himself perform the rites; since it is added—'*he who performs the rites, even if he be a Sapiṇḍa, would never be impure*'; which means that 'even a Sapiṇḍa-relation would not be impure, to say nothing of other persons'; says the *Gṛhyasūtra* also—'They should perform in the house-fire the obligatory rites, with the exception of the *Vaitāna*-rite'; and then—'others would perform these.' This does not refer to the mere offering of libations that is done in connection with the setting up of the fires, but to the performance of the rite in all its details; since it is only for these that the employment of other agents is possible, since the principal libation itself, which consists in offering certain substances, can be offered by the householder himself. Hence the rites that are precluded (during impurity) are those of the *Vaishvadēva-offering* and the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* and other sacrifices. Of other acts, such as the telling of beads, the saying of Twilight Prayers and so forth,—the preclusion of these has nowhere been indicated; and all these are obligatory. Hence what the present taxt does is to permit the performance of other acts; specially as another *Smṛti* text has prohibited such acts as 'the offering of libations and Vedic study.' Thus then, the distinction (as to what acts are precluded and what not) is based upon the obligatory or voluntary character of the acts themselves; specially as the voluntary act tending to the accomplishment of desired ends should never be done, since impurity deprives the man of the title to perform all such acts.

"But the impure man cannot be entitled to the performance of the obligatory acts either."

As a matter of fact, *purity* does not constitute an essential factor in the rites; and though an obligatory act may be done even in a slightly deficient form (due to the lack of *purity*, for instance), such is not permissible in the case of voluntary acts done with a view to definite ends. It might be argued that they also might be performed, on the strength of the present text itself. But this would not be right; for all that the present text permits is getting certain rites performed by proxy; and as this in itself would be a

deficiency, it would be admissible in the case of the obligatory rites only, and not in that of voluntary ones.

With regard to the *Vaishvadēva* offering however, there is a difference of opinion. Some people quote the following *Smṛti*-text—'At a birth or a death, one shall not pour libations into fire, even with dry grains or fruits, nor should he perform any sacrificial rites.'

From all this it follows that one should offer the following:—the Twilight-libations, the *Dūrsha-Purṇamāsa* sacrifices, the Annual *Shrāddha*, the *Shrāddha* offered in the month of Āshvina and so forth. As for the Upākarma, its performance depends upon the lunar asterism and it need not be done on the full-moon-day.—(83.)

VERSE (84).

AFTER HAVING TOUCHED THE CHĀṆḌĀLA, THE MENSTRUATING WOMAN, THE OUTCAST, THE WOMAN IN CHILD-BED, THE DEAD BODY, OR TOUCHER THEREOF—ONE BECOMES PURE BY BATHING.—(84).

Bhāṣya.

The '*divākīrti*' is the *chāṇḍāla*; that it is so is clear from the fact that he is mentioned along with the worst untouchables, and also from the use of the name in the *Mahābhārata*, in course of a conversation between the Cat and the Mouse—'at that time the *Divākīrti* became oppressed with fear' (where it is the *chāṇḍāla* that is clearly meant). It cannot stand for the *barber* here; for the barber is among the touchables, and also because he is one whose food may be eaten (by the *Brāhmaṇa*). As for the rule laying down the necessity of bathing after a shave, this cannot be put forward in the present context, as the bathing in this case is necessitated by the consideration that, while one is shaving hairs are bound to fall on the body, and as, on falling from the body, they are unclean, it is necessary that one should bathe.

'*Tatsprṣṭinam*', '*the toucher thereof*.'—This compound is to be expounded as—'*tasya sprṣṭam, tadasyāsti*'. The men who touch those mentioned above have also got to bathe.

Some people argue that, as the persons mentioned are not all in equal proximity to the term '*tatspṛṣṭinam*,' '*the toucher thereof*,' this refers to the '*dead body*' only, and not to the '*Chāṇḍāla*' and the rest. But others hold that since all are mentioned in the same sentence, and since the term occurs at the end of all the other persons mentioned, all these are present before the mind, and hence referred to by the pronoun '*thereof*'; so that the construction intended is that all the terms up to '*shavam*', '*the dead body*', form one copulative compound, and then compounded with '*spṛṣṭinam*', '*toucher*'; and hence when the term '*the toucher thereof*' comes up, all the things spoken of by all the members of the copulative compound come to the mind. There is, on the other hand, nothing to indicate that the term '*toucher*' is to be connected with the '*dead body*' only ; for the simple reason that it is equally connected with the 'outcast' and the rest also. In fact, all that is clearly indicated is that the term '*toucher*' is connected with some other term that has gone before ; in a copulative compound however, each term is regarded as denoting all the things spoken of ; and hence all these latter are equally closely related to the term '*toucher*'. Another construction that might be suggested is to construe the term 'toucher thereof' with the term 'dead body', and then with the other terms. But in this case, there would be nothing to justify the connection of the term 'toucher' with the 'outcast' and the rest.

From all this it follows that it is only on the strength of usage that a right conclusion can be arrived at.—(84)

VERSE (85).

ON SEEING UNCLEAN THINGS, THE MAN, AFTER HAVING SIPPED WATER, SHALL ALWAYS ATTENTIVELY RECITE THE SOLAR MANTRAS ACCORDING TO HIS INCLINATION, AS ALSO THE PĀVAMĀNĪ VERSES, ACCORDING TO HIS CAPACITY.—(85).

Bhāṣya.

'*Unclean things*'.—Those just mentioned are to be understood as meant here, because of their proximity.

Those *mantras* that are addressed to the Sun are called '*Solar*' and the mantras meant are '*udutyam jātavēdasam, &c. &c.*'

The *Pāvamānī verses.*—The verses '*svādiṣṭayē, &c. &c.*' occurring in the ninth *maṇḍala* of the Ṛgveda.

'*According to his inclination*' and '*according to his capacity*' mean the same thing ; two words have been used for the purposes of metre.

In as much as the 'mantras' and 'verses' are mentioned in the plural, at least three verses should be recited ; and as regards more, they may be recited only if other and more important duties do not suffer thereby. Then again, since the text speaks of '*mantras*,' and the term '*Pāvamānī*' also refers to *verses*, purification is brought about as soon as one has gone beyond three verses, even though the hymn may not be completed.

The *dog* also has to be included among the '*unclean things*'; as it also is *unclean*. In the present context Gautama has declared—'Of the dog also; whatever it might pollute, say some' (14·29—30).

'*Attentively*';—without allowing his mind to wander about ; he should fix it upon contemplating the deity. Or, '*Prayataḥ*' may mean that 'at a time when one is busy with worshipping deities, if he should happen to touch an unclean thing, he should do what is here laid down,—and not otherwise'.—(85).

VERSE (86).

HAVING TOUCHED A FATTY HUMAN BONE, THE BRĀHMAṆA BECOMES PURE BY BATHING, BUT IF IT BE FREE FROM FAT, THEN BY SIPPING WATER AND TOUCHING A COW, OR LOOKING AT THE SUN—(86).

Bhāṣya.

'*Nāra*,' '*human*,'—belonging to man.

'*Fatty*'—*i.e.* Besmeared with flesh, marrow &c.

'*Ālabhya*' means *touching*.

The *touching of the cow* and *looking at the sun* are meant to be optional alternatives.—(86).

VERSE (87).

THE PERSON UNDER INSTRUCTION SHALL NOT MAKE WATER-OFFERINGS TILL THE COMPLETION OF HIS PUPILAGE ; AT ITS COMPLETION, HE BECOMES PURE IN THREE DAYS, AFTER HAVING MADE THE WATER-OFFERINGS.

Bhāṣya.

'*Āḍiṣṭa*' means '*ādēsha*', 'instruction'; and the term '*person under instruction*' denotes the *Student*, by reason of his connection with the instruction that he receives regarding his observances. The present text prohibits the making of water-offerings by one who is still in the state of the Student, to such *Sapiṇḍa* relations as may happen to die *during that period*. As for those that have died before, the offering of water to the forefathers and Gods has already been prescribed for the Student also.

'*Till the completion of his pupilage* ;—*i.e.* till the performance of the '*Samāvartana*' ceremony; and it does not mean any forced completion of the stage in the interval.

On returning after having finished his observances,he shall make a water-offering to each of the dead relations on one day; and he should observe 'impurity' for three days.

As regards the making of water-offering to his mother, this is necessary for the Student also ; and such an offering does not interfere with the proper fulfilment of his observances. In support of this they quote another *Smṛti*-text—*viz.* 'The person undergoing instruction does not commit a wrong in making a water-offering.'—(87).

VERSE (88).

THE WATER-OFFERING IS WITHDRAWN FROM THOSE BORN IN VAIN AND FROM INTERMIXTURE, FROM THOSE WHO ARE ADDCITED TO ASCETICISM AND FROM THOSE WHO HAVE ABANDONED THEMSELVES.—(88)

Bhāṣya.

The term 'born' is to be construed separetely with each of the two terms with which it is compounded. He is said to be

'*born in vain*' who does not worship Gods, Pitṛs or Men; *i. e.* he who does not lead the life proper for any of the four stages of life, even though he is capable of doing so; one who is excluded from all offerings and invitations. Having referred to the man 'who for one year does not lead the life proper for any stage,' the scriptures speak of a great sin attaching to persons doing this for any length of time. This is so because with the exception of the Student and the Renunciate, all the others have to cook food for other people; and it is only cooking for one's own self alone that has been prohibited.

'*Born of intermixture;*'—*i. e.* the *Āyogava*' and other persons born of an improper and inverse mixture of the several castes; that the issue of improper mixtures is meant is indicated by its association with those 'born in vain,' which implies lowness of birth. As regards the issue of legal mixtures, even though these also are 'born of intermixtures,' yet these are not meant here, because they belong definitely to their mother's caste and are entitled to all that pertains thereto. Further, in ordinary usage children of legal mixtures are not spoken of as being of 'mixed origin'; *e.g.* in 10.25, where the issues of 'mixed origin' are described. The term also includes (*a*) the children of such widows as have not been 'permitted' to beget children, born of the intercourse of several men, and (*b*) the children of prostitutes; the children of women begotten by a person other than their husbands are not included in this category, if there has not been intercourse with several men.

Some people hold that this prohibition refers to *Sapiṇḍa* relations who are as described, and not to their sons; while in the case of those who have '*abandoned themselves,*' it applies to their sons also.

This however is not right; as the text makes no distinction among those mentioned.

Asceticisms; *i. e.*, of heretics, such as the '*Bhagala,*' the *Raktapaṭa*' and the rest. That these are meant is indicated by the plural number and by the fact that it is the heterodox heretic alone

that is excluded. These are regarded as 'heterodox' by reason of their observances &c., being different from those of the orthodox ascetics.

'*Those who have abandoned themselves*;'—*i. e.* those who, even before their life's span has been run out, give up their bodies (by committing suicide). [It is only such suicide that is reprehensible]. It is considered quite desirable in the case of old men suffering from incurable diseases given up by the physicians; as has been thus declared:—'If an old man,—incapable of purification and memory, who has passed beyond the reach of the physician's art,—kills himself by falling down from a precipice, or entering into fire, or by fasting, or by drowning in water,—in his case there is impurity for three days; his bones being collected on the second day, on the third day the water offering-should be made, and on the fourth day the *Shrāddha* should be performed'. Suicide is regarded as desirable also in the case of persons suffering from leprosy and such other diseases; as has been said in connection with men who, though still in the Householder's state, have lost all energy,—'Bent upon entering the Great Path, they do not wish to live on uselessly.' That man is called 'devoid of energy' who is incapable of doing purificatory acts, as also saying the Twilight Prayers &c. Then again, in texts deprecating suicide, the words used are—'if one whose body has not been emaciated, or who has not lost all energy, should kill himself &c. &c.'; which implies that it is permitted for those who are not such as here described.

Other Smṛti-texts prohibit the water-offering for other persons also. It has been thus declared—'Those killed by kings, those killed by horned or fanged animals, or by serpents, and those who have abandoned themselves,—to these no *Shrāddha* is to be offered; and water, ball-offerings and other offerings that are made to the dead, all this does not reach them, it becomes lost in the intervening regions. Through fear of popular blame, one should make the *Nārāyaṇa* offering; and for the sake of these also food-grains, along with the additional fee, shall be given.'

Elsewhere again—

'Sinful men meet death from the *Chāṇḍāla*, from water, from serpents, from Brāhmaṇas, from lightning and from fanged animals.'

It is also laid down that—

'For incendiaries, for keepers of baths and makers of ornaments and for professional mourners, there is purification after the performance of two *Taptakṛchchhra* penances. Hence for these no after-death rites shall be performed by others ; even the name of such persons, or of their family, should not be pronounced. For truly fearful is the uttering of the name of such a great sinner, who has gone to the worst hells.'

It is in connection with the acts mentioned here that Samvarta has prescribed the '*Sāntapana*' penance; and Parāshara has laid down the '*Taptakṛchchhra*'; and Vashiṣṭha has prescribed the '*Chāndrāyaṇa*' along with the '*Taptakṛchchhra*'. But these differences may be ignored.

With reference to what has been said above regarding 'the death of sinners' resulting from 'the Chāṇḍāla, from water &c. &c.,' there arises the following question—"Does this rule, regarding the non-performance of the *Shrāddha* and the performance of penance, pertain to the Chāṇḍāla who kills himself intentionally ?—or to one who is killed through carelessness, without intention ? "

Why should this question arise ?

(A) Well, Gautama (14-12) has said—'In the case of those dying from hunger, by a weapon, by fire, by poison, in water, in prison, or from a precipice,—it is only when it is unintentional.' While in the verse just quoted it is said simply, without any qualification 'Those dying at the hands of the *Chāṇḍāla* &c.' And on account of the necessity of reconciling this with what has been said in the other *Smṛti* text regarding the case of 'dying in water' &c., it must be '*intentional* death' that is meant. And the idea

arises that by reason of 'association,' the same should be the case with the others also.

(B) On the other hand, the verse quoted uses the term 'sinful'; and all sinful act has been prohibited; he who does what is prohibited is called 'sinful'. And a man becomes the 'doer' of an act through his own initiative, as also through the urging of another person. Now, death 'from lightning, and the fanged and horned animals' could never belong to the former category (*i.e.* this could never be *intentional*); and no one is ever urged by others to such death; nor are these means of dying employed by suicides, as holes, water and sword etc., are, and it is only if these were so, and the man were to kill himself by having recourse to these, that he could be the 'self-sufficient agett,' of the act of 'dying.' The truth therefore is that the man who comes by such death is understood to have been sinful in his previous life,—as is learnt from the scriptures; just as the possession of 'black teeth' and the rest. If it be asked—'what is the use of this fact of the man's having been sinful in the past being indicated?' But in the case of persons with deficient limbs etc., their previous connection with sin is clearly indicated; and the expiatory rite to be performed in the case has been laid down by Vashiṣṭha, as consisting, in the case of some men, of the performance of two *Kṛchchhras*, and in that of others, of something more.

(C) In reality however, the suicide having died, can have nothing to do with the performance of any rites. Or, if he be regarded as having commited a grievous sin, then, any person who may have entered into any kind of relationship with him—marital, or friendly, or sacrificial,—would also have to be regarded as *sinful*. But such is not the usage of cultured men. For

as a matter of fact, people having relationship with suicides are not looked down upon in any way; nor do they perform any expiatory rites.

From this it follows that what is meant is *intentional* death.

(D) Some people, having read, in another *Smṛti text*, the words—'those killed by cows and Brāhmaṇas etc.'—read the words 'those who have abandoned themselves' apart by themselves, and seem to take up an entirely different position.

From all this (A, B, C and D) there arises the above-mentioned doubt—as to what is the right view.

The right view is that *intentional suicides* are what are meant;—why?—because of their being spoken of as 'sinful.' The man who intentionally proceeds to set into activity the causes leading to his own death, wilfully disobeys the law that 'no man shall by his own desire, cut off his life-span;' and it is only right that such a transgressor should be spoken of as 'sinful.'

"But it has been said and pointed out above that the causes of death spoken of do not resemble the sword and other things used by suicides; so that the intentional killing of oneself could not be meant."

Our answer to this is as follows:—If a man does not guard himself against a danger, he is regarded to be as good as having brought it upon himself. So that if a man wanders about alone in a forest infested with *chāṇḍālas* and robbers,—even though he may not have the wish that they should kill him, yet—there is disobedience of scriptures on his part, since he acts in a way that invites danger, and he does nothing to avert that danger. Similarly with the man who goes to swim in the river, or enters a boat of doubtful capacity rowed by incompetent boatsmen. Under such circumstances, if by the loss of vigour, or by the turning over of the boat, the man should happen to die, it would be only right to regard him as having committed a sin.

On the contrary, if persons were to bathe in water, whose depth they have duly ascertained by means of sticks etc., and of the presence wherein of alligators and other animals they are ignorant,—and were to be carried away by any such animals, no blame would attach to them. Similarly if one gets into a boat, which is well-fastened, and rowed by capable rowers, and proceeds to cross a swift stream,—if, on the sudden rising of a strong wind, the boat happen to be tossed on a whril-pool and capsize, and the man become drowned,—he would not have transgressed the scriptures at all. Similarly again, if one did not carefully avoid places known to be infested with snakes, and being bitten by a snake were to die, he would have acted sinfully; not otherwise. Similarly if one does not run to a safe distance, on seeing a sharp-horned cow or an elephant, and become killed, he is rightly regarded as sinful. Similarly again if, when it is raining heavily and lightning is flashing, if one wanders about in desolate places and does not take shelter in a village or town,—his action is reprehensible. While if the lightning should, by chance, happen to fall upon a man who is in the village, there would be nothing sinful on the part of the man. For these reasons it is always right and proper that the man should do all that has been laid down (for his safety).

The prohibiting of 'water-offerings' should be taken as applicable to all kinds of after-death rites; for such is the view propounded in another *Smṛti*-text.-(88)

VERSE (89).

ALSO FROM WOMEN, WHO HAVE JOINED A HERETIC, WHO BEHAVE TOO FREELY, WHO HAVE INJURED A CHILD IN THEIR WOMB OR THEIR HUSBAND, AND THOSE WHO DRINK WINE—(89).

Bhasya.

One who has renounced the scriptures and has taken to wearing such things as the human skull, red garments and so forth, on the basis of hetorodox theories of life and morals, is a '*heretic.*' Those women who have '*joined*', such a person,—*i.e.*

who have adopted his distinguishing marks and are under his control.

'*Those who behave too freely.*'—When a woman renounces the customs and usages of her family, and allowing free scope to her desires, has recourse to one as well as several men,—her behaviour is called 'free.'

The 'injury' to the husband consists in giving him poison etc.; and that to the child in the womb consists in abortion.

'*Those who drink wine;*'—*i.e.* those who drink what is prohibited.

On this subject some one makes the following observations:—

"The prohibition of wine-drinking is found in the words '*brāhmaṇo na pibēt surām*', ('the Brāhmaṇa shall not drink wine'); and though the words apply to all members of the caste, yet the particular gender used is indicative of the fact that the prohibition applies to males only, and not to females. Though both the male and the female belong to the same caste, yet there is a distinct difference between the masculine and feminine genders. So that when the text uses the masculine form '*brāhmaṇaḥ*', what possibility is there of the prohibition applying to the female, who is not mentioned at all? For instance, when it is said that 'for the sake of a son one should make the *Brāhmaṇī* drink' a certain substance, it is not understood to mean that the *male* Brāhmaṇa should be made to drink it. In the same manner when a text makes use of the masculine form, what it asserts cannot be predicated of females. It is true that in some cases, significance is not meant to be attached to the particular gender used;—*e.g.*, in the text 'the Brāhmaṇa should not be killed', where the prohibition is understood to apply to the killing of the *female* Brāhmaṇa also. But what happens in this latter case is that the direct signification of the Accusative case-ending marks out the '*Brāhmaṇa*' to be the predominant factor by reason of his being what is most intended to be 'got at' by the preadicate; and as a rule in the case of the predominant factor no

significance is attached to the gender, or the number or any other factor, except what is expressed by the basic noun itself. *E.g.* the injunction 'wash the cup' is not taken to mean the washing of only *one* cup. In the case under discussion, however, the prohibitive text is in the form '*Brāhmaṇēna surā na pēyā*' ('wine shall not be drunk *by the Brāhmaṇa*'), where the '*Brāhmaṇa* appears as the Nominative, and as such, an accessory in the fulfilment of the act denoted ; so that in the case of the prohibition in the form—'The Brāhmaṇa shall not drink wine'—also, the nominative being denoted by the verb (with its conjugational ending), is expressed by the basic noun ('*brahmaṇa*') and comes to be taken as something conducive to the fulfilment of the act denoted by the verb ; so that the nominative ending in this text is to be construed on the same lines as the Instrumental in the proceding text ; and it has to be taken as a subordinate factor. And in connection with a subordinate factor, all that is expressed by the word has to be taken as significant ; for instance, in the case of the text '*pashunā yajēta*', ('sacrifice with an animal'), it is the *male* animal that is always sacrificed (and this on account of the Instrumental ending marking out the *animal* as the subordinate factor)."

Our answer to the above is as follows :—In such cases as the one under consideration whether a certain thing form the predominant or the subordinate factor is not determined by the Accusative or Instrumental case-ending, but upon its being or not being already known. That is to say, what is not already known, that alone can form the subject of the Injunction, and this is to which due significance is meant to be attached ; and this for the simple reason that it is denoted by a word which can have no other denotation ; while what is already known from other sources, and is mentioned for the sake of the Injunction, has to be taken as subserving the purposes of the Injunction in exactly the same form in which it has been denoted by the previous word. In the sentence 'the Brāhmaṇa should not be killed', all that the Injunction directly signifies is the *prohibition* of the act of killing, and everything else (mentioned in the sentence) is such as is already

known from other sources. Even so however, due significance has to be attached to what is expressed by the basic nouns (in the sentence), as otherwise, their very use would come to be meaningless. But the gender, the number and other elements, which are denoted by the case-endings,—it is just possible that these are used simply because they are invariable concomitants of basic nouns (which cannot be used by themselves without a case-ending); and hence sometimes these latter are meant to be significant, sometimes not. As regards the killing of the Brahmaṇa, no man requires to be urged to do it by an Injunction; as he is urged to it by his own hatred of the man he kills; and all men are, by their very nature, prone to do this act. But as regards the *prohibition* of it, unless it were directly enjoined, it could not be got at by any means; specially as it could not be obtained from any other source. So that, since it is not in any way conducive to the fulfilment of an act, nor is it the qualification of anything so conducive, hence, even though it were to be included under the nature of man, it could not be connected with the context. Consequently, for the purpose of connecting it with the context it is necessary to attribute to it the character of the *topic*; and when the prohibition in question has been made the topic of the Injunction, it is no longer necessary to make the denotation of the verb the topic. Thus then, the topical character having been wrested by the Prohibition, what is denoted by the verb naturally loses that character. The performance of the act (denoted by the verb) is such that its performance is secured through ordinary tendencies (of men); so that for its own accomplishment it does not stand in need of being embraced by any Injunction; and all that it needs is the capacity (and desire) of the man to do the act; and this, act of *killing*, being got at by other means of knowledge, establishes the man's capacity for doing the act; so that it is through a qualification of the man that it becomes correlated with the sentence. Thus it is quite in keeping with the theory of words denoting only correlated entities. The act, along with its qualification, thus not forming the topic of this Injunction, man's tendency to it has to be explained as being due to ordinary wordly

causes. As a matter of fact, in the case of killing, such tendency and motive power is present, in the form of the man's passion; and certainly no restrictions of gender or number pertain to passion; or the activity might be due to the man's hatred.

From all this it follows that the word, whose denotation does not form the topic of the Injunction, on the ground that it is already known, renounces its denotative power and indicates a sense that is determined by other means of knowledge. And in as much as gender and number are not, even by import, signified by the word, how can any significance be attached to them? It being necessary to speak of what is denoted by the basic noun, it has to be spoken of with the help of some number and it cannot be used entirly by itself; and it is for this reason that gender and number are added.

On the point at issue thus the conclusion is as follows:

The man, who has determined to take upon himself the character of the agent of the act of killing, is urged (by the prohibition) to what is signified by the negative word. So that in a prohibitive sentence, no significance need attach to the use of the Accusative ending, which therefore may be ignored. Even sentences where we find the Instrumental Ending, or even the Nominative—*e.g.*, 'wine shall not be drunk by the Brāhmaṇa', or 'the Brāhmaṇa shall not drink wine',—what is denoted by them being already got at from other sources, they do not form topics of the Injunction; and hence they are taken as spoken of only by way of reference. In the case where the Accusative comes in as a qualification of the motive, the Nominative and the Instrumental endings are always taken along with the Accusative. Even when the Accusative is directly used, that which is not already known from other sources forms part of the enjoined (predicate), and, as such, is regarded as duly significant; for example in the case of such texts as '*bhāryām upagachchhēt*' ('one should have recourse to his wife'), '*apatayam utpādayēt*' ('one should beget a child') [where due significance attaches to the

singular number in 'wife' and 'child']. The 'wife' is not a a thing acquired in the ordinary worldly manner; as she can be acquired only by means of the marriage-rites. Nor is it a thing that has been definitively described in an Injunction, which would strictly restrict it to what is enjoined therein ; as there is in the case of such texts as—'*āshvinam gṛahṇāti*' ('holds the cup dedicated to the Ashvins'), '*maitrāvaruṇam grāhṇāti* ('holds the cup dedicated to Mitra-Varuṇa'), and '*dashaitānadhvaryur-gṛhṇāti*' ('the Adhvaryu holds these then') [where the exact character of the cups has been prescribed by the texts laying down the dedication], and the cups taken up are of the precise number mentioned in the texts ; consequently, their number being known, they become connected with the injunction of the *washing*, in sequential accordance with that number. Now in this case, there being no other sentence, and the sentence in question itself being the originative injunction, there are no grounds for rejecting the directly expressed *number* ; so that any rejection of what is expressed by the self-sufficient denotative power of words could proceed only from the mind of man. Similarly in the case of the text '*pashunā yajēta*' ('one should sacrifice with an animal'), the Injunction pertains to the *sacrifice*, which is of the nature of something to be accomplished ; so that when we proceed to seek for the means by which it could be accomplished, all that is mentioned in the injunctive text, qualification and all, comes to be regarded as the object of the Injunction ; specially because the function of the Injunction cannot be regarded as having been fully fulfilled only by the laying down of what is signified by the root '*yaji*', 'to sacrifice' ; why, then, should not the words be taken in the sense that is indicated by their own denotation as helped by the denotation of other words connected with them ?

Persons versed in the science of "Pramāṇas" however regard the text as a self-sufficient Injunction ; and in this they only repeat what has been said by other people. What we have said is easily understandable ; and it does not demand any very keen acumen to grasp it. It is the very essence of things. The

science is useful only so far as the Injunction is concerned ; anything more than that is a mere show of learning, a purely exaggerated description. Such description is of use only in a case where the Injunction does not supply all the information needed ; as for instance, in the case of the injunction regarding the "laying of pebbles ', there being several articles such as butter, oil, salt and the like, that are helpful towards wetting,—it being doubtful as to which of these is to be used in the wetting of the ' pebbles ', it is the description (of Butter as ' longevity itself ') which leads to the conclusion that Butter should be used. Or again, in the case of the '*Ratri-sattra* ', the performance of sacrificial rites during the night being unheard of anywhere else, the subsequent description of the ' men obtaining honour ' helps to indicate the propriety of such performance by one who is desirous of acquiring honour or fame. In the case in question however the sentence (which in Adh. 11, verses 92 *etc.* prohibit wine for the Brāhmaṇa) is complete in all respects, at the mention of ' *Brāhmaṇas* ' ; so that all needs having been fulfilled, the only purpose served by the description is ' commendation.' It might be argued that what is said under 11-96 is treated on the same footing as the assertion that ' the sinful man comes by accomplished happiness ',—so that the prohibition of wine-drinking comes to have a footing, though a partial one, as referring to the *male* only. But there would be no force in this ; because *females* also are entitled to partake of the butter and other substances, which have been left after the offerings to the Gods have been made ; and they are permitted to recite Vedic texts also at the Darsha-pūrṇamāsa and other sacrifices ; such texts, for instance, as ' *vidēyakarmāsi*, &c., &c.' Even such Injunctions as ' one should make the performer of *Shrāddhas* drink wine ' indicate that wine is permitted for women.

Nor is any such distinction (between *male* and *female*) made in the case of ' Brāhmaṇa-killing.' So that upon the question here raised, the final conclusion is that the prohibition of wine-drinking pertains to the whole caste—(89).

VERSE (90).

THE STUDENT, CARRYING HIS OWN DEAD TEACHER, OR TUTOR, OR FATHER, OR MOTHER, OR MONITOR,—DOES NOT SUFFER IN HIS OBSERVANCES.—(90).

Bhāṣya.

Some people think that the term '*his own*' qualifies the Teacher' only; and it serves to exclude the Teacher's Teacher, ;ould be thought of as deserving the same treatment, according o what has been said above under 2.205.

Others again explain 'his own' as standing for one's *elations.*

But in this latter case, it would seem unnecessary to mention he 'father' and the 'mother.' But it may be explained as em- hasising the obligatory character of the rule as regards these articular *relations.*

'*Monitor*', '*Guru*',—is one who has been described in 2·149.

There is no harm done to his observances by carrying the lead body of these persons; and what the text means by this pecification is that there is interference in the observances by the arrying of the dead bodies of persons other than these—(90).

VERSE (91).

ONE SHOULD CARRY THE DEAD SHŪDRA BY THE SOUTHERN GATE OF THE CITY; BUT THE TWICE-BORN PERSONS BY THE WESTERN, NORTHERN AND EASTERN GATES RESPECTIVELY—(91).

Bhāṣya.

The term '*City*' stands for the village &c. also.

This rule applies to those places where there are several gates; the advice pertaining to such persons as may be capable of following it.

The *Shūdra* has been mentioned first, because it is an inauspicious subject. And this reversal of the order indicates that the term '*respectively*' indicates that the *Vaishya* should be

carried by the western, the *Kṣattriya* by the northern and the *Brāhmaṇa* by the Eastern gate.—(91).

VERSE (92).

THE TAINT OF UNCLEANLINESS DOES NOT ATTACH TO KINGS, OR TO THOSE KEEPING A VOW, OR TO THE PERFORMERS OF SACRIFICIAL SESSIONS ; BECAUSE THEY OCCUPY THE POSITION OF SOVEREIGNS AND ARE EVER OF THE NATURE OF BRAHMAN. - (92).

Bhāṣya.

Though the term '*rājan*', 'king', is denotative of the *Kṣattriya-caste*, yet, on account of the reason being stated in the words that 'they occupy the position of sovereigns', it follows that it indicates the ruler of countries. This we shall explain fully under the next verse.

'*Those who are keeping a vow*;'—*i.e.*, those who are observing a vow, and undergoing such penances as those of the '*Chāndrāyaṇa*' and the like.

Performers of sacrificial sessions ;'—*i.e.* those who are performing the '*Gavāmayana*' sacrifice, or those who have been initiated for the other sacrifies also. Says Gautama (14·1)—'For sacrificial priests, for one who has been initiated and for the Student.'

In support of this we have the laudatory statement (in the second line). '*Position of Sovereigns* ;'—*i.e.*, the kings—'*occupy*,'—maintain,—the '*position*'—place—'*of sovereigns*'—of rulers of men ; and the other two—the keepers of vows and performers of sacrificial sessions—have attained the character of Brahman.

'*Taint of uncleanliness*'—*i.e.* impurity.

Others have explained the term '*Sattriṇaḥ*' to mean persons who are constantly making gifts. But in its primary denotation, the term refers to a particular form of sacrifice.—(92).

VERSE (93).

IMMEDIATE PURIFICATION HAS BEEN ORDAINED FOR THE KING ON THE MAJESTIC THRONE ; AND THE REASON FOR THIS LIES IN HIS OCCUPYING THAT POSITION FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE PEOPLE.—(93).

Bhaṣya.

'*Majestic*'—*i.e.* that seat whose character is grand, glorious ; this 'majesty' consists in the fact that it is seated upon this throne that the man is enable to carry on the work of protecting the people ; and herein lies his sovereignty over men. This is what is meant by the clause—'*and the reason for this lies in his occupying that position*' ; and what this means is that mere caste does not entitle the man to the consideration that the rule implies ; what entitles him to it is his work of protecting the people. The term '*āsana*', '*position*,' also does not mean here a *seat* or a *couch* ; it stands for the duties incumbent upon one who takes his seat upon it. It is for this reason that the older writers have explained the present rule to mean that there is no impurity in the case of any person who is capable of protecting the people, even if he be a *non-Kṣattriya* by caste.

'*For the purpose of protecting the people.*'—The meaning of this is that all the observances relating to impurity are not to cease, but only those that would be incompatible with the proper fulfilment of his duty of protecting the people ; for example, the giving of food-grains out of his granary during times of scarcity, and so forth, the performance of rites for the allaying of celestial, atmospheric and terrestrial portents. Further, it becomes incumbent upon the king to attend to such business as may be brought up suddenly by gentlemen ; or, when it becomes necessary for him to speak out for the purpose of settling disputes and religious doubts that may arise among twice-born persons in the higher stages of life.—(93).

VERSE (94.)

ALSO IN THE CASE OF THOSE KILLED IN A RIOT OR BATTLE OR BY LIGHTNING OR BY THE KING ; AND OF THOSE WHO HAVE DIED FOR THE SAKE OF COWS AND BRĀHMAṆAS ; AS ALSO FOR THE PERSON FOR WHOM THE KING DESIRES IT.—(94).

Bhāṣya.

'*Ḍimba*', '*Riot*', is fighting done by many people, without weapons ; '*Āhava*' is battle.

In the case of persons killed in these, there is immediate purification.

'*Lightning*'—This has been already explained.

'*Pārthiva*'—the lord of the Earth, who may belong to any of the four castes.

Also in the case of one who, even apart from battle, has been killed in water, or by tusked animals,—for the sake of cows and *Brāhmaṇas*.

'*Also for the person for whom the King desires it ;*'—*i.e.* the person who has been deputed by him to do a definite work.

Question :—" Why should this be so ? In the case of the king himself, immediate purification has been ordained only in reference to his work of protecting the people ; how then could the impurity of any and every person, without any restriction, cease merely by the king's desire ? "

[The answer to this is supplied by the next two verses]. —(94).

VERSE (95).

THE KING HOLDS IN HIMSELF THE BODY OF THE EIGHT GUARDIAN DEITIES OF THE WORLD, OF THE MOON, THE FIRE, THE SUN, THE WIND, INDRA, THE LORD OF WEALTH, THE LORD OF WATER, AND OF YAMA.—(95).

Bhāṣya.

'*Body*' here stands for a portion of their effulgence.

'*Lord of Wealth*'—Vaishravaṇa, Kubēra.

'*Lord of Water*'—Varuṇa.

To the same end we have also a second laudatory declaration in the next verse.—(95).

VERSE (96).

THE KING IS POSSESSED BY THE LORDS OF THE WORLD ; NO IMPURITY, THEREFORE, HAS BEEN ORDAINED FOR HIM ; FOR THE PURITY AND IMPURITY AFFECT MORTALS AND HAVE THEIR ORIGIN AND END IN THE WORLDLY REGIONS.—(96).

Bhāṣya.

The king is possessed by the said Lords of the World ; for him there is no purity or impurity ; because the effect of these is only upon mortals ; and their origin and end proceed from the world ; hence they affect mortals, and not the Lords of the World.—(96).

VERSE (97).

FOR ONE WHO IS KILLED IN BATTLE WITH BRANDISHED WEAPONS, IN THE MANNER BEFITTING THE KṢATTRIYA, SACRIFICIAL PERFORMANCES BECOME INSTANTLY COMPLETED ; AND SO ALSO IS THE IMPURITY ; SUCH IS THE ESTABLISHED LAW—(97).

Bhāṣya.

'*Shastra*', '*weapon*', is that by which people are slain, killed ; hence by the present rule, also for the man who is killed by pieces of stone or a club or such other things, sacrificial performances become completed.

'*Āhava*', 'Battle', is so called because in this men are *challenged* (*āhūyantē*) to fight, through mutual rivalry.

'*Manner befitting the Kṣattriya* ;—*i.e.* never turning his back,—fighting in the defence of his people, or under orders from his master.

'*Sacrificial performances*'—such as the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and the rest ;—'*become instantly completed*'—finished. That is, the man becomes endowed with the merit proceeding from the due performance of the sacrifices.

Impurity also in their case is the same ; *i.e.* it ceases immediately.

Some people construe the term '*sadyaḥ*', '*instantly*', with the word '*killed*' ; and according to this what is said here would apply to the case of only that man who actually dies on this battle-field, and not to one who is moved away from there and dies on some other day.

This point however is open to question.—(97).

SECTION. (10)

Means of Purification.

VERSE (98).

THE BRĀHMAṆA BECOMES PURIFIED BY TOUCHING WATER; THE KṢATTRIYA BY TOUCHING HIS CONVEYANCE AND WEAPONS; THE VAISHYA BY TOUCHING EITHER THE GOAD OR THE LEADING-STRINGS; AND THE SHŪDRA BY TOUCHING THE STICK,—AFTER HE HAS PERFORMED THE RITE—(98).

Bhāṣya.

After the completion of the prescribed period of impurity—of ten days, &c.—there is something more that has got to be done.

'*Touching Water*' stands for *bathing*, as we have already explained before.

'*After he kas performed the rite.*'—This goes with the *Kṣattriya* and the other two that follow; and the 'rite' meant is only *bathing*, noue other being found to have been prescribed. The meaning thus is that, 'having bathed, they should touch the conveyance and other things.'

Others however explain the term '*rite*' as standing for the *Shrāddha ceremonies*; the meaning being that all become pure after having performed the *Shrāddha-ceremonies*, but the *Brāhmaṇa* after he has 'touched water', and the *Kṣattriya* and the rest after touching the conveyance and other things.—(98).

SECTION. (11)

Impurity in the case of persons beyond the pale of Sapinda relationship.

VERSE (99).

O BEST OF BRĀHMAṆAS, THUS HAS BEEN DESCRIBED TO YOU THE PURIFICATION NECESSSARY IN THE CASE OF 'SAPIṆḌA-RELATIONS.'—(99).

Bhāṣya.

The two halves of this verse are meant to serve respectively the purpose of recapitulating what has gone before and introducing what is to come.—(99).

VERSE (100.)

A BRĀHMAṆA, HAVING CARRIED, LIKE A RELATION, A DEAD BRĀHMAṆA WHO IS NOT HIS 'SAPIṆḌA' RELATION,—OR THE NEAR RELATIVES OF HIS MOTHER,—BECOMES PURE IN THREE DAYS.—(100).

Bhāṣya.

'*Like a relative*',—i.e., from a religious motive, and not on payment of wages.

'*Near relatives of his mother*':—the term 'near' is meant to include such close relations as the maternal uncle and the like. From this it appears that the term '*non-sapiṇḍa*' here stands for those who are not '*samānodaka*',—and not only for all except *sapiṇḍa*-relations.—(100).

VERSE (101).

BUT IF HE EATS THEIR FOOD, HE BECOMES PURE IN TEN DAYS; IF HOWEVER HE DOES NOT EAT THEIR FOOD, HE IS PURIFIED IN ONE DAY, IF HE DOES NOT DWELL IN THAT HOUSE.—(101).

Bhāṣya.

If he does not eat food, but dwells in the house, then the impurity lasts for three days, as already laid down before. But if

he does not eat food, nor dwells in the house, then it lasts for one day only ; while if he eats the food, as well as lives in the house, then it lasts for ten days.—(101).

VERSE (102).

HAVING VOLUNTARILY FOLLOWED A DEAD PERSON, WHETHER HE BE A RELATION OR NOT, HE BECOMES PURE BY BATHING WITH HIS CLOTHES ON, TOUCHING FIRE AND EATING CLARIFIED BUTTER.—(102).

Bhāṣya.

'*Following*'—going after, intentionally. If he happen to follow it by chance, then he need not bathe with clothes on.

Bathing, *Touching of fire* and *Eating of clarified butter*,—all these *collectively* are the means of purification.—(102).

VERSE (103).

ONE SHOULD NOT HAVE A DEAD BRĀHMAṆA CARRIED BY A SHŪDRA, WHILE HIS OWN PEOPLE ARE THERE. FOR IT WOULD BE AN OBLATION INTO FIRE, DEFILED BY THE TOUCH OF THE SHŪDRA, AND AS SUCH NOT CONDUCIVE TO HEAVEN.—(103).

Bhāṣya.

'*Have carried*'—have taken out.

'*While his own people are there*'—i.e., men of the same caste.

The use of the term '*oblation into fire*' implies that the body should not also be burnt by the *Shūdra*.

The specification of the 'Brāhmaṇa' is not emphasised ; for the *Kṣattriya* and the *Vaishya* also the Shūdra's touch is defiling ; hence what the supplementary statement indicates is that the prohibition applies to the case of these two also.—(103).

SECTION. (12)

Means of Purification for Corporeal Beings.

VERSE (104).

WISDOM, AUSTERITY, FIRE, FOOD, CLAY, MIND, WATER, SMEARING, WIND, ACTION, THE SUN AND TIME ARE MEANS OF PURIFICATION FOR CORPOREAL BEINGS.—(104).

Bhāṣya.

'*Wisdom*' and the rest are mentioned only by way of illustrating the purification by lapse of time; the sense being—'just as these are the means of purification within their own spheres, so is *Time* also, and the efficacy of this latter should not be doubted.'

Of the several things mentioned here, what is efficatious under what circumstances shall be explained in the present context itself; and the efficacy of other things shall be described in particular places.

'*Wisdom*—spiritual knowledge; such as is taught by the *Sāṅkhya-Yoga*. This serves to set aside Ignorance, and removes attachment and other impediments, whereupon wisdom becomes free from all defects. This is what is going to be described under 108, where it is said—'Intellect becomes purified by wisdom.'

'*Austerity*;'—the *Kṛhchhra*, the *Chāndrāyaṇa* and the rest. This serves to remove the taint of major and minor sins.

'*Fire*'—is the means of purification of earthen-ware vessels and such other things as have been mentioned as being 'purified by re-baking' (121).

'*Food*;'—i.e., the eating of such pure things as milk and roots. This also serves to purify in the same manner as Austerity.

The fact of '*clay*' and '*water*' being the means of purification is well-known. That of the '*mind*' is going to be described under 108.

'*Smearing*;'—i. e. cleaning and whitewashing with such things as cowdung, lime and the like.

'*Wind*'—purifies pieces of grass and wood lying on the roads, which happen to be touched by the *chāṇḍāla* and such others.

'*Actions*;'—e. g., the saying of Twilight Prayers and such other rites. It has been decleared under 2-102 that 'one should stand saying the morning prayers, thus he removes the sin committed during the night';—what this means we have explained under Discourse II.

Though 'Austerity' also is an 'action', it has been mentioned separately for the purpose of emphasising its importance. In fact, in the śrciptures 'Austerity' is generally mentioned separately; e. g. in Yājñavalkya, Āchāra 221—'*Karmaniṣṭhāstaponiṣṭhāḥ*' —(104)

VERSE (105)

AMONG ALL MODES OF PURIFICATION, PURITY IN REGARD TO WEALTH HAS BEEN ORDAINED TO BE THE MOST IMPORTANT; FOR HE WHO IS PURE IN REGARD TO WEALTH IS REALLY PURE, AND HE IS NOT PURE WHO IS MERELY PURIFIED BY CLAY AND WATER.—(105).

Bhāṣya.

"What is the connection of this in the present context?"

What is meant is that—'just as one who, after having paid the calls of nature, immediately betakes to purifying himself by clay and water,—so whenever, through carelessness and mistake, one happens to steal what belongs to others, or to do any such act,—he should immediately betake to the necessary expiattory rites, for the purpose of purifying himself';—as is going to be explained under Discourse 11.—(105).

VERSE (106).

LEARNED MEN BECOME PURE BY TOLERANCE ; BY LIBERALITY THOSE WHO HAVE DONE WHAT SHOULD NOT BE DONE ; SECRET SINNERS BY THE REPEATING OF SACRED TEXTS; AND BY AUSTERITY THOSE WHO ARE WELL-VERSED IN THE VEDA.—(106).

Bhāṣya.

Those who are learned are purified by tolerance ; they are never affected by hatred, jealousy or ill-will ; hence even when sin is rampant, they remain ever pure. 'Tolerance' is the property of the Mind which consists in having the same consideration for all.

Of 'liberality' also the efficacy in removing the sin of doing what sought not to be done has been described under 11.139, where it is declared that 'murder is wiped off by charity'.

In the section dealing with 'secret sins' also it has been declared that for the expiation of secret sins, one should repeat the sacred texts.

For persons well-versed in the Veda, '*austerity*'; which, in their case, consists in repeating the Vedic texts and also cultivating knowledge; as it has been declared that—'for the Brāhmaṇa, learning is the real austerity' (11·235). As regards the '*kṛchchhra*' and other penances, they are means of purification for all men, not only for those versed in the Veda.—(106).

VERSE (107).

WHAT NEEDS PURIFICATION IS PURIFIED BY CLAY AND WATER ; THE RIVER IS PURIFIED BY ITS CURRENT ; THE WOMAN OF UNCLEAN MIND BY MENSTRUATION ; AND BRĀHMAṆAS BY RENUNCIATION.—(107).

Bhāṣya.

When the banks of a river with water shallowed down becomes defiled by unclean things, its water becomes purified by the current of the same river, when it has regained its current strong

enough to demolish its sides. The banks of rivers are not purified in the manner in which other ground is purified "by means of five things" (Verse 123).

Or, it may be that the text has declared that 'the river is purified by its current' in view of the idea that people may have in regard to the river having become defiled on account of unclean things flowing along its current; and the meaning is that it should not be thought that, inasmuch as the river has become contaminated by the flowing along of unclean things coming from all sides, it can never become pure.

The woman who has not been found to have had carnal intercourse with any man, but continues to think of the beauty and good qualities of other men, is regarded as '*of unclean mind*', and such a woman becomes purified by '*menstruation*'; i.e., ; by the flow of blood during her courses.

'*Renunciation*' shall be described in Discourse VI, and by this are Brāhmaṇas purified. And no mere mental process removes the sin that they, in their ignorance, may have committed in the shape of having entertained thoughts for the killing of small insects and so forth.—(107).

VERSE (108).

THE LIMBS ARE PURIFIED BY WATER; THE MIND IS PURIFIED BY TRUTHFULNESS; THE SOUL PROPER BY LEARNING AND AUSTERITY; AND COGNITION IS PURIFIED BY KNOWLEDGE.—(108).

Bhasya.

The 'personality' entitled to the performance of acts consists of the following factors—(1) The person himself, i.e, the Inner Soul, (2) the Internal Organ, i.e., the mind, (3) the Intellect and (4) the Body, the receptacle of experiences. The Sense-Organs being material, do not constitute a separate factor. Of these factors some are purified by one thing, and some by other; the statement that 'Time purifies everything' being purely valedictory.

'*Limbs*,' standing for the parts, indicate the *whole*, the *body*; the sense being that 'by water'—i.e., by bathing—'the body becomes purified.'

The 'mind'—described (in Discourse I) as consisting of 'the existent and the non-existent'—becomes contaminated by evil intentions; and it becomes pure by '*truthfulness*'—i e., by good intentions. In a previous verse (104) the mind has been spoken of as a 'means of purification'; but that has to be taken in an indirect sense; and the present text can not mean that 'words' (truthful) are the means of purifying the mind; and the Shruti also speaks of 'the *word* being prompted by the Mind, whence the word uttered by one who is absent-minded becomes fit for demons and not for the gods.'

'*Learning*'—produced by the proper study of the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta;—and '*austerity*'—in the form of the *Kṛchchhra* and the rest;—when endowed by these the 'soul proper' becomes purified. The term—'*bhūta*' (in the compound '*bhūtātmā*)' means *proper*, *real*; i.e., that which is really the soul, the object of the notion of the 'ego' as free from the notion of 'I', and not the material entity consisting of the *body*.

'*Buddhi*' is '*cognition*'—which is regarded as contaminated when it appears in the form of a thing that is non-existent, or when it does not take any account of the distinction between the real form of the thing cognised and the apparent form in which it is cognised when, during dreams and such conditions, it is obsessed by wrong notions of things;—or '*Buddhi*' may stand for that faculty of the personality which is the product of the unexpiated portions of his past misdeeds, and which may, by virtue of each single sin committed in the past, beset that personality in the form of Ignorance, appearing in the shape of the notion of diversity, or in the shape of the non-discrimination between the Soul and the material attributes, which operates in the form of attachment to children, wealth and such things, and becomes the source of extreme longings.—This '*Buddhi*' becomes pure by '*knowledge*;'—i.e., proper understanding of the means of cognition as

indicating the self-luminous character of all cognitions. *Cognition* is distinct from the *Object cognised*, by reason of the latter having a shape, and it being impossible for the former to become modified into that shape ; and hence it becomes purified by the conviction that it is, by its very nature, unmodifiable.

The term 'learning' in the previous clause stands for the *knowledge of what is taught by the Veda* ; and its capacity for purification is of the same kind as described under 11.246—'as the fire, in one moment, etc.'

Being purified in the above manner, the person reaches the regions of Brahman. Such is the four-fold purification. And what is intended to be expressed is eulogy of such purification as leading to the fulfilment of the highest ends of man in the matter of his births and other ciruumstances.—(108).

SECTION—13.

Purification of Substances.

VERSE (109).

THUS HAS BEEN EXPLAINEED TO YOU THE RULE REGARDING BODILY PURIFICATION; LISTEN NOW TO THE RULE REGARDING THE PURIFICATION OF VARIOUS SUBSTANCES.—(109.)

Bhāṣya.

'*Of various things*;'—i.e., of substances that are used by man, in the form of products that are igneous, earthy, liquid, solid, isolated, compact.

This verse points out the difference of what is going to be described from the purification described above. In the foregoing Section the most important purification was shown to be that of the Soul, that of substances deserving attention only because of their being used by the personality; while in the present section the reverse is the case.

'*Listen to the rule*'. This verse is meant to avoid the two sections being comfounded.—(109).

VERSE (110)

OF IGNEOUS SUBSTANCES, OF GEMS AND OF EVERYTHING MADE OF STONE,—THE PURIFICATION HAS BEEN ORDAINED TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BY MEANS OF ASH, BY WATER AND BY CLAY.—(110)

Bhāṣya.

The name '*Igneous substances*' is applied to all those substances that melt at the contact of fire; e. g. silver, gold, copper, iron, lead, zinc and so forth.

'*Gems*'—things of the nature of the rock-crystal.

'*Ashma*' is *stone*; and what is made of it is called '*ashmamaya*'.

'*Sarvasya*,' '*of everything*.'—This has been added for filling up the metre; the justification for it being found in there being two kinds of stone—that quarried from mountains and that obtained from river-beds.

'*By ash*';—since both *ash* and *clay* serve the same purpose, they are to be regarded as optional alternatives; while 'water' is meant to be used along with each of these two.

"What is the use of these?"

The removing of stains and smells. It has been declared that—'the purification of the unclean thing consists in the removal of its stains and smell';—and again 'so long as from the object besmeared with an unclean substance, the odour and stain do not pass off &c. &c.'

Both ash and clay are, by their very nature, non-greasy; hence purification is brought about by these in the case of oily effects.

The 'purification' of the 'impure' thing consists in making it fit for use by removing its defects.

"If this is so, then it should be necessary to describe in detail the impurity attaching to things—in some such form as 'such and such a substance becomes *impure* when in contact with such and such a substance'.—'But these are worldly things; and all this would be known from ordinary usage.'—Not so; because from ordinary usage, the thing is known only in a vague general form. Further' in ordinary usage what is called 'impure' is only what has become disgusting by being contaminated by urine, ordure and blood; while what is meant by 'impure' in the present context is that which is *unfit for touching* &c.; and it is only from the scriptures that it could be learnt whence this unfitness arises. Then again, a man is called *pure* when he does not fall into a mistake in regard to what belongs to others. From all this it is clear that no useful purpose can be served from what is thus known, from ordinary usage, regarding the signification of the term in question. Though it is generally known that what has been contaminated is *impure*, yet it cannot be known by what particular thing a certain thing becomes contaminated.—'But

how can the exact signification of a term be ascertained from scriptures, when, as a matter of fact, what the scriptures provide is the knowledge of *what should be done*, and not the meaning of a certain word, which latter is what is done by the work of Pāṇini; that this is so follows from the fact that the *Smṛtis* of Manu and others are based upon the Veda (which deals only with the Duties of Man)'.—Our answer to this is as follows :—In the case in question, we do infer an injunction in the form—'one should not make use of a substance that has become contaminated by such and such a substance' ; and there would be nothing incongruous in the notion that the substance by whose contact the thing becomes unfit for use is the cause of contamination. Similarly as regards *purification* also, we can recognise its basis in some such injunction as—'when a thing has become contaminated, it may be used after it has gone through the prescribed process of washing &c.' ; and yet such an injunction would not mean that 'purification should be done'. For if it did this, then, he who would not do it would incur sin. What happens is that in the case of ordinary secular acts, it being possible for the man in need to make use of any kind of vessels, pure or otherwise,—the Scripture lays down the restriction that 'if need arises, one should make use of such vessels, and not of others'.—'If it is to be treated as a *restriction*, then it would be incumbent upon only one who seeks prosperity ; and every other man would be free to do as he chose ; just as in connection with the question of the correct forms of words, though the correct and incorrect forms are both equally expressive, yet there is the restriction which indicates that the use of the correct form brings merit, while that of the incorrect form is sinful [and this means that only people seeking merit need use the correct form].'—This would be true only if there were no text prohibiting the use of *unclean* vessels. But when there is such a prohibition, how could anyone make use of the vessel that has not been purified ? As for the rules regarding purification, these only represent exceptions (to the prohibition of unclean vessels, the meaning being that if the unclean vessel has been purified, it may be used). How then could there be any

prosperity arising from what is a mere *exception* ? Since all that it means is that if one acts according to the exception, he does not incur the sin of transgressing the prohibition.

" Or again, the Smṛti may be taken as dealing with the explanation of the meanings of words,—resembling the Smṛti that deals with the correct and incorrect forms of words. As for the notion that 'the works of Manu and others have their basis in such Vedic texts as deal with the subject of what *ought to be done* ', we ask—who has said that this is so ? As a matter of fact, our presumption of the basis for the assertions of Manu and others depends upon the merit of each individual case. For instance, in the case of the *Aṣṭakā*, which is of the nature of a *rite*, we presume its basis in the form of a Vedic text enjoining what *ought to be done*; but in a case where the assertion deals with things as they really exist, the corresponding basic text also must be of the same kind, dealing with an accomplished entity. As regards the subject of the exact meanings of words, the idea regarding the priority of a particular denotation may always be derived from usage ; as in this matter there is no question of anything *to be done*. In the case in question however (where there *is* a question of something *to be done*), it is not possible to derive any knowledge from mere usage. Specially because *purification* being something that can be brought about only by means of Vedic texts, how could it ever be made dependent upon usage ? If it were, then all injunctions on the subject would be absolutely futile.—' But we have such injunctions as that of Pāṇini, to the effect that one should make use of correct, and not incorrect, forms of words' (where also there is no act to be done, nothing to be brought into existence).'—This is not Pāṇini's injunction at all; all that his rule says is 'this is correct, not that' ; though it is true there is a rule like what has been quoted in the works of the authors of the *Dharmasūtras* all this may be learnt in detail from the *Abhidhānāsara*).—' In this Smṛti itself we find such injunctions as that—(1) claimants to property shall divide it in such and such a manner, or that (2) the eldest brother shall take four shares (9·153), or that (3) the eldest brother shall take &c.

&c. (9·105). The proper denotation of the injunction has been declared to extend to *directing* and other factors also. In fact the denotations of the words are in the form of *injunctions* and *direction*, and other factors are only supplementary to the injunctions ; for in all these cases the notion derived from the words is in the form of *urging to activity* (towards a certain end).'—But what sort of *urging* could there be in the case (1) of causes and effects, or (2) of the pronouncing of blessings, or (3) of *opportunity* (all which are sometimes expressed by the injunctive affix) ? Nor could the *taking* (of the four shares, mentioned in the texts just quoted) form the object of an injunction ; since it is what is liable to be done by reason of the eldest brother being desirous of taking all he can.—' But the desire of the eldest brother would lead him to take his own as well as the other brothers ' shares, and hence the said injunction serves to restrict what should be taken by each.'—As a matter of fact however, there being no possibility perceptible of any one demanding more than his prescribed share, there is no room for any restrictive injunction.—' Well, on account of the prohibition, the text may be taken as a preclusive injunction.'—This would be all right ; but in that case, if at the time of division itself, any of the brothers were to take something in excess of his prescribed share, with the acquiescence of his brothers, he would be incurring sin, even though the permission of the brothers would be there. Nor could the text be taken as indicating the man's ownership over a certain share of the thing concerned ; because the coming into existence of ownership has been already mentioned in the injunction of *receiving* one's share ; and what the prohibition does is to point out that over everything else, apart from the prescribed share, the man has no rights of ownership. But even so, if one were to transgress this prohibition and take possession of an excessive share, his ownership would certainly come into existence. It is for these same reasons that ownership has been held to be produced even by *stealing* and such acts. And for the time, apart from possession, no such idea is entertained as that this man has no ownership over the thing.

"Thus then, it being found that the text in question cannot be taken either as an Injunction, or a Restriction, or a Preclusion, all that the *dividing* means is the apportionment of the shares —'so much is the share of this person and so much of that.' Consequently the injunctive in '*vibhajēran*', 'should divide', must indicate *opportunity*; and that the term 'should take' only refers to what actually happens in ordinary worldly practice; just as in the injunction 'the hungry man should eat', or 'for the sake of the acquisition and safe-guarding of his property one shall seek the help of the king.' Gautama has distinctly enumerated (in 10·39) the sources of ownership as—'Inheritance, purchase, &c., &c.'

"Thus then, since we have such direct Smṛti-injunctions as those of the *Aṣṭakā* and the like (which are something *to be done* and hence fit subjects for injunction), what is said in them regarding Impurity and Purity can only be taken as laying down something that is entirely of a sanctificatory character; and since this also has its basis in a (Vedic) Injunction, it may be regarded as prescribed by that injunction itself. So that it is only from the scriptures that it can be determined what is *impurity* and what is *purity*. For this reason it is necessary that the nature of impurity also should be fully explained."

Our answer to the above is as follows:—This has been explained under 135 below, where 'fat, semen, &c.,' of men have been mentioned as constituting 'impurities'; and the specifying of 'men' is only illustrative, as is clear from other *Smṛti*-texts, of all such animals as the dog, the cat, the ass, the camel, the monkey, the crow, the village-hog, the village-cock, the rat, the jackal and other carnivorous animals and birds, also nailed animals and the mungoose; and 'fat' and the other things include also the *flesh* and the *hair*.

What is meant by the declaration of 'purification' (in the present verse) is that whenever the substances mentioned become contaminated by urine and such things they have to be sanctified in the manner laid down; and this need not be done when they are to be used in their natural condition. Because gold and other

things are not *impure* by their nature,—when alone they could need purification whenever they would be used.

Or, the verse may be taken as laying down the purification in connection with a visible act, but with a view to an invisible (trancendental) result: just like the laying down of the rule that 'one should eat facing the East.'

In this latter case however, the mention of 'purification' would be incongruous.

As for the ordinary clearing and washing of vessels before eating, those are done on account of usage, and not by virtue of the Smṛti-rule regarding purification (which pertains to only such articles as have become defiled by the touch of the unclean thing).

As regards the other things that are 'untouchable' by man—such, for instance, as the *Chāṇḍāla* and the like—or garlic, onion, wine, meat and so forth,—these also are sources of defilement of substances.

What particular form of purification shall be used in the case of the contamination by what unclean thing,—for this it is necessary to look out for usage and other Smṛti-texts. Details on this point have been supplied by Hārīta, Āpastamba, Parāshara and other sages; but all these passages we have not quoted here, for fear of having to write too much, in the manner of the philosophical writer Chandragomin.—(110).

VERSE (111).

A GOLDEN VESSEL, FREE FROM STAINS, BECOMES PURE BY WATER ALONE; SO ALSO WHAT IS PRODUCED IN WATER, WHAT IS MADE OF STONE AND WHAT IS MADE OF SILVER, IF IT IS NOT ENCHASED (OR VERY MUCH DEFILED).—(111).

Bhāṣya.

This rule applies to two particular metals, gold and silver, when they are free from stains; as for other metals, copper and the rest, their cleansing is to be done with washing with powdered

bricks and such things, just as in the case of their being defiled by leavings of food. There is no stain in a vessel in which milk or water has been drunk. As regards the case where parts of the vessel become stained by the leavings of meat, butter, milk and such things, the author is going to lay down distinct means of cleansing—'By that from which they sprang &c.' (113). Then again, since the text has spoken of the removal of 'smells and stains', we should make use of such cleansing substances as may be capable of removing a particular stain; and it is not necessary to make use of ash and water in all cases. Hārīta mentions several such cleansing substances, as 'powdered wheat, rice, peas, barley, kidney-bean and lentil'; and he proceeds to say—'even when gold and silver vessels are not stained, if they have been touched by a Chāṇḍāla, or by a menstruating woman, they should be cleaned with ash twenty-one times.'

Shaṅkha however has declared thus—'Of metal vessels defiled by a dead body or blood or semen or urine or ordure, there should be either alteration or scrubbing or washing twenty-one times with ash'. There should be 'alteration' in the case of vessels long immersed in urine &c.; 'alteration' means the destruction of the original name and form and the bringing about of another shape and name;—'scrubbing' means scratching with a sharp weapon or with stone.

Another Smṛti-text has prescribed '(1) melting, (2) heating and (3) hammering.'—When the vessel has been put into the melting-pot by the goldsmith, it becomes pure;—'burning', i.e., being put into fire by goldsmiths;—'hammering', i.e., heating and then placing on the anvil and hammering, in the melting-pot;—it being declared that 'all mines are pure.'

'*What is produced out of water*'—the conch-shell, the rock-crystal and the like. For the *stained* conch-shell there is purification by the paste of white mustard, or by cow's-urine and water, or by milk. We read in another *Smṛti*—'The couch-shell is purified by water; if it is defiled and oily, then by milk and water, and by the paste of white mustard.'

'*Anupaskṛtam*' '*enchased*', i.e., the chasings in which are not filled (with unelean things), not very much defiled. This goes with every one of the things mentioned ; hence in the case of every one of these being defiled with the touch of dry unclean things or of the chaṇḍāla and the like,—even though there be no stain,—the purification is to be as described before, in accordance with other Smṛti-texts.—(111).

VERSE (112.)

GOLD AND SILVER SPRANG OUT OF THE UNION OF WATER AND FIRE ; FOR THESE REASONS THE PURIFICATION OF THESE TWO IS BEST DONE BY MEANS OF THEIR SOURCE.—(112.)

Bhāṣya.

This is a purely commendatory description.

In the series of commendatory passages beginning with the words '*agnirvai varuṇam*' and ending with '*abhyākāmyata*', the origin of gold and silver has been described ; the meaning of which is that—'Agni approached Varuṇa, i. e., water, in the manner of a male approaching a female, and had sexual intercourse with it, and out of this sprang gold and silver.'

For this reason the purification of these is done by means of their 'source' ; i. e., by fire when there is much defilement, and also by water.

Another reading is '*Sayonyā*' ; in which case the meaning is 'by that which has the same source as themselves', i.e., by ash. And in accordance with this view cleansing by means of clay is also sometimes permitted.

The '*purification is best done*'.—(112).

VERSE (113).

OF COPPER, IRON, BRASS, PEWTER AND TIN, THE PURIFICATION SHOULD BE DONE, ACCORDING TO SUITABILITY, BY MEANS OF ALKALINE SUBSTANCES, OF LIQUID ACIDS AND OF WATER.—(113).

Bhāṣya.

'*According to suitability*'.—According to what may be suitable

to a particular thing; i.e., that substance should be used for cleaning which is best fitted to remove the dirt from the object to be cleaned. It is for this reason that in another *Smṛti* we find it stated that—'things made of tin and lead are to be cleansed by means of cow-dung and chaff.' Similarly—'Brass-articles smelt by the cow, or defiled by the food-leavings of the Shūdra, or defiled by dogs and cows become cleansed by means of alkaline substances.' It is with a view to this that we have the various varieties of alkalines, such as those prepared out of gruel, or of pomegranates and so forth.—(113).

VERSE (114).

FOR ALL LIQUIDS, PURIFICATION HAS BEEN DECLARED TO CONSIST IN THROWING OUT A LITTLE; FOR SOLIDS, IN SPRINKLING; AND FOR WOODEN ARTICLES, IN SCRAPING.—(114).

Bhāṣya.

'*Liquids.*'—Substances that have the tendency to *flow*; e. g., clarified butter, oil, gruel and so forth; when small quantities of these,—not more than a seer—are defiled by the cow and other things,—their purification is done by means of '*utpavana*',—i.e., the removal or throwing away, of a portion of the original contents. In another *Smṛti*-text it has been declared as follows:—'Utpavana is done by means of two blades of Kusha, with the hymn—'*pavamānaḥsuvarjanaḥ*, &c.'

Others have explained '*utpavana*' to mean 'make to overflow'; the meaning being that another similar substance is to be poured into the defiled liquid till the vessel becomes filled to overflowing and a portion of the liquid flows out.

What is here prescribed is to be done in the case of direct contamination.

In the case of small quantities, the liquid has to be thrown away.

When, on the other hand, it is the vessel that is contaminated—and there is no direct defilement of the liquid itself—it should be removed into another vessel. In the case of liquids becoming

contaminated by the contact of food-leavings, it has been declared 'clarified butter should be placed in water and Vedic mantras recited'; and it is clear that the things have to be poured into another vessel, which latter is to be placed in water; for if the oil itself were placed in water, it would not remain fit for use. Similarly in the case of clarified butter also.

The said '*utpavana*' is meant for *liquids*. But when liquids come into contact with urine and other unclean things, to this extent that their own odour and colour cease to be perceptible,—they have to be thrown away.

As regards such liquids as have been boiled, Shaṅkha has prescribed *re-boiling* also.

This same purification pertains to even urine and other unclean liquids, when they are to be used by the Shūdra and others. But in this case '*utpavana*' would mean only 'overflowing'. As Vashiṣṭha has said—'for things on the ground it is like water'.

'*Solids*'—hard substances; such as cooled clarified butter, curds, sugar-candy, cakes and the like. In the case of these, if the portion that is defiled is thrown away, the remainder becomes purified. Shaṅkha has declared—'In the case of dry substances, by the removal of contamination'.

Or, the term '*samhatāḥ*' may stand for things composed of several components; such as, couch, seat, bed and the like, which are composites, composed of homogeneous as well as heterogeneous constituents.

But in all cases, purification is obtained by the removal of contamination.

In the case of contact with a dead body, or with unclean things that have dried up, that part which has come into direct contact with such things is to be washed and the rest of the thing is to be sprinkled with water.

In the case of *wooden articles*—i. e., things made of wood

only, such as a seat, a board and the like made of wood—if these are contaminated by the touch of a dead body, or a *chāṇḍāla* or Shūdra,—there should be *scraping*.

Others hold that scraping is to be done only when the thing touches *Ordure*; in which case, the stain and the smell have got to be removed by scraping, and the rest of the thing is to be washed and sponged with clay and water.

On contamination by a dog and such things, there should be washing, as in the case of *ordure*.

In the case of the wooden bed and such things made up of wood and ropes &c. (and not of wood *only*), purification is secured as in the case of 'solids' or 'composites'.—(114).

VERSES (115—116.)

DURING SACRIFICIAL PERFORMANCE THERE SHOULD BE CLEANING OF THE SACRIFICIAL VESSELS; THE PURIFICATION OF SPOONS AND CUPS IS ACCOMPLISHED BY WASHING;—(115)

THE PURIFICATION OF THE 'CHARU', THE 'SRUK' AND THE 'SRUVA' IS DONE BY MEANS OF HOT WATER; AS ALSO OF THE 'SPHYA', THE WINNOWING BASKET, THE CART, THE PESTLE AND THE MORTAR.—(116).

Bhāṣya.

These two verses are to be taken as citing examples in illustration of what has been laid down in the *Shruti*.

When the cups, the spoons and other sacrificial vessels have been used in one performance, they become smeared with clarified butter and other offering-materials employed at that performance; and with a view to avoid the contamination of the fresh performance by such stains and smearings, these have to be removed by means of hot water; and this cleansing has to be done in the manner prescribed for each case: sometimes by hand, sometimes by kusha-grass, sometimes by the threads at the end of one's garment, and so on.

The purification here mentioned is in connection with sacrificial performances; in the event of the vessels becoming defiled

with food-leavings etc., the cleaning is to be done in the same manner as in the case of ordinary vessels. In as much as we have the Vedic declaration—'they do not become unclean by Soma',—it is understood that in the case of other defilements, the ordinary purification is to be done.

The exact shapes of the '*graha*' the '*chamasa*' and the '*sphya*' are to be ascertained from persons versed in sacrificial lore.—(115—116).

VERSE (117).

OF GRAINS AND CLOTH, IN LARGE QUANTITIES, THERE IS SPRINKLING WITH WATER; AND IN SMALL QUANTITIES, THEIR PURIFICATION HAS BEEN ORDAINED TO BE SECURED BY MEANS OF WASHING WITH WATER.—(117).

Bhāṣya.

Grains are declared as to be regarded to be 'in large quantities' when they are more than one '*droṇa*' in weight (about thirty-two seers). Others hold that they are to be regarded as 'much' in relation to particular men and to particular time and place; e.g., for one who is in a poor condition, even a '*kudava*' (a quarter seer) may be 'much'; similarly under certain conditions, grain is regarded as 'much', only when there is a large accumulation. Says Baudhāyana (*Dharmasūtra* 1-5-47)—'One shall employ the method of purification after having duly considered the place, time, the man himself, the substance, the use to which it is going to be put, its origin and condition.'

Some people would apply the same rule to *cloth* also.

Though things have been declared to be 'many' when they are three and more, yet, since the text has used the *plural* number in the term '*alpānām*', '*those in small quantities*', we take it that upto (and including three), they are to be regarded as of 'small quantity'.

'*With water*' (in the second time)—This is purely illustrative; hence the cloth is to be washed with that liquid which may be able to remove the contamination that has defiled it. This has

been already explained before. The term '*sprinkling*' has been used for the purpose of emphasising the use of water, the sense being that 'the sprinkling is to be done with *water* only.' It is on account of this difference that the term '*with water*' has been used twice.

If even by washing the stain in the cloth does not go, then that much of it should be cut off, or the whole should be cut off,—as laid down by Gautama (1—33).—(117).

VERSE (118).

THE METHOD OF PURIFYING LEATHER AND TREE-BARKS IS SIMILAR TO THAT OF CLOTHES; AND FOR VEGETABLES, ROOTS AND FRUITS, THE PURIFICATION IS LIKE THAT OF GRAINS.—(118).

Bhāṣya.

'*Leather*',—i. e., goat-skins and such other skins as are touchable; and not the skin of the dog, the jackal or such animals as are by their nature unclean.

The same rule holds good regarding also things made of the said leather, in the shape of shoes, armour and the like.

In the present context, wherever the original constituent cause is mentioned, it includes the product also; and *vice versa*. So that the rule laid down in connection with 'wooden articles' is applicable to *wood* also. Vashiṣṭha, having described the purification of wooden articles, proceeds to speak of 'wood, bone and earth'; and if the cause did not include its product, how could the author apply the purification (prescribed for *wooden articles*, and not for *wood*) to the *wood*? In fact the inclusion of the product by the cause is only right, since the notion of the latter does not certainly cease in regard to the former.

'*Vaidala*' stands for the *bark of trees* and other like things.

In another *Smṛti*-text this same purification in laid down for feathers, *kusha*, skins, *chowries*, grass, cane, hair, and tree-bark'—Here 'feather' stands for the *peacock's feathers*, and things made of them, such as umbrellas, hair ornaments and so forth;—the term '*pavitra*' stands for *kusha*, and also for cloth made of

kusha;—the term '*grass*' stands for *palm-leaves*; according to the assertion that 'the palm is known as the *king among plants*'; and the part of the wood (i.e., '*ṭṛna*', which is part of '*ṭṛṇarāja*') denotes the whole, like the term '*deva*' denoting the name '*Dēvadatta*';—'*hairs*'—i. e., of the cow, the horse and the goat, not of man; as the latter, when fallen from the body, are untouchable; for in the present context all the purification mentioned pertains to cases where a thing has been defiled by the touch of another substance, and not where the thing is unclean by its very nature; that this is so is indicated by the fact that exactly the same purification has been laid down for cloth and grain.

Vegetables have to be dealt with in the same manner as grains. That is just as *sprinkling* and *washing* are the means of purifying grains, while they are still in the form of grains, and have not undergone embellishment by means of *thumping* and the like acts,—so also are they for the purifying of vegetables also. Hence the present rule pertains to *uncooked* vegetables only. As for *cooked* vegetables, even though they are spoken of as 'vegetables', yet some other method of purification has to be found for them; as it has been said—'by clean water and by the flame of fire' and so forth. For vegetables taken out of large heaps, as also for gruel, cow's milk and the rest, *sprinkling* and *heattng on fire* have been specially laid down by Hārita;—and similarly, for all grains in pods, scrubbing and pounding and so forth.

All this is for the purpose of removing all doubts in the event of their being touched by foot, as it has been said that 'all things in large quantities are pure.'—(118).

VERSE (119).

OF SILKEN AND WOOLEN STUFFS, BY MEANS OF SALINE EARTH; OF BLANKETS BY SOAP-BERRIES; OF 'AMSHU-PAṬṬA,' BY THE BEL-FRUIT; AND OF LINEN BY WHITE MUSTARD.—(119).

Bhāṣya.

'*Uṣa*' is *saline earth.*

The '*soap-berry*' and other things mentioned are well-known.

When the stuffs spoken of are stained by an oily substance, they have to be rubbed over with the powder of the things mentioned, and then washed.

'*Silken-stuff*', '*kausheya*', is a particular kind of cloth ; so also the '*amshu-paṭṭa*' ; the '*āvika*', is *woolen stuff*. In connection with this latter *Hārīta* has declared that 'woolen articles are purified by the sun.' But this should be understood as pertaining to such stuffs as are constantly worn, and hence come into contact with the bodies of several persons ; and not when they have become defiled by foreign contamination.

By reason of all these being 'cloth', it might be thought that 'sprinkling and washing' would be the means of purifying them ; and the present text prescribes the methods for moving the stains of oil, &c.

'*Kṣauma*', '*Linen*', includes *jute stuff* also. (119).

VERSE (120).

THE LEARNED MAN SHOULD PURIFY CONCH-SHELLS, HORN AND THINGS MADE OF BONE AND TUSK, LIKE LINEN ; AND BY COW'S URINE OR WATER. (120).

Bhāṣya.

The 'bone', 'horn' and 'tusk' meant are those of the touchable animals,—the cow, the sheep and the elephant,—and not of such animals as the dog, the ass and the like.

'*Water*' and '*cow's urine*' are optional alternatives ; while the use of 'white mustard' is to be combined with either of these.—(120).

VERSE (121).

GRASS AND WOOD AND STRAW BECOME PURE BY SPRINKLING ; THE HOUSE BY SWEEPING AND SPRINKLING ; AND AN EARTHEN POT BY RE-BAKING.—(121).

Bhāṣya.

'*Palāla*', '*straw*,' is the name applied to corn-stalks used in the making of mats and such other things

'*Grass*',—i.e., *kusha*, ordinary grass, and so forth.

"In connection with the mention of 'wooden articles'(114), it has been remarked that the mention of the *product* implies the *cause* also; under the circumstances, why should 'wood' be mentioned in the present verse?"

It is mentioned for the purpose of emphasising the fact that *sprinkling* alone is what should be done. And it is in virtue of this that until the cause contamination is very serious, people do not have recourse to scraping the wood. In the event of its being touched by the Chāṇḍala and such unclean persons, the purification is brought about 'by means of the rays of the sun, of the moon and wind'; but in the case of things made of wood,—such as the ladle and the like,—if the contamination is slight, people desirous of using them in connection with food &c., should have recourse to sprinkling and scraping.

'*Sweeping*'—is the clearing of the house, which consists in removing of the stains of smoke and such things.

'*Smearing*'—i. e., rubbing the floor with cow-dung, lime or some such thing.

All this should be understood to be necessary in the case of the whole wall of the house becoming defiled by the touch of a dead body, *a chāṇḍala*, a menstruating woman and such persons; while in the case of only a portion of the wall being defiled, only that part should be *smeared*. But in the case of defilement by a dead body falling on the roof, walls should be scraped, rays of the sun should be made to enter the house, and the inside should be exposed to flames of fire; and in some cases *re-building* also has been laid down. All this comes under the term '*clearing*'

Of earthen articles, there should be '*re-baking*'. That is, when it has been touched by a man with unwashed mouth, it shall be heated on fire; actual *rebaking* is to be done only in the case of its being defiled by such unclean things as a *wine-keg* and the like. When however it is touched by the wine itself, it should be thrown away. This is what has been thus declared by Vashiṣṭha (3—59)—'An earthen article is not purified by re-

baking, if it has been touched by wine, urine, ordure, spittings, pus and blood '.—(121).

VERSE (122),

BY CLEANING AND SMEARING, BY SPRINKLING AND BY SCRAPING, AND BY THE LODGING OF COWS—BY THESE FIVE LAND BECOMES PURIFIED.—(122).

Bhāṣya.

Sprinkling—with cow's urine or water; or by milk, as laid down in some books.

'*Scraping.*'—Scratching with some weapon and then throwing away the scraped earth, according to Gautama's direction that 'of land there should be throwing away' (1.32).

'*By these five.*'—This re-iteration is with a view to indicate that the methods may be used singly or collectively. '*Smearing*', without '*cleaning*', is a means of purifying a spot which is not supplied with a dust-bin. If the ground is stained with urine or ordure, there should be *scraping* and *sweeping*. In the case of river-banks and forests, there should be sprinkling with water.

'*Lodging of cows*'—making the land a cow-pen for a single day.

All this should be done in the case of land lying near the cremation-ground. In the case of land containing bones and skull, a portion of the earth should be taken out and thrown away to another place; also where all these may not be visible, but where their existence and subsequent appearance may be suspected.—(122).

VERSE (123).

WHAT HAS BEEN EATEN BY A BIRD, WHAT HAS BEEN SMELT BY A COW, BLOWN UPON, OR SNEEZED AT, OR DEFILED BY HAIR AND INSECTS, BECOMES PURE BY SCATTERING EARTH.—(123).

Bhāṣya.

The use of the term 'eaten' indicates that the text pertains to *food.*

'*By birds*' —i.e., parrots and other birds that are eatable—what has been eaten out of (rendered a 'leaving). This does not apply to what may have been eaten by the crow, the vulture and other such birds ; as in connection with this extensive expiatory rites have been prescribed under the text 'what has been licked by a bird &c., &c.,' which lays down the expiration to be performed in the case of food which, by itself, is quite pure. Thus it is that there is no purification for food that has been eaten out of by the cow, in connection with the eating of which a similar elaborate expiation has been laid down. Though such may be the law, yet it is necessary to find out other Smṛti-texts and usage bearing upon the subject. As a matter of fact, when food, larger in quantity than ten cupfulls, has been defiled by the crow and other such birds, what cultured people do is to throw away just that portion of it that has been touched, and make use of the remainder after having purified it ; but if it is less than ten cupfulls, they throw it away. Here also the peculiar circumstances of each case have to be taken into consideration.

In another Smṛti-text, food defiled by the black birds has also been prohibited.

'*Blown upon*'—with breath from the mouth, or over which a piece of cloth has been shaken for the purpose of being dusted.

'*Sneezed at*'—that food on which some one has sneezed.

'*Hair*'—of men from their heads.—'*Insects*'—small organisms ; some of these, born out of moisture in the house, if they fall upon the food while living, they do not defile the food ; just as is the case with flies. The present purification is laid down for the case where *dead* insects fall on the food. Those insects, on the other hand, that are born out of impure sources, or which live upon dirt, they defile the food, even when living. Says Gautama (17·89)—'What is defiled by hair and insects is ever uneatable.' When the food happens to be covered by a large number of these, the whole of it should be thrown away.

In the case of large heaps of food, if a small portion of it happen to be contaminated by impure insects, that much alone of

the food has to be thrown away and the remainder is purified.

In the case of contamination by hair, another Smṛti has laid down that the food shall be touched by vessels of gold, silver, *kusha* and gems, along with water. In certain works *heating* also has been prescribed.

Some people have taken this verse as laying down a rule for the purification of *land*. But they go against—(*a*) other Smṛti-texts, (*b*) usage and (c) the direct meaning of the text.—(124).

VERSE (125).

FROM AN OBJECT TAINTED BY AN UNCLEAN SUBSTANCE, AS LONG AS THE SMELL AND THE STAIN CAUSED BY IT DO NOT DISAPPEAR, SO LONG SHOULD EARTH AND WATER BE APPLIED TO IT,—IN ALL CASES OF THE PURIFICATION OF THINGS.—(125).

Bhāṣya.

'*Unclean*'—Untouchable.

"If that be so, then what is not eatable by the person concerned, that alone will be a source of contamination for him ; e.g., wine and spirit would be 'unclean' for the *Brāhmaṇa*, but not for the *Shūdra*."

This is not right ; because substances intended as offering-materials at a sacrifice are 'not eatable', before the offerings have been made ; and yet they are not 'untouchable'. As for wines and spirits, even the *touching* of these has been prohibited for the *Brāhmaṇa*. So that that thing may be regarded as a source of contamination for a man the *touching* of which has been prohibited for him. So that what is true is, not 'what is *not eatable* is *untouchable*,' but that 'what is *untouchable* is *not eatable*.'

'*Tainted*'—besmeared ; contaminated.

'*So long*',—this prescribes repetition of the act.

'*Earth and water*' ;—all this to be is used only if there is need for it ; and the *need* would consist in the removing of the smell and stain. So that in the case of the touch of such unclean things as are dry, or in the case of the contamination having

taken place long ago,—since the smell and stain would have been removed by the lapse of time,—washing with earth and water should have to be done once only.

"The use of earth and water is for a visible purpose,—since it is only by their use that the stain is removed and the thing is purified ; what then is the use of the phrase '*as long as &c.*' ?"

The explanation is as follows :—The qualifying phrase has been added with a view to exceeding the restricted number of applications, specifically laid down in such texts as—'once to the urinary organ, thrice to the anus &c. &c.' (3·448) ; the sense being that if the removal of the stain &c., of the excretions be found to be impossible by the restricted number of applications, the said restrictions are to be ignored and more applications used. All that the mention of the exact number of applications means is that even if the smell and stain be removed by a less number of applications, the prescribed number must be made up.

'*Earth and water*' have been mentioned only as indicating things that may be used as a means of purification. Hence even though the contaminating substance may have been washed off by water, yet it should be rubbed with saline substances, so that not a trace of the substance may be visible.

'*Disappear*'—go off, cease.

'*Caused by it*'—caused by the *unclean* substance. Hence there would be no contamination if the smell of such substances as musk and the like did not disappear from clothing &c. But in the case of a thing painted with *kuṅkuma* and such substances, if any portion of it should happen to be contaminated by an unclean thing, then the *kuṅkuma* also has to be removed from that portion ; and this for the simple reason that the *kunkuma* also is in contact with the unclean thing ; specially there also the 'smell and taint' are present. If however the colour of *kuṅkuma* happens to be attached to one's body, and it cannot be removed by rubbing, then purification may be attained (even by the use of earth and water).—(125).

VERSE (126).

THE GODS ORDAINED THREE THINGS PURE FOR THE BRĀHMAṆAS: WHAT IS NOT SEEN, WHAT IS WASHED WITH WATER AND WHAT IS COMMENDED BY WORD.—(126).

Bhāṣya.

'*Pavitram*'—pure.

The mention of the gods is by way of commendation.

The term '*Brāhmaṇa*' includes, according to usage, all castes.

'*What is not seen*';—a thing that, though lying in an unprotected place, is yet not actually seen to have been contaminated by the touch of the dog, the crow or such other things. The mere presence of such animals should not be made the ground for suspecting actual defilement, until it is actually perceived. Similarly there can be no harm in a man partaking of food prepared in the kitchen by cooks and others who may have done the cooking without having themselves undergone a cleansing process [if anything unclean is not actually perceived].

In this connection, no one should entertain the idea that—'there would be nothing wrong in the partaking of food if the defilement were entirely unknown.' As this would be contrary to what has been declared (in 5-20) regarding the sinfulness of eating certain things *unintentionally*.

Thus the conclusion is that a thing is to be regarded as *pure* in connection with which no contamination is known by any of the recognised means of knowledge. But when, even in the absence of definite proof, there be even the slightest and most far-fetched suspicion regarding contamination, the thing concerned should be washed with water. *E.g.* when from among a large number of dishes and cups lying in the same place, if even *one* has been seen to be contaminated by the touch of the dog or some such thing, all the rest of them also should be washed with water.

To this same category (of '*what is not seen*') belongs also '*what is commended by word.*' That is cultured men should be made to

pronounce the thing to be *pure*. They say that things become pure by the Brahmaṇa's word. The *present tense* in '*prashasyatē*', '*is commended*', has the force of the *Injunctive*.

Some people explain the 'commendation' here spoken of as follows :—"When the person going to make use of a certain thing has seen it being defiled, even if he does not himself see it being purified, he should believe it to have been purified if cultured people assure him that it has undergone purification."

This however is not right. Since the assertion of a trustworthy person has nowhere been spoken of as being unreliable, to assert it here would be a needless repetition.

Others have explained the term '*what is washed with water*' as meant to be an example,—and the '*unseen*' and the '*commended by word*' as the two whose purity is here enjoined ; the sense being —'Just as what is washed with water is pure, so also should be regarded *what is not seen* and *what is commended by word*.'

"If everything is *pure*, in which no contamination is cognised by either Perception or Inference or Verbal Authority,—then why should the *Chāndrāyaṇa* have been prescribed (under 5-21) as to be performed for the expiation of the sin of having partaken of defiled food, without knowledge ?"

What has been said under 5.21 is in connection with what is *fit for being eaten* ; while the present text deals with *purification* in general. Or, a distinction may be drawn between the two declarations, either on the ground of one refering to cases of more serious defilement than the other, or on the ground of one refering to times of distress and the other to normal times.—(126)

VERSE (127).

WATER COLLECTED ON THE GROUND IS PURE, IF IT IS SUFFICIENT TO ALLAY THE THIRST OF THE COW ; BUT ONLY IF IT IS NOT CONTAMINATED BY ANY UNCLEAN THING, BECOMING AFFECTED BY WITH ITS SMELL, COLOUR AND TASTE.—(127)

Bhāṣya.

The 'ground' is mentioned only by way of illustration ; so that water in canals is also pure. Water on the ground, as also in the

atmosphere, is, by its very nature, pure ; but the ground, being in contact with unclean substances, is slightly impure ; hence when water is collected on the ground, it imbibes impurity by contact ; and the present text proceeds to point out what quantity of water thus collected is to be regarded as *pure* :—'*Sufficient to allay the thirst of the cow*' ;—'*vaitṛṣṇyam*' means *freedom from thirst.* This is meant to indicate a particular quantity ; this explanation having been adopted by the ancients on the strength of the words of the Veda—'so that the dawlap of the cow dapples in water &c. &c.' Thus the quantity meant is that in which the cow's dewlap becomes submerged, or which allays her thirst.

Water collected on pure ground is pure, even in small quantities.

"How is it to be known that water has been '*contaminated by an unclean thing*' ?"

In answer to this we have the phrase—'*becoming affected by its smell, colour and taste.*' The Instrumental ending in '*amedhyēna*', '*by an unclean thing*', has to be changed here into the *genitive* ; the meaning being—'when the water imbibes the smell, colour and taste *of the unclean thing*, then it is to be regarded as *contaminated* by it.' According to this construction, if in a tank, an unclean thing be found in one part, while in another part the water be found to be free from its smell &c., then this latter is to be regarded as pure—(127).

VERSE (128).

THE ARTISAN'S HAND IS ALWAYS PURE ; SO ALSO IS MERCHANDISE SPREAD OUT FOR SALE ; THE FOOD BEGGED AND HELD BY THE STUDENT IS EVER SACRED ; SUCH IS THE ESTABLISHED RULE—(128).

Bhāṣya

'*Kāru*' is artisan ; such as the cook; the dyer, the weaver and so forth ;—the hand of these people is '*always pure.*' It is for this reason that they are touchable even during periods of impurity

caused by birth or death. But it does not mean that their hand is to be regarded as pure even when found to be actually bearing the stains of ordure or such unclean things.

What is stated here is on the same footing with what as been asserted before regarding certain people being 'immediately purified.' Nor is there any superfluous repetition; as no such purification has been declared anywhere else in the Institutes of Manu. Then the present text contemplates another case also, *e.g.* weavers, as a rule, weave cloth without bathing;—for separating the yarns from the pillars they make use of dough and gruel &c.; —they place the vessels containing these things at random:—the 'impurity' involved in all this is what is negatived by the present text; and it is not meant that people who are impure by their very nature are to be regarded as 'touchable' by taking to the work of artisans; because such work has not been ordained for them.

This same reasoning holds good regarding the view that things touched by *Mlechchhas* are not impure. In connection with these, *sprinkling* and *washing* have to be done, as laid down by Shaṅkha, who reads—'The artisan's hand is pure, and so also are substances in a heap.'

'*Merchandise*;—the substance that is sold for money, or is exchanged for some other substance, is called '*merchandise*'; and when this is '*spread out*' in the market-place, it is pure. That is, it does not become defiled by such contaminations as being handled by several purchasers, being spread out on unwashed ground and so forth, even though one may perceive such contaminations again and again. Since the text speaks of its being '*spread out*', it follows that so long as the thing is stored within a room, it is not pure, even though it is 'in the market-place'. As regards cooked substances, sueh as fried flour, cakes and the like,—though these also are 'pure' (when spread out in the market-place), yet they are not fit for eating; as declared by Shaṅkha—'things exposed in the market-place are not fit for eating'.

'*Held by the student*'.—By reason of the 'purity' being spoken of in this verse along with this term, it is to be regarded as pertaining

to such contamination as the following—(a) treading along the public road in course of begging (b) the sight of unclean objects, (c) spitting and sneezing, (d) the dropping of one hand on the food obtained and so forth,—all which are probable.

'*Sacred*;—this is meant to imply *purity*—(128).

VERSE (129).

THE MOUTH OF WOMEN IS ALWAYS PURE ; AS ALSO THE BIRD IN THE DROPPING OF FRUITS ; THE CALF IS PURE IN CAUSING THE FLOW (OF MILK) ; AND THE DOG IS PURE IN THE CATCHING OF DEER—(129).

Bhāṣya.

The mouth of all women is '*pure*'—for the purposes of kissing &c. 'Women during sexual intercourse etc.'—says another *Smṛti*-text. What is said here applies only to such women with whom sexual intercourse is possible, and not to the mother, sister and such women. This should not be understood to be the denial of the impurity attaching to the mouth until it is washed after food. Because even though the wife is a woman with whom sexual intercourse is possible, yet it has been declared in discourse IV that 'one should not eat with his wife'.

The addition of the term '*always*' implies that the mouth is pure, not only at the time of the actual intercourse, but also during the acts that lead up to it.

'*The bird in the dropping of fruits*'.—Though the term "*shakuni*', '*bird*', denotes all kinds of birds, yet by usage, what is said here is not applicable to the crow, the vulture or other such birds as feed upon unclean things.

Since the text uses the term '*dropping*', the present rule applies only to fruits on the tree.

'*In causing the flow*'.—When the cow is being milked, the calf is made to touch the teats for the purpose of making the milk to flow ; and yet it has been declared that 'cows are pure except in their mouths' ; so that the touch of the calf's mouth might be

regarded as a source of impurity; it is with a view to preclude this notion that we have the present text.

The dog itself is not pure; but it is to be regarded as pure when in the course of hunting, it catches the deer—(129).

VERSE (130).

THE FLESH OF THE ANIMAL KILLED BY DOGS MANU HAS DECLARED TO BE PURE; AS ALSO THAT OF THE ANIMAL KILLED BY OTHER CARNIVOROUS ANIMALS AND BY THE CHĀṆḌĀLA AND OTHER LOW CASTES.—(130).

Bhāṣya.

In the preceding verse—'the dog is pure in the catching of deer'—all that was meant was that in the act of catching deer, the dog is pure; while the present verse goes into further details and declares the purity of what has been killed by the dog, as also of that killed by others with the stroke of sticks &c. Hence it is only the latter part of the verse that lays down something new.

'*Carnivorous animals*'—the kite, the jackal and the rest.

'*Chāṇḍāla and others*';—'and others' is meant to include the *Shvāpada* and people of that class.

'*Low castes*';——the *Nisāda*, the *Vyādha* and others, who live by killing animals.—(130).

VERSE (131).

THE CAVITIES THAT ARE ABOVE THE NAVEL ARE ALL PURE; THOSE THAT ARE BELOW IT ARE IMPURE; AS ALSO ARE ALL EXCRETIONS DROPPED FROM THE BODY.—(131).

Bhāṣya.

The term '*kha*' stands for *organ*; hence the *organs of action* also become included; and thus taking the two feet, the plural number becomes justified in the phrase '*those that are below it are impure.*'

This explanation (by which the lower organs are all made *impure*) is not right; as it is contrary to what has gone in the first half. Therein it has been declared that the purity of those above the navel is of a higher grade and superior; and this could have a meaning only if the lower ones also were *pure*; for what is *white* cannot be called *more black*.

Further, the term '*kha*' does not signify the *organ*, it only signifies the *cavity* or *hole*. It is for this reason that the organs have been spoken of as '*saptashīrṣanyāḥ*', 'having seven seats' (the cavities of the two ears, two eyes, two nostrils and the mouth). There are two 'cavities' below the navel; but the plural number has been used on account of the male and female generative organs being regarded as distinct.

According to this, there would be no uncleanliness of the hand involved in touching the inside of the mouth;—but only if it does not come into contact with the phlegm or other things that may be there. So. that if the hand does become contaminated with some such defiling substance, the mouth shall not be touched by it—(131).

VERSE (132).

FLIES, WATER-DROPS, SHADOW, THE COW, THE HORSE, THE SUN'S RAYS, DUST, EARTH, AIR AND FIRE—SHOULD BE REGARDED AS PURE TO THE TOUCH.—(132).

Bhaṣya.

'*Flies*'.—all sweat-born insects.

The '*cow*' includes the goat and sheep.

The '*horse*' includes the elephant and the mule.

The '*sun*' includes all luminous bodies.

'*Vipruṣaḥ*', '*water-drops*'—such drops of water as are invisible and can be felt only by touch.

'*Shadow*'—of the *Chāṇḍāla* and other unclean things.

'*Earth*'—in contact with, or walked over by, the Chāṇḍāla and the like—is pure. In other cases its sweeping has been prescribed.

The flies &c. mentioned here, even though coming into contact with ordure and other unclean things, do not become sources of defilement.

Another Smṛti-text says—'Goats and horses are pure in their mouths ; cows are pure except in their mouths; cats and mongoose are touchable,—as also other auspicious birds and animals'.—(132).

VERSE (133).

FOR THE CLEANSING OF THE EJECTORS OF URINE AND FAECES, EARTH AND WATER SHOULD BE USED, AS MUCH AS MAY BE NECESSARY ; AS ALSO IN THE TWELVE CLEANSINGS OF THE BODILY EXCRETIONS. —(133).

Bhāṣya.

The impurity of the bodily excretions having been asserted in 131, the present verse proceeds to lay down directions for their cleansing.

'*Ejectors of urine and faeces*'—*i. e.* the organs by which these are passed,—*i. e.* the Anus &c. ;—for the cleansing of these —one should '*use earth and water, as much as may be necessary*' ; *i. e.* not minding any restrictions as to the number (of washings and rubbings), one should go on taking up as much water and earth as may be necessary for the total removal of smells and stains.

'*Bodily*'—proceeding from the body,—'*excretions*'—which are sources of impurity. In connection with the purifications necessitated by these also, earth and water are to be used as much as may be necessary. In another *Smṛti* we read—'In the case of the former six excretions both earth and water should be used ; in the case of the latter six one is purified even by the use of water only'.

In connection with phlegm &c. it is thus declared in another *Smṛti*—'The viscid excretion from the nose is called *Phlegm*' ; and since this occurs among the latter group of six, for cleansing it earth need not be used at all.—(133).

VERSE (134).

FAT, SEMEN, BLOOD, MARROW, URINE, ORDURE, NASAL EXCRETION, EAR-WAX, PHLEGM, TEARS, RHEUM OF THE EYES AND PERSPIRATION,—THESE TWELVE ARE THE 'EXCRETIONS' OF HUMAN BEINGS.—(134).

Bhāṣya.

The twelve 'excretions' or 'impurities' are here indicated.

'*Human beings*' includes all *five-nailed* animals. As regards dogs and jackals, their excretions are impure by reason of their own untouchability.

'Urine and ordure'—of all animals, except those of the goat, the sheep, the cow and the horse.—(134).

VERSE (135).

ONE WHO DESIRES CLEANLINESS SHOULD APPLY EARTH—ONCE TO THE URINARY ORGAN, THRICE TO THE ANUS, TEN TIMES TO ONE HAND AND SEVEN TIMES TO BOTH HANDS.—(135).

Bhāṣya.

After the passing of urine and fæces, for the cleansing of the urinary organ, earth should be applied to it once.

In another *Smṛti* it has been laid down that one should take as much earth mixed with water as can be contained in one hand. What I assert is that in view of what has been said regarding the using of as much earth and water as may be necessary, the proper quantity would be what is stated in the present text. Some people quote, in this connection, the following saying—'The hand being filled up, the first (and largest) measure of it is called *Prasṛti*, the second is half of it; and the third part of it is called *mṛttikā*.' But this measure applies to the case of anus-cleansing only. In all other cases, as much is to be used as may be necessary.

In the case of a single evacuation also, the number of applications is to be as here prescribed ; and what is prescribed is the repetition of the act (of rubbing and washing).

There is a distinction among the various kinds of 'earth', just as there is among the various kinds of the 'cow' and other things. In present connection, for instance, it has been declared that 'earth should be got from a place far removed from an ant-hill, as also from the stables' and so forth. No account need be taken however of the distinction into 'white', 'black', 'red' and so forth.

'*Who desires*'—who wishes.—(135).

VERSE (136).

SUCH IS THE PURIFICATION FOR HOUSEHOLDERS ; DOUBLE OF THIS FOR STUDENTS, TREBLE FOR HERMITS, AND QUADRUPLE FOR RENUNCIATES.—(136).

Bhāṣya.

The rules regarding Purification vary with the stages of life. For those who do not belong to any of these stages, the only rule is that as much earth and water shall be used as may be necessary. The same holds good for the *Shūdra* also, who is entitled to observe the rules regarding the stage of the Householder ; so that he also has to observe the same number of applications.—(136).

VERSE (137).

HAVING PASSED URINE OR FAECES, AND SIPPED WATER, ONE SHOULD TOUCH WITH WATER THE CAVITIES ; ALSO WHEN HE MAY BE GOING TO READ THE VEDA, AND ALWAYS WHEN GOING TO TAKE FOOD.—(137).

Bhāṣya.

Having '*passed*'—i. e., cleansed away according to the aforesaid directions,—all taint of urine &c., from the urinary organ,

etc. ;—'*and sipped water*,'—'*one should touch with water the cavities*'.

'*Also when he may be going to read the Veda*'—*i. e.*, according to the course of Vedic study prescrbed in Discourse II.

In accordance with its primary signification, the word '*kṛtvā*', '*having passed*', appears to mean 'having evacuated'; and the meaning is that—'after having passed urine and faeces and washed the anus and the urinary organ, one should sip water'.

'*Also when going to read the Veda*;'—the sipping of water has been prescribed as a necessary duty in connection with the course of Vedic study, under 2·70. What is prescribed here is meant for all sorts of reading of the Veda—either by one who is *teaching* it, or *reading* it. In other cases, people are said to be 'reciting' the Veda (*udāharantaḥ*). The meaning is that after having done other secular acts, one should not pronounce the words of the Veda, without having sipped water.

'*Also when going to take food*.' (137).

VERSE (138).

DESIRING BODILY PURIFICATION, ONE SHOULD SIP WATER THRICE; THEN HE SHOULD TWICE WIPE HIS MOUTH; BUT THE WOMAN AND THE SHŪDRA SHOULD EACH DO IT ONCE ONLY.—(138).

Bhāṣya.

This is the reiteration (of a former injunction), for the purpose of enjoining what is necessary for the woman and the *Shūdra*. Though what is said here has been already declared before, yet it is repeated here for the sake of women and *Shūdras*.

Some people explain this text as follows:—According to the rule that 'the Shūdra is purified by touching water', all that the ordinary Shūdra is to do is to touch water; hence washing and touching of the ear, etc., that are understood as applying to the

Shūdra, are regarded as pertaining to the better class of *Shūdras*. As regards women,—the general rule being that 'the Brāhmaṇa is purified by water reaching the heart &c., &c.' (2. 62), where the different castes are specified, it would seem as if all that is prescribed for males is to be done by females also; and it is with a view to preclude this notion that we have the present text.

'*Desiring bodily purification*';—this indicates that if one is quite clean when going to read or to take food, he need not necessarily repeat the acts *thrice*; nor need there be *washing*;—all that need be done is the sipping of some quantity of water, and the touching of the organs; and not all the details that have been laid down in connection with the 'sipping of water' prescribed among the duties of the Student.—(138).

VERSE (139).

BY SHŪDRAS LIVING ACCORDING TO LAW, SHAVING SHOULD BE DONE EVERY MONTH; THEIR MANNER OF PURIFICATION SHOULD BE LIKE THAT OF THE VAISHYA; AND THEIR FOOD SHALL CONSIST OF THE LEAVINGS OF TWICE-BORN MEN.—(139).

Bhāṣya

A general rule of conduct is here laid down for the better class of *Shūdras*.

'*Living according to law*;'—*i.e.* attending on twice-born men and performing the great sacrifices. By these '*shaving*'—of the head—shall be done '*every month*'. The Genitive in *Shūdrāṇām* has the sense of the Instrumental. Or, in as much as *shūdras* are entirely dependent upon Brahmaṇas their shaving shall be got done by these latter; and in this case the root '*kṛ*,' which has several meanings, is to be taken in the sense of *advising*.

The details of the manner of purification—in connection with births, deaths and the rest—should be like those of the *Vaishya*.

'*Their food shall consist of the leavings of twice-born men*.'—This has been already explained before.—(139).

VERSE (140).

DROPS FROM THE MOUTH, IF THEY DO NOT REACH THE BODY, DO NOT MAKE ONE IMPURE ; NOR THE HAIRS OF THE BEARD THAT ENTER THE MOUTH ; NOR WHAT ADHERES TO THE TEETH.—(140).

Bhaṣhya.

In the text—'on having spat and on having told a lie &c.' (5.144)—it has been laid down that on spitting one should sip water ; which indicates that until one has sipped water, he remains impure. Drops issuing from the mouth would also be a form of 'spitting;; so that the issuing of drops of water from the mouth standing on the same footing as the spitting of phlegm, it might be thought that it should necessitate the sipping of water. With a veiw to this contingency, the author has added the present verse.

'*Mukhyaḥ*'—produced in, or issuing from, the mouth ;—such '*drops*' do not make one impure, if they do not fall upon the body.

"But it has been already declared that drops are pure (5-132.)"

But that was with reference to things other than bodily excretions. That this was meant there is clearly indicated by the present verse ; which makes it clear that *all kinds of drops* were not meant when they were declared to be pure.

'*Shmashrūṇi*'—hairs of the beard,—'*that enter the mouth*'—'do not make one impure'; this has to be construed with the present phrase ; so that they do become the cause of some slight evil effects (even though they do not make the man impure).

So also '*what adheres to the teeth.*' In connection with this we have greater details in another *Smṛti text*—'What adheres to the teeth is like the teeth, except what is touched by the tongue ;—some say that this is so before it falls off from the teeth ;—what falls off is to be treated as saliva ;—the man becomes pure by swallowing it.' (*Gautama* 1-38 to 40.) 'Those that fall off'—*i. e.* without being touched by the tongue ; since the touch of the tongue has been declared to be not pure.—(140).

VERSE (141).

THE DROPS THAT TOUCH THE FEET OF ONE WHO IS HELPING OTHERS TO WASH SHOULD BE REGARDED AS ON THE SAME FOOTING AS THOSE ON THE GROUND; AND HE IS NOT RENDERED IMPURE BY THEM.—(141)

Bhāṣya.

'*Helping others to wash*,'—*i. e.* offering water to other persons.

The meaning is as follows :—When one is pouring water for another person and the latter begins to sip water, if drops of water flowing out from between the fingers of that person happen to fall on the ground and rising from it, touch the feet of the man who is offering the water,—that man is not made impure by them.

'*Those on the ground*'.—The drops of water falling from the hand of the washing person, though unclean, should be regarded to be as clean as small quantities of water collected on clean ground.

'*By them*,'—touched, the man does not become impure.—(141)

VERSE (142).

HE WHO, WITH SOME SUBSTANCE IN HAND, HAPPENS TO BE TOUCHED BY AN UNCLEAN OBJECT, BECOMES PURE BY WASHING, WITHOUT LAYING DOWN THAT SUBSTANCE.—(142).

Bhāṣya

The man who has committed something necessitating 'washing' is called 'unclean'. For instance, one who has passed urine or evacuated his bowels, and has not performed the purificatory ablutions ; or when he has been defiled by the contamination of some unclean thing.

With some substance in hand ;'—the person who is holding in his hand some thing to be eaten or some metal or cloth, &c., is called '*dravyahastaḥ*', the use of the compound being similar to such compounds as '*khaḍgahastaḥ*'.

If such a person happens to be touched, then '*without laying down*'—without setting aside—'*that substance*'—he should wash.

"How can the man wash, when he has a substance in his hand ? The procedure of washing has been described as 'washing the hand upto the wrists and so forth."

In answer to this some people offer the following explanation :—What is meant by the man being 'with some substance in hand' is that he should have the substance somewhere on his body, not necessarily in his hands. Similarly in the case of impurity also if the man become defiled, the contamination affects substances that may be lying on his shoulders also. Similarly purification is obtained by washing. Hence the man should perform the washing by removing the substance from his hand and keeping it on his fore-arm, in his lap or in some other part part of his body. The meaning is that just as the impurity of the man makes the substance impure so also the purification of the man renders the substance pure.

Gautama has declared that—'The man with a substance in hand, happening to become unclean, should wash after *having kept away the substance*' (1.28). This they explain as follows : Though both (*washing* and *keeping away*) are spoken of together, yet it is the *keeping away* that is meant to be enjoined by this text, otherwise all that would be necessary in the circumstances would be the purifying of both himself and the substance ; and where would there be any necessity for the *keeping away* of the substance ? Hence, since, in the absence of the text quoted, there would be no possibility of the *keeping away*, this text must be taken as meant only for enjoining this latter. "How then would the substance be purified?" It would be purified by being held by the pure person,—or by the 'washing' prescribed by another *Smṛti-text* : viz : 'while dealing with foods and drinks

if one happens to touch an unclean thing, he should wash the article and then sip water ; in this manner it does not become defiled.'

"In the present verse nothing is said regarding the necessity of having to keep away the substance, and yet if it were to be taken as implied, the phrase '*without laying down*' would be absolutely futile."

As a matter of fact, the same purpose runs through all *Smṛtis* ; and yet from the direct words of the texts in the present instance we understand that there is a clear difference of opinion (between Manu and Gautama). So that the two should be regarded as optional alternatives ; and the rule determining the option would be that—(a) if the substance is a heavy one it shall be laid aside, otherwise it may be kept on the body,—or (b) when the man himself eats the food (carried), or he touches a large quantity of unclean things, or is touched by a person who should have washed but has not yet washed,—in all these cases the touching of the substance would be a source of uncleanliness (142)

VERSE (143).

HAVING VOMITTED OR PURGED, ONE SHOULD BATHE AND THEN EAT CLARIFIED BUTTER. AFTER HAVING EATEN HIS FOOD, HE SHOULD ONLY SIP WATER. FOR ONE WHO HAS COPULATED BATHING HAS BEEN ORDAINED.—(143).

Bhāṣya.

'Vomitting' and 'purging' are wellknown. The man who throws out the food that he has eaten is said to have '*vomitted*'. The man the number of whose motions has gone beyond the number *eight*,—either through disease, or through his having taken *Harītakī* or some such purgative—is said to have '*purged*.'

These two persons should first of all bathe.

Then, they should eat clarified butter and then any other kind of food ; and the injunction of eating clarified butter is meant to be a

prohibition of other kinds of food. Just as in the case of expiatory rites, ashes and water are regarded as means of purification, so in the case in question, is the eating of clarified butter.

'*After having taken food he should only sip water.*'—After he has taken his food, if he happen to vomit or purge on the same day, then he should do the sipping of water only, and not bathing and eating of clarified butter.

Others have taken this independently by itself, to mean that 'after having taken his food he should sip water',—this being a reiteration of the water-sipping that has already been prescribed as to be done after meals.

'*One who has copulated,*'—i. e., one who has had sexual intercourse with a woman,—becomes pure by bathing. (143).

VERSE (144).

ONE SHOULD SIP WATER AFTER HAVING SLEPT, AFTER HAVING SNEEZED, AFTER HAVING EATEN, AFTER HAVING SPAT, AFTER HAVING TOLD A LIE, AFTER HAVING DRUNK WATER, AND WHEN GOING TO READ THE VEDA, EVEN THOUGH HE MAY BE QUITE PURE.—(144).

Bhāṣya.

'*After having sneezed,*'—after having done *sneezing*, which is the name given to the sound that emanates involuntarily from the nostrils of a man moved by internal wind.

'*Even though he may be quite pure.*'—This is to be construed only with the phrase '*when going to read the Veda*'; the meaning being that even though he be quite pure, he should, when going to read the Veda, read it after having sipped water; i.e., the water sipping-should be done as part of the procedure laid down in connection with Vedic study; while after *sleep* &c., the water-sipping shall be done *once* only.

As for the following declaration—'Having slept, having sneezed, having eaten, having drunk water, the wise man shall sip water and then again sip water ; as also after having spat and told lies',—this has to be construed to mean that 'having sipped water, he should eat and then sip water again.' In a case however where it is clearly stated that 'one should sip water *twice*, the act has to be repeated consecutively.' (144)

SECTION. (14)
Duties of Women.

VERSE (145).

THUS HAS THE WHOLE RULE REGARDING CLEANLINESS AND PURIFICATION OF SUBSTANCES FOR ALL CASTES BEEN EXPOUNDED TO YOU; LISTEN NOW TO THE DUTIES OF WOMEN. (145).

Bhāṣya.

The first three quarters sum up the section dealing with Purifications; and the fourth states briefly what is going to be explained.

The term '*rule regarding cleanliness*', though a general one, yet, by reason of the proximity of the term 'purification of substances', is to be taken as standing for purification other than this latter; just as in the case of the expression '*go-balīvarda*' (the term '*go*' stands for the *cow* as distinguished from the *bull*, *balīvarda*).

'*Duties of women*,'—such duties as have to be performed exclusively by women; those that are common to men and women—such as the performance of sacrifices and the like—are not described here.—(145).

VERSE (146).

WHETHER SHE BE A CHILD, OR A YOUNG WOMAN, OR AN AGED WOMAN, SHE SHOULD NOT DO ANY ACT BY HERSELF, EVEN IN THE HOUSE.—(146).

Bhāṣyā.

The sense of the teaching is that under no circumstances should there be independence for women. The mention of the various stages of her age, is meant only to indicate where she has to be

dependent upon others, and no significance is meant to attach to it.—(146).

VERSE (147).

IN CHILDHOOD SHE SHOULD REMAIN UNDER THE CONTROL OF HER FATHER, IN YOUTH UNDER THAT OF HER HUSBAND, AND ON THE HUSBAND'S DEATH UNDER THAT OF HER SONS ; THE WOMAN SHOULD NEVER HAVE RECOURSE TO INDEPENDENCE.—(147).

Bhāṣya.

It has been declared thus—'In the absence of any *sapiṇḍa-relation* of her husband, some one on her father's side shall be the woman's protector ; on the total extinction of both families, the King has been declared to be the woman's guardian.'

This refers to a case where the husband is no more. (147).

VERSE (148).

SHE SHOULD NOT SEEK SEPARATION FROM HER FATHER, HUSBAND OR SONS ; BY SEPARATING, THE WOMAN WOULD RENDER BOTH FAMILIES DISREPUTABLE.—(148).

Bhāṣya.

The ground for 'disrepute' would consist in the irregularity of her life ; this is what is meant by the words '*would render both families disreputable.*' This passage has to be explained as 'By living or going about in other villages, apart from the persons mentioned, &c., &c.'—(148).

VERSE (149).

SHE SHOULD BE ALWAYS CHEERFUL AND ALERT IN HOUSEHOLD-WORK ; SHE SHOULD HAVE THE UTENSILS WELL-CLEANED AND IN SPENDING SHE SHOULD BE CLOSE-FISTED.—(149).

Bhāṣya.

The term '*sadā*', like the term '*nitya*', signifies *constantly*.

'*Cheerful*'—always smiling. Even though elsewhere she might have had reasons for anger and sorrow, yet when she sees her husband, she should show that she is happy, by means of a cheerful face, smiles, sweet words and so forth. This advice is meant for the married as well as the unmarried girl.

'*Alert in household-work*,'—in laying by and spending money in such religious acts as bathing and the like. What is 'household-work' has been explained in 9·11. In all that she should be '*alert*', expert. That is to say, she should be able to cook food quickly and so forth.

'*She should have the utensils well cleaned.*'—Vessels used in the house, such as the jar, the tub and so forth, are called '*utensils*'; and all these should be '*well cleaned*', thoroughly washed and nice-looking.

'*In spending*'—wealth, over the feeding of friends, relations and guests,—'*she should be close-fisted*'—not too liberal; that is, she should not spend too much.

'*Susaṁskṛtopaskaṛayā*' is a *Bahuvrīhi* compound—'she whose *upaskaras*, utensils, are *susaṁskṛta*, 'well-cleaned.' Similarly '*mukta-hastayā*' means 'she whose *hasta*, fist, is *mukta*, open'; and this is compounded with the negative particle. But apart from its literal meaning, the word '*mukta-hasta*' denotes, by convention, *liberality*—(149).

VERSE (150).

HIM TO WHOM HER FATHER MAY GIVE HER,—OR HER BROTHER WITH THE FATHER'S PERMISSION,—SHE SHALL ATTEND UPON AS LONG AS HE LIVES, AND SHALL NOT DISREGARD HIM WHEN HE IS DEAD.—(150).

Bhāṣya.

'*Or her brother with the father's permission.*'—Just as the brother is entitled to give away the girl only with the father's

permission, so also is the father entitled to give her away only with the consent of her mother, though the present text speaks of the father as if he were free to give her away without consulting anyone else. And the reason for this lies in the fact that in all things the husband and wife have joint title, and the daughter belongs to both the parents. In fact in Discourse IX it is pointed out that if the father is not alive, the girl may be given away by the mother. The child is born of both parents, and on this rests their right over her; hence it is only right that both should consult each other.

'*Attend upon*'—Serve.

'*When he is dead, she shall not disregard him.*'—'Disregarding' means *not minding*. The meaning is that she should not behave as if she were her own mistress; just as during her husband's life-time she is dependent upon him, so after his death also, she should ever remain subservient to him. Since it has been declared that—'the fact that she has been given away constitutes the ground of his ownership over her',—as soon as the father gives away his daughter, his ownership over her ceases, and then comes into existence the ownership of the man to whom she is given away. This 'giving away' happens not only at the time of marriage, but even at the time at which the bridegroom is chosen.

"For what purpose then is the *marriage* performed?"

[The answer is given in the next verse.]

VERSE (151).

AT THEIR WEDDING, THE SACRIFICE TO PRAJĀPATI, WHICH IS THE MEANS OF SECURING WELFARE, IS PERFORMED FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROCURING GOOD FORTUNE; IT IS THE GIVING AWAY THAT IS THE SOURCE OF OWNERSHIP.—(151).

Bhāṣya.

'*Good fortune*' consists in the accomplishment of the desired

object; what brings about this is said to be 'for that purpose;' it is for this that there is 'sacrifice to Prajāpati.' The term '*maṅgalārtham*' is in the neuter form, because it is an adverb.

'*Svastyayanam*' is that by which '*svasti*', *welfare*—'*īyate*',—*is secured; i.e.* whereby the person's loved objects do not become lost.

'*Their*'—of women.

'*At wedding*', sacrifice' is offered to the deity Prajāpati. This refers to certain offerings of butter that are prescribed as to be made at marriage with the *mantras* '*Prajāpatē* &c.' This is only illustrative; it indicates the other deities also—e. g. Pūṣan, Varuṇa and Aryaman. Indicative also of these other deities are such mantra-texts as—'*Puṣannu dēvam varuṇannu dēvam, &c., &c.*'

What the present text means is that even without the marriage, ownership is produced by the *giving away*; and no significance is meant to be attached to the statement that the marriage-sacrifices are performed only for the purpose of securing good fortune; because 'marriage' has been declared to consist in the 'taking of a wife'; and even though there may be ownership, the girl does not become 'wife' until the marriage is performed.—(151).

VERSE (152).

THE HUSBAND WHO HAS PERFORMED THE MANTRIC SACRAMENTAL RITES FOR WOMEN IS THE IMPARTER OF HAPPINESS TO THEM BOTH IN SEASON AND OUT OF SEASON, HERE AS WELL AS IN THE NEXT WORLD.—(152).

Bhāṣya.

The husband is '*the imparter of happiness*' to his wife '*out of season*' also,—in accordance with the rule 'one may have recourse to his wife at all times, except on the days expressly prohibited.'

'*Mantric sacramental rite*'—i. e., the marriage-ceremony ; he who has performed this is called the '*Mantrasaṃskārakṛt.*'

'*In the next world.*'—Since it is only along with her husband that the wife is entitled to the performance of religious acts, and the acquiring of their results,—the husband is called '*the imparter of happiness in the next world.*'—(152).

VERSE (153).

BE HE ILL-MANNERED OR OF LICENTIOUS HABITS OR DESTITUTE OF GOOD QUALITIES,—THE HUSBAND SHOULD ALWAYS BE ATTENDED UPON LIKE A GOD BY THE TRUE WIFE.—(153).

Bhāṣya.

'*Ill-mannered.*'—Addicted to gambling and other evil habits.

'*Of licentious habits*'—whose nature is prone to be voluptuous.

'*Destitute of good qualities*'—devoid of learning, wealth and other good qualities.

'*Should be attended upon*'—served.—(153).

VERSE (154)

THERE IS NO SEPARATE SACRIFICING FOR WOMEN, NO OBSERVANCES, NO FASTINGS; IT IS BY MEANS OF SERVING HER HUSBAND THAT SHE BECOMES EXALTED IN HEAVEN.—(154).

Bhāṣya.

It has been more than once explained that women separated from their husbands are not entitled to the performance of sacrifices. From this it follows that, when going to keep an observance or to take to a fast, she should obtain his permission.

'*Observance*' here stands for the vow to give up meat, wine and such things ; it does not stand for the *Kṛchchhra* and other penances ; because the repeating of *mantras* and offering of libations form part of these latter, and to these the woman is not

entitled. It will not be right to argue here that—"it would be possible for the woman to perform the *Kṛchchhra* and other penances, omitting the mantras and the libations" ;—because it can never be right to abandon, at one's will, the details of a sacrificial performance ; specially as it is only the act complete in all its details that is regarded as leading to prosperity and success. Nor does the dropping or adding of details depend upon the varying capacities of performers. Then again, a woman has always available men of her own caste, among the three higher castes, who could perform for her the said acts. For these reasons neither the woman nor the *Shūdra*, desiring her own welfare, is entitled to the performance of the *Kṛchchhra* and other penances. We shall explain this in detail under the *Expiatory Rites*.

'*Fasting*'—living without food, giving up eating for one day, two days or such limited periods.

'*Serves*'—attends upon.—(154).

VERSE (155).

THE GOOD WIFE, DESIROUS OF REACHING HER HUSBAND'S REGIONS, SHOULD NEVER DO ANYTHING THAT MAY BE DISAGREEABLE TO HER HUSBAND, ALIVE OR DEAD.—(155).

Bhāṣya.

'*Her husband's regions*'—The regions to which she has become entitled by the performance of religious acts in the company of her husband.

'*Being desirous*' of reaching those regions,-'*she should never do anything that might be disagreeable*' ; i. e., such acts as intercourse with other men and so forth, *which have been forbidden by the Scriptures*. It is not possible for anyone to ascertain what is agreeable or disagreeable to the dead person ; it is not necessary that what was agreeable to the living would be agreeable to the dead also ; because notions of pleasure and displeasure vary with the varying conditions of men. From all this it follows that what is

meant by 'disagreeable' here is that 'freedom of life' which has been forbidden for women ;—and this the good wife should avoid.—(155).

VERSE (156).

WELL MIGHT SHE MACERATE HER BODY BY MEANS OF PURE FLOWERS, ROOTS AND FRUITS ; BUT SHE SHOULD NOT EVEN MENTION THE NAME OF ANOTHER MAN, AFTER HER HUSBAND IS DEAD—(156).

Bhāṣya.

What has been said in the preceding verse is explained more specifically in the present verse.

As in the case of men, so in that of women also suicide is forbidden. As for what Aṅgiras has said—'they should die after their husband',—this also is not an obligatory act, and so it is not that it must be done. Because in connection with it there is an eulogium bestowed upon the results proceeding from such suicide. Thus then, the performing of the act being possible only for one who is desirous of obtaining the said result, the act stands on the same footing as the *Shyēna* sacrifice. That is, in connection with the *Shyēna* sacrifice we have the Vedic text—'one may kill living beings by means of the Shyēna sacrifice,'—and this makes the performance of this sacrifice possible ; but only for one who has become blinded by extreme hatred ; so that when the man does perform the act, it does not become regarded as 'Dharma,' a 'meritorious act' ; exactly in the same manner, when the widow happens to have a very strong desire for the results accruing from the act of suicide, it is open to her to disobey the prohibition of it and kill herself ; but in so doing she cannot be regarded as acting according to the scriptures. From this it is clear that the act of killing herself after her husband is clearly forbidden for the woman. Further, in view of the distinct Vedic text—'one shall not die before the span of his life is run out'—being contradicted by the Smṛti-text of Aṅgiras, this latter is open to being assumed to have some other meaning. Just as in the case of the Smṛti rule

'one should take the final bath after having read the Veda',—the injunction of the bath, as pertaining to one who has not yet studied the meaning of the Vedic texts, has been taken as having a different meaning.

It may happen so that the widow is childless, has not inherited any property from her husband and has to maintain herself by spinning or some such work; and she does not wish to marry again, because her husband was very dear to her and any disregard for him would be against the scriptures and is even distinctly forbidden; so that knowing that in abnormal times of distress all transgressions are permissible,—as was the case when Vishvāmitra partook of the dog's thigh—she might, being pinched for a living, be tempted to some transgression. It is with a view to such a case that the author has put forward the present text.

Under the stated circumstances '*well might*' the woman '*macerate*'—reduce—'*her body*'—'*by means of flowers, roots and fruits*';—i. e., she might maintain herself upon these, according as they may be available; '*but she shall not even mention the name of another man*'—by saying to him 'you are my husband to-day'.

As for the text—'When the husband is lost or killed or become a renunciate, or is found to be impotent, or become an outcast,—under these five difficulties, another husband is sanctioned for women' (Parāshara —what is meant is that she may for the purpose of obtaining a living by doing such work of as that of the *maid* &c., have recourse to another man *as her protector*,—this being the literal meaning of the term '*pati*'.

This shall be fully dealt with under discourse IX.

This rule also is applicable to the woman whose husband has gone out on a journey.

The use of the term '*kāmam*'—'well might'—is meant to indicate the author's displeasure at the course of conduct suggested; the sense being—'the emaciating of the body is bad, and worse still is the act of having intercourse with another man.'—(156).

VERSE (157).

TILL HER DEATH, SHE SHOULD REMAIN PATIENT, SELF-CONTROLLED AND CHASTE,—SEEKING THAT MOST EXCELLENT MERIT THAT ACCRUES TO WOMEN HAVING A SINGLE HUSBAND. (157).

Bhāṣya.

What has gone before is further explained.

'*Till her death she should remain chaste*';—i. e., even under the said distressing conditions she shall not seek to maintain herself by misbehaviour.

'*Patient*'—disregarding the troubles caused by her circumstances, she shall not allow her chastity to be disfigured by hunger; she shall not allow her mind to be disturbed by the waves of passion.

The compound '*ekapatnī*' may be expounded either as 'those who have a single husband,' or 'those who are wives of single men'; such women, as Sāvitrī and the rest;—the 'merits' accruing to such women; which brings such results as the capacity to confer boons and pronounce curses;—'*seeking*' such merit, the woman should not renounce chastity.

Under the said circumstances, if, by living upon fruits and roots, she happen to die,—there would be nothing wrong in this.—(157).

VERSE (158).

MANY THOUSANDS OF UNMARRIED BRĀHMAṆA STUDENTS HAVE GONE TO HEAVEN, WITHOUT HAVING PERPETUATED THEIR RACE—(168).

Bhāṣya.

The preceding verse has prohibited intercourse with another man for the purpose of maintenance; the present verse prohibits it, if betaken to for the purpose of continuing the race.

It has been declared that 'there is no heaven for the childless

person ('aputrasya').' But in this sentence no significance attaches to the masculine gender used. In view of this text a widow might be prompted to take to another husband ; and it is for meeting such a case that we have the present text.

'Many thousands of unmarried students'—life-long celebates—'*have gone to heaven*'—do go to heaven.

As for the '*Niyoga*' that is prescribed for the widow in Discourse IX, that refers to a case where she is commanded to do so by her elders and not where she herself desires offspring.

'*Without having perpetuated their race*'—The begetting of offspring is for the purpose of perpetuating one's race ; and they did not do it ; i. e., they did not beget children.

'*Many, anēkāni*'.—In a negative compound the latter term forms the predominant factor : hence the use of the plural ending is open to question. Even though the compound contains the *negation of unity*, yet plurality is inadmissible. What the word signifies therefore is a very large number, though its exact nature is not expressed, and the character of *unity* is abandoned. Just as it is in the case of such words as '*modat*'(?), '*grâmaḥ*' and the like which denote *multitude*. Says the author of the *Chūrṇikā*—'The form *anēkasmāt* becomes justified',—where he has declared the correctness of the use of the singular number.

Or, the term '*anēka*' may signify 'alone, helpless' ; the meaning being 'the men who had become helpless by the death of their wife.'—(150).

VERSE (159).

On the death of her husband, the good wife who remains firm, goes to heaven, even though childless ; just like those students.—(159).

Bhāṣya

The same thing is repeated again, for the purpose of strengthening our conviction.—(159).

VERSE (160).

THAT WOMAN, HOWEVER, WHO, FROM A LONGING FOR A CHILD, DISREGARDS HER HUSBAND, BRINGS DISGRACE TO HERSELF IN THIS WORLD AND FALLS OFF FROM HER PLACE IN THE OTHER WORLD.—(160).

Bhāṣya.

Her longing being—'may a child be born to me'; this is the '*longing for a child.*' From this cause if the woman disregards her husband and becomes wedded to another man, she brings to herself '*disgrace*'—bad name—'*in this world*'; and never reaches heaven.—(160).

VERSE (161.)

WHAT IS BORN OF ANOTHER IS NOT A 'CHILD'; NOR IS ONE BEGOTTEN ON ANOTHER MAN'S WIFE; FOR GOOD WOMEN A SECOND HUSBAND IS NOWHERE ORDAINED.—(161).

Bhāṣya.

The child that is born for her from another man is not her 'child'; similarly what is begotten by a man on another man's wife is not his child.—(161.)

VERSE (162).

SHE, WHO, HAVING ABANDONED HER OWN HUSBAND WHO IS INFERIOR, HAS RECOURSE TO ANOTHER PERSON WHO IS SUPERIOR, BECOMES CONTEMPTIBLE IN THIS WORLD AND IS CALLED A 'REMARRIED WOMAN.'—(162).

Bhāṣya.

It is not only contempt and disgrace that is hers; but something more (described in the next verse).—(162).

VERSE (163).

THE WOMAN, WHO, THROUGH FAILURE IN HER DUTY TO HER HUSBAND, BECOMES AN OBJECT OF CONTEMPT IN THE WORLD, COMES TO BE BORN AS A JACKAL AND IS TORMENTED BY FOUL DISEASES.—(163).

Bhāṣya.

For these reasons, the woman shall not fail in her duty to her husband,—either with a view to worldly or heavenly joys.—(163).

VERSES (164—165).

SHE, WHO DOES NOT FAIL IN HER DUTY TO HER HUSBAND, HAVING HER THOUGHT, SPEECH AND BODY WELL-CONTROLLED, REACHES HER HUSBAND'S REGIONS; AND IS CALLED 'GOOD' BY ALL GENTLEMEN.—(164).

BY SUCH CONDUCT, THE WOMAN, HAVING HER THOUGHT, WORD AND BODY WELL-CONTROLLED, OBTAINS EXCELLENT FAME IN THIS WORLD, AND ALSO HER HUSBAND'S REGION IN THE OTHER WORLD.—(165).

Bhāṣya.

These verses sum up the duties of women; and these duties are easily intelligible; hence I have devoted no attention to the explanation of these.

The meaning of the teaching is as follows:—Though the man is permitted (in 167) to take to another wife, yet that does not permit of the woman taking another husband; because according to the injunction—'she shall not disregard him when he is dead', there can be no possibility of her marrying again; and by the assertion that 'even childless persons go to heaven' it is made clear that the bearing of children, even in times of distress, is forbidden. It is only in the *Smṛti* sanctioning '*Niyoga*' that this latter is permitted. Hence in view of these (prohibition and sanction) the two courses are regarded as optional alternatives;

and between these two *Smṛtis* we cannot determine which is superior and which inferior ; since one of them enjoins the bearing of children, and the other clearly forbids it. Hence by taking them as optional alternatives we make room for both—(164—195).

VERSE (166).

THE TWICE-BORN MAN, KNOWING THE LAW, SHOULD CREMATE THE WIFE OF HIS OWN CASTE,—WHO BEHAVES HERSELF IN THE SAID MANNER, AND DIES BEFORE HIM,—WITH THE SACRED FIRE AND ALONG WITH THE SACRIFICIAL IMPLEMENTS.—(166).

Bhāṣya.

This verse reiterates what is already implied by the law.

In as much as she is a 'good' wife, it is only right that she should be cremated with the sacred *Agnihotra* fire ; specially in view of the assertion—'on the death of the wife the Fires are not maintained'—(166).

VERSE (167).

HAVING, DURING THE LAST RITES, GIVEN AWAY THE SACRED FIRES TO HIS WIFE WHO DIED BEFORE HIM, HE MAY MARRY AGAIN AND KINDLE THE FIRES AGAIN.—(167).

Bhāṣya

The present verse is added with a view to indicate the man's title to another marriage ; i. e., an exception in favour of his wedding another wife ; and it also serves to prohibit the man forthwith taking to the life of the Recluse or the Renunciate, as soon as he finds himself deprived of his help-mate ;—and this because he has still got to fulfil certain duties. Says the *Shruti*—'He is abandoned by old age, or by the omission of his duties.'

Others say that a '*yadā*', 'when', should be supplied in this verse ; so that there would be no incompatibility between this and the *Shruti* laying down life-long *Agnihotra*.—(167).

SECTION (15)

Conclusion.

VERSE (168).

IN THIS MANNER, ONE SHALL NOT OMIT THE FIVE SACRIFICES; AND DURING THE SECOND PART OF HIS LIFE, HE SHALL TAKE TO A WIFE AND DWELL IN THE HOUSE.—(168).

Bhāṣya.

This verse sums up the Discourse.

The 'five sacrifices' are mentioned as including all duties.—(168).

END OF DISCOURSE V.

DISCOURSE VI.

Duties of the Hermit and the Renunciate.

SECTION (1).

Introductory.

VERSE (1).

THE TWICE-BORN ACCOMPLISHED STUDENT, HAVING, IN THE AFORESAID MANNER, LIVED, ACCORDING TO LAW, THE LIFE OF THE HOUSEHOLDER, SHOULD DWELL IN THE FOREST, IN THE PROPER MANNER, SELF-CONTROLLED AND WITH HIS ORGANS UNDER SUBJECTION—(1).

Bhāṣya.

The term '*gṛhāshrama*' means that '*āshrama*', *life-stage* which is characterised by the '*gṛha*', *house*,—i. e. the *presence of the wife.*

Having '*lived*' there,—i. e. having duly fulfilled the duties of that stage of life—he should dwell in the forest. This is the injunction here set forth.

The affix in '*sthitvā*', 'having lived', indicates the priority of the Householder's life to that of the Hermit; and the meaning is that one should proceed from stage to stage in the right order; it is only one who has lived the Householder's life that is entitled to the forest-life of the Hermit.

What is said here is in accordance with the view that a man should pass through each and all the four stages. There is however the other view that from the life of the purely celebate student also one can proceed at once to the forest-life; as is going to be described later on.

'*With his organs under subjection*'—with his impurities washed off, his passions calmed down.

The phrases '*according to law*' and '*in the proper manner*' have been added only for the purpose of filling up the metre ; as we have already explained in several places.

All that is meant to be enjoined here is that 'having completed the Householder's life, he shall betake himself to the life in the forest.'—(1).

The Procedure to be adopted.

VERSE (2).

WHEN THE HOUSEHOLDER NOTICES HIS WRINKLES AND GREYNESS, AND SEES HIS CHILD'S CHILD,—THEN HE SHOULD RETIRE TO THE FOREST,—(2).

Bhāṣya.

It has been said before that the person who is entitled to the life of the Hermit is only one who has abandoned all longing for the objects of sense : and this is what the author is explaining now.

'*Wrinkles*'—Looseness of skin.

'*Greyness*'—the whiteness of the hair.

'*Child's child.*'—They explain this to mean 'son's son'. And cultured people have held that this rule does not apply if the man has only a son born to his daughter, or a daughter born to his son.

Others however have taken the 'greyness of hair' and 'birth of the grandchild' only as indicative of *old age*. So that even if an old man's hairs may not, for some reason, become grey, he should, at the approach of old age, retire to the forest. Just as the person who has got a son and has his hairs still black is entitled to the 'kindling of fire', so is the man who has got a grandson and has his head turned grey entitled to the Hermit's life. And in the former case also 'the birth of the son' and 'blackness of hair' are only indicative of a certain age.

Some people have taken the text to mean that 'one should retire into the forest *neither too early nor too late in life*.' But in is necessary to find out an authority for this.—(2).

VERSE (3).

HAVING GIVEN UP CULTIVATED FOOD AND ALL HIS BELONGINGS, HE SHALL REPAIR TO THE FOREST, EITHER MAKING OVER HIS WIFE TO HIS SONS, OR ALONG WITH HER.—(3).

Bhāṣya.

From this time onward he shall not eat any food consisting of barley, paddy and the like ;—this is what is meant by '*having given up*'. This is what has been described as 'living on roots.'

'*Belongings*'—Consisting of cows, houses, clothing, seats and beds, etc.

If the wife wishes it, then they should go away together ; otherwise he shall go alone. Others explain the text to mean that if the wife is still young he shall commit her to his sons, and if she is old, he is to take her with himself.

It is only when the wife is there that there can be any rule regarding her either being made over to the sons or going to the forest with her husband. If the wife has died, then also the man should retire to the forest, as declared by Āpastamba and others, in connection with the 'Re-kindling of Fire.'

Only that man can be a Hermit whose senses are not too mobile ; otherwise, he should take another wife ; such is the established rule.—(3).

VERSE (4).

TAKING WITH HIM THE SACRED FIRE, AS ALSO ALL THE RITUALISTIC APPURTENANCES OF THE FIRE, THE MAN SHALL GO FORTH FROM THE VILLAGE TO THE FOREST AND LIVE THERE, WITH HIS SENSES UNDER CONTROL.—(4).

Bhāsya.

The term '*agnihotra*' here stands for the *fires* themselves.

Taking with himself the Fires that had been kindled according to Shrauta rites, and also '*the ritualistic appurtenances of the Fire*'—in the shape of the *sruk*, the *sruva* and the rest. The abandoning of all belongings having been laid down, the present text makes an exception in favour of those pertaining to the Fires—(4)

SECTION (3)

Details of the Hermit's Life.

VERSE (5).

THESE SAME 'GREAT SACRIFICES' HE SHOULD OFFER, ACCORDING TO RULE, WITH VARIOUS KINDS OF PURE FOOD FIT FOR HERMITS, OR WITH HERBS, ROOTS AND FRUITS.—(5).

Bhāṣya.

'*These same*'—those that have been prescribed for the Householder;—'*he should offer*'—perform.

'*According to rule*':—this is a reiteration, for the purpose of filling up the metre.—(5).

VERSE (6).

HE SHOULD WEAR EITHER SKIN OR A BIT OF CLOTH; HE SHALL BATHE IN THE EVENING, AS ALSO IN THE MORNING; HE SHALL ALWAYS WEAR MATTED LOCKS, AS ALSO BEARD, HAIR ON HIS BODY AND NAILS.—(6).

Bhāṣya.

Skin—of the bull, the deer and other such animals.

'*Chīra*'—a bit of cloth.

'*Evening*'—end of the day.

'*Morning*'—opening of the day.

This rule regarding bathing in the evening implies that the man is to eat at night only; because bathing after meals is forbidden.

This view, some say, is not right; because among the observances of the Accomplished Student, it is said that 'after taking his food he shall bathe' (which shows that bathing after meals is not entirely forbidden). In fact this bathing after meals is declared in the *Mahābhārata* as to be done by each and every person.

It is open to the Hermit to bathe thrice during the day—this being a matter of option.

'*Matted locks, beard, hairs on the body and nails*';—all this he shall not have cut.—(6)

VERSE (7).

WHAT HE EATS, OUT OF THAT HE SHOULD MAKE THE OFFERINGS AND GIVE ALMS, ACCORDING TO HIS CAPACITY; AND THOSE WHO COME TO HIS HERMITAGE HE SHOULD HONOUR WITH WATER, ROOTS AND FRUITS AND ALMS—(7).

Bhāṣya.

It has been said that 'food fit for hermits' should be used; this consists of wild grains, such as *Nīvāra* and the rest, and of wild-growing herbs, etc. The term '*anna*', 'food', is generally used in the sense of some *preparation of grains*,—such as rice, fried flour, cake and so forth; and it is for this reason that, though herbs, &c., also are 'food fit for hermits', they have been mentioned separately. 'Hermits' are ascetics, and their food is called 'food fit for hermits.' And what is meant (by verse 5) is that the man should perform the Five Sacrifices, which are duties related to cooking on the household fire. This might give rise to the notion that when the man lives upon ripe season-fruits (and does not cook his food) he should not offer the said sacrifices; it is with a view to preclude such a notion that the Text adds—'*what he eats*'; the meaning is that whatever, in the shape of flour, &c., he eats, that he should offer to the best of his capacity.

'*Offerings*'—apart for the Agnihotra libations; those that are laid down as to be made to '*Indra*' '*Indrapuruṣa*' and so forth.

In this view, there are no offerings poured into the fire,—they say.

But this is not right; as the term '*bali*', 'offering', is a generic name for all kinds of oblations; and hence it stands equally for those offered into the fire, and those not offered into the fire.

If the right view to take were this that 'one shall offer only what he eats;—and that also into the fire only,—and that offerings into the fire must consist of *cooked* food',—then the hermit would cook just that much herb, &c. as would be needed for the offerings, and he himself would eat the ripe fruits of the season. Even for one who lives upon season-fruits, it is necessary to offer the *Vaishvadēva* oblations into fire.

The compound in the second line is a copulative one, formed of '*ap*', 'water', and the rest; the meaning being that 'the traveller that happens to come to his hermitage he shall honour with water, roots, fruits and alms—consisting of *Nīvāra* and other grains'.—(7).

VERSE (8).

HE SHOULD BE ALWAYS ENGAGED IN VEDIC STUDY, MEEK, CONCILIATORY, QUIET, EVER LIBERAL, NOT ACCEPTING ANY GIFTS, AND COMPASSIONATE TOWARDS ALL LIVING BEINGS.—(8).

Bhāṣya.

This being a distinct stage of life, people might think that such duties as Vedic Study and the like, which pertain to other life-stages, should have to be omittēd now; hence with a view to show that they do not cease, the Text has added—'*always engaged*'; and not as in the Householder's stage, during which, the man being busy with his household work, their performance leaves no time for Vedic study and such duties.

'*Meek*'—endowed with humility; free from haughtiness.

'*Conciliatory*'—abounding in the friendly spirit; always saying what is agreeable and wholesome; ever ready to conciliate his neighbour.

'*Quiet.*'—Even when urged by others, he should not speak much of what may be irrelevant.

'*Ever liberal*'—in making gifts of water, fruits and roots

'*Not accepting any gifts*'—He should not beg anything for his medication or diet and such needs, from a person belonging to another stage of life and coming to see him.

'*Compassionate towards all living beings.*'—'Compassion' is *pity*. But even though he be compassionate, he should not, for the sake of any person, beg anything from another person.—(8).

VERSE (9).

HE SHALL OFFER, ACCORDING TO RULE, THE SACRIFICIAL OBLATIONS, TAKING CARE NOT TO OMIT THE 'DARSHA' AND THE 'PAURṆAMĀSA' SACRIFICE.—(9)

Bhāṣya

'*Vitāna*', *is vihāra, sacrifice*'; what pertains to it is '*sacrificial*', '*vaitānikam*'; i. e. the rites pertaining to the Three Fires;—this he shall '*offer*', perform.

The term '*agnihotra*' primarily denotes the wild barley and other substances that are employed in sacrificial oblations; and it is not the name of a particular rite; it is in this sense that we have the term used as the object of the verb '*shall offer*'; and we get at the meaning that 'he shall offer, by means of the *Agnihotra* and other rites, the oblations into the *Āhavanīya Fire*;'—it is in this way that the use of the verb '*juhuyāt*', '*shall offer*' becomes justified. In this explanation the word '*agnihotra*' becomes synonymous with the denotation of the root '*hu*', 'to offer into the fire.'

Objection—"The text has just prescribed the optional alternative of committing his wife to his sons; in this case how can the man, in the absence of his wife, be entitled to the performance of *shrauta* rites? It might be said that 'the man would be entitled to them in the same way as the man away from home is entitled; just as the man who is away from home, though at a distance from the Fires, is regarded as the *performer* of the rituals by reason of his having made arrangements for the offerings to be made

by a proper substitute, in the same manner, in the case in question, when the man is starting for the forest, his wife shall permit him to carry on the rituals ; and in this manner the joint character of the title would not be disturbed.' But this cannot be right. The procedure of employing a substitute is permissible only in cases where the man is forced by human or divine agencies to go away from home, and not when he goes out of his own accord. Because in such a procedure, many of the details would become omitted, even though the man would be perfectly capable to accomplish them (if he himself remained at home) ; e.g. in connection with the *Darsha-Paurṇamāsa* sacrifices it is laid down that the *sacrificer* shall *make his wife repeat* the *mantra* '*vedo-si vittirasi*, &c.' ; and this would be omitted (during the sacrificer's absence).

"It might be said that the rule laid down in the present verse may be taken as pertaining to the case where the householder is retiring to the forest *along with his wife* (and not when he is going alone, leaving her in charge of his sons). But this also is not possible; because we do not find any such restrictive specification. Further in connection with the contigency of leaving the wife behind, the scriptures have prescribed another method of disposing of the Fires (in the shape of the direction that they should be committed to the charge of the wife.)

"Then again, even if the rule were taken as pertaining to cases where the wife accompanies the husband, the following direction (contained in verse 11) would not be relevant—'With pure grains, fit for hermits, which grow in spring and in autumn, and which he has himself collected, he shall prepare the cakes and the boiled messes, according to law' ;—the grains meant here are the wild ones, *Nīvāra* and the like, because he has been directed to relinquish all his village-belongings ; and yet in the Veda cakes are laid down as to be made of *Vrīhi* and other grains, which are *cultivated*. Nor could the rite be completed by using any other pure grain, either in accordance with the maxim that 'whatever is produced may be used' ('*Utpanna-nyāya*'), or in accordance with the law of options (*Vrīhi-*

nyāya). Because any such grains it would be difficult for the wife to obtain. Lastly, the performance of the *Agnihotra* being a life-long duty, how can there be any relinquishing of that rite, or of the wife? From all this it is clear that the rule regarding the entering into the next stage of life is not compatible with the performance of the Sacrificial Acts."

On this point a special effort has to be made (for reconciling the apparent discrepancy).

(A) Some people say that the term 'sacrificial' in the text has been used, by way of praise, for the *smārta* (not *shrauta*) rites; and in connection with the *smārta* rites there are no such scriptural restrictions as that cakes should be made of the *Vrīhi* and other *cultivated* grains only. In fact in connection with these rites it has been declared that—'The deities of a man partake of the same food as the man himself' (Vālmīki-Rāmāyaṇa *Ajodhyā kāṇḍa*). So that there would be nothing wrong if the Hermit performed these rites with 'grains fit for the hermit.' Even if this were incompatible with the injunctions regarding the use of *Vrīhi* and other cultivated grains, this incompatibility could be easily explained away.

"But even in this case there would be the law relating to the joint right of the husband and wife to the performance, which would be infringed by the man doing it when separated from his wife."

Well, as regards the Vedic declaration—'One shall offer sacrifices, when accompanied by his wife,'—this can pertain to *shrauta* rites only [so that the said difficulty does not arise in connection with the *smārta* rites.]

(B) Another explanation is that the rule laid down in the present verse does not refer to the Householder's Fire at all; it refers to what has been prescribed by Gautama (3·27) regarding 'the kindling of fire in the month of *Shrāvaṇa*.' In the present treatise also, the author is going to add the phrase 'following the methods of the hermit' (Verse 21). From all this it is clear that the rites referred to here are those that have been prescribed in the

scriptures, as entirely apart from the rites relating to the Agnihotra, &c. And the terms '*Darsha*' and '*Paurṇamāsa*' too have been used only figuratively. Thus the said kindling of the Fire by the Hermit is to be done by him, without his wife. As regards the household Fires of the *Agnihotra*, the method of disposing of them is laid down (in verse 25 below) in the words—'Having reposited the sacrificial fires in himself, &c. &c.'

As regards the contention based upon the life-long character of the *Agnihotra*-rite, that the abandoning of the Fires cannot be right,—we shall deal with this when we are considering the question of the sequence among the four life-stages.

(C) Others again explain as follows:—What has been forbidden for the Hermit is the act of offering oblations of cultivated grains, and not that of employing these for the sake of the Deities.

"But the sacrificer has got to eat of what is offered to the gods, according to the law that the four priests, with the sacrificer as the fifth, partake of the sacrificial cake."

True; but that *eating* is one that is prescribed by the scriptures, and not the ordinary one; and what has been forbidden under verse 3 is the *ordinary* eating. And for purposes of the scriptural act, even if the man were to go into the village, there would be nothing wrong in this; in fact it is going to be declared below (verse 28) that—'he may eat the food after having obtained it from the village.'

This however is not right; because of the express injunction that he is to make use of only such grains as are 'fit for hermits.'

Thus we find that the whole explanation regarding the text referring to the fire kindled during the month of *Shrāvaṇa* (explanation B above), and all that follows is not acceptable.

Further, verse 4 has spoken of the man '*taking with himself* the sacred fire',—and not *leaving it behind*. As for its being committed to another person, it is going to be laid down that it is to be done either by the man who is going to die, or who is going out for the first time. Then again, the *Tūrayāṇa* and other rites that are

prescribed (in verse 10) for the Hermit (and which are all *Shrauta* rites to be performed in the *Shrauta* Fire of the *Agnihotra*) cannot be explained, if the present verse refers to the fresh *Smārta* fire kindled in *Shrāvaṇa*. In fact, this latter Fire-kindling could be done only by one whose wife has died,—such being the implication of the actual words laying it down. Or, it may be done in a case where the man retires to the forest immediately after Studentship.

From all this it follows that when an *Agnihotrin* retires to the forest, he shall do so along with the Fire, and accompanied by his wife.

In the forest, the rites are to be performed 'according to law', with *Vrīhi* and other grains; and these grains (though belonging to the *cultivated* category) may somehow or other be brought under the category of 'grains fit for hermits.' Specially as *Vrīhi* and *Yava* (which are *cultivated* grains) are quite sacred.

For the man who has not maintained the Fire, the duty of 'committing the Fires to his wife' may be accomplished somehow with reference to the Fire kindled according to *smārta* rules. This would be only right, as both are '*smārta*' acts. In the case of a man who has two wives, and one of these has taken charge of the Fires, the 'committing of the wife to the children' would apply to the second wife.

'*Not omitting.*'—'Omission' is disobeying the Injunction; the non-performance of an act in the form in which it has been prescribed. This has been added only for the purpose of filling up the metre; similarly also the term '*yogaṭaḥ*', '*taking care.*' The construction is '*yogaṭaḥ askandayan*', '*taking care not to omit*', i. e., carefully keeping up. The 'care' here refers to the injunction itself—(9).

VERSE (10).

HE SHALL PERFORM THE DARSHĒṢṬI AND THE ĀGRAYAṆA, AS ALSO THE CHĀTURMĀSYA SACRIFICES, AND THE TURĀYAṆA AND DĀKṢĀYAṆA IN DUE ORDER.—(10).

Bhāṣya.

'*Darshēṣṭyāgrayaṇam* is a copulative compound consisting

of the two terms '*darshēṣṭi*' and '*āgrayaṇa*'. '*Chāturmāsya*' '*Turāyaṇa*' and '*Dākṣāyaṇa*' are the names of particular *shrauta* rites.

According to some people the performance of the *Turāyaṇa* and the rest is obligatory—(10).

VERSE (11).

WITH THE PURE GRAINS FIT FOR HERMITS, WHICH GROW IN SPRING AND IN AUTUMN, AND WHICH HE HAS HIMSELF GATHERED, HE SHALL SEVERALLY PREPARE CAKES AND BOILED MESSES, ACCORDING TO LAW—(11).

Bhāṣya.

If the phrase '*grains fit for hermits*' is not connected with what has gone before, then there is no room for the objection—"how can the sacrificial offerings be made, which are laid down as to consist of *Vrīhi* and other cultivated grains ?"

The 'boiled mess' and 'cake' meant here are those that have been prescribed by the rules laid down for Hermits.

'*Vāsanta*'—those that grow, or ripen, during spring; similarly '*shārada*'.

'*Sacred*'—this is a mere re-iteration.

'*Which he has himself gathered*'.—This forbids such means of livelihood as receiving gifts and the like. For the due fulfilment of the aforesaid *smārta* rites, grains have to be gathered by wandering hither and thither.

'*According to law*', '*severally*'.—Both these terms are added for filling up the metre.—(11).

VERSE (12).

HAVING OFFERED TO THE GODS THAT MOST PURE OFFERING CONSISTING OF WILD-GROWING THINGS, HE SHALL TAKE TO HIMSELF THE REMNANT, AS ALSO THE SALT PREPARED BY HIMSELF—(12).

Bhāṣya.

He should eat only what remains after the offerings to the

gods have been made on the New and Full moon days,—and not any herbs, roots, fruits and the rest.—'*He shall take to himself the remnant*';—shall use it for his own purposes, i.e. for the sustaining of his body.

He should eat only such salt as is '*prepared by himself*' and not rock-salt &c.—(12).

VERSE (13).

HE SHOULD EAT THE VEGETABLES THAT GROW ON LAND AND IN WATER; ALSO FLOWERS, ROOTS AND FRUITS, THE PRODUCTIONS OF PURE TREES; AS WELL AS OILS PRODUCED FROM FRUITS.—(13).

Bhāṣya.

He should eat those growing on land and in water; as also flowers, roots and fruits.—(13).

VERSE (14).

HE SHALL AVOID HONEY, MEAT, CABBAGES, MUSHROOMS, THE FRAGRANT GRASS, THE POT-HERB AND THE 'SHLĒṢMĀTAKA' FRUITS.—(14).

Bhāṣya.

'*Bhaumāni Kavakāni*'.—The term '*kavaka*' has already been explained (under 5·5) as a synonym of '*chhatraka*' (mushrooms). These mushrooms grow on the ground, as also in the hollow of trees and other places. Hence the specification 'land-grown'.

This however would appear to be contrary to usage; specially as among the duties of the Householder, all kinds of mushroom have been forbidden, and for the Hermit, the discipline, if anything, should be stricter.

For this reason the term '*bhaumāni*' should be taken separately by itself; and it should be understood as standing for the '*gojihvikā*' (cabbage), which is well-known among foresters,—and not for *anything grown on the land.*

Mushrooms having been already forbidden before, their repeated prohibition in the present text is for the purpose of indicating that the eating of the fragrant grass and other things involves the same Expiatory Rite as that of mushrooms.

'*Bhustṛṇa*' (fragrant grass) and '*shiyruka*' (pot-herb) are the names of particular kinds of herbs well known among cultivators—(14).

VERSE (15).

IN THE MONTH OF ĀSHVINA, HE SHALL THROW AWAY THE FORMERLY-GATHERED 'HERMIT'S FOOD', AS ALSO THE WORN-OUT CLOTHES AND THE HERBS, ROOTS AND FRUITS. —(15).

Bhāṣya.

This throwing away of the food during the month of *Āshvina* is applicable to cases where the man is either one who lays by provision for six months or for one who does it for a year.

"As a rule hermits' food should be collected only in such quantities as may be actually needed for the rites to be performed; so that there can be no surplus; under the circumstances, what would be there to be thrown away?"

The answer to this is as follows:—At the time that the man is gathering food he cannot always keep a weighing balance in his hand; hence it is quite possible that some small quantities may be left over; and it is these that have to be thrown away during the month of *Āshvina.*

'*Worn out clothes*'.—There is no throwing away of such clothes as are not worn out.—(15).

VERSE (16).

HE SHALL NOT EAT ANYTHING PRODUCED BY PLOUGHING, EVEN THOUGH IT MAY HAVE BEEN THROWN AWAY BY SOME ONE; NOR SUCH FLOWERS AND FRUITS AS ARE GROWN IN VILLAGES, EVEN THOUGH HE IN BE IN DISTRESS. —(16).

Bhāṣya.

Of forest-grown things also, those 'produced by ploughing' are forbidden; whlie things grown in villages, even though not 'produced by ploughing', have been already forbidden by verse 3 above; the present fresh prohibition is meant for flowers and fruits, and this prohibition applies to the use of village-grown flowers and fruits in the worshipping of gods &c.

'*Even though he be in distress*'.—That is, even though nothing else be available, and the worshipping of gods be absolutely necessary,—these things shall not be used even as substitutes.

The term '*api*', '*even*', should be construed away from where it occurs; the sense being—'*even* flowers shall not be used, what to say of *grains* ?'—(16).

VERSE (17).

HE MAY BE ONE LIVING ON FOOD COOKED BY FIRE, OR ONE EATING ONLY WHAT RIPENS IN ITS OWN TIME; HE MAY USE THE STONE FOR GRINDING OR HE MAY USE HIS TEETH AS THE MORTAR.—(17).

Bhāṣya.

'*One living on food cooked by fire*'.—One whose food consists of vegetables and rice &c. cooked by fire.

Or he may eat only such fruits of trees as ripen themselves in their season.

Or his food may consist of flour obtained by grinding *nīvāra* and other grains. That is, he should grind these grains, and having thus turned them into dough, eat it.

Or this phrase may mean that those nuts that ripen in their own season, and which have a kernel beneath a hard crust,—the outer crust of these should be broken with stone and the inner kernel eaten.

'*Dantolūkhalikaḥ*'.—One who has his teeth for the mortar. That is the outer crust of nuts may be removed with the teeth. This however ought not to be done even though the nut may have been cleaned.

Or the phrase may be taken as qualifying the eating; the sense being that—'he shall eat in such a way that his teeth may serve the purposes of the mortar, in the thumping and removing of chaff'.—(17).

VERSE (18).

HE MAY BE EITHER ONE WHO WASHES OFF IMMEDIATELY, OR ONE WHO LAYS BY FOR A MONTH, OR ONE WHO LAYS BY FOR SIX MONTHS, OR ONE WHO LAYS BY FOR A YEAR.—(18).

Bhāṣya.

The food that has been described above, he should obtain day after day, just enough to serve for the day.

The man who has a collection that lasts for one month. The form is obtained by the adding of the affix '*ṭhan*'. Or the reading may be '*māsasañchayakaḥ*' and the word explained as a *Bahuvrīhi* compound: 'he whose collection is sufficient for a month'.

Similarly with the last two expressions.—(18).

VERSE (19).

HAVING COLLECTED FOOD TO THE BEST OF HIS ABILITY, HE SHOULD EAT IT AT NIGHT, OR DURING THE DAY; OR HE MAY DO IT AT EVERY FOURTH TIME, OR AT EVERY EIGHTH TIME.—(19).

Bhāṣya.

Two meals having been prescribed for the man's ordinary purposes, the present text lays down the dropping of one of these meals for the Hermit. The sense is that as age goes on advancing, the man should go on dropping the meal-times one by one. The 'fourth' meal-time is to be computed in the same manner as the 'eighth': Three days having elapsed, if one eats in the evening of the fourth day, he comes to be regarded as eating '*every eighth time*'. The act of *eating* being the subject-matter of the context, the 'fourth' (or 'eighth') time has to be taken as referring to that act.—(19).

VERSE (20).

OR HE MAY LIVE DURING THE BRIGHT AND DARK FORTNIGHTS IN THE MANNER OF THE 'CHĀNDRĀYAṆA' PENANCE; OR HE MAY EAT ONCE AT THE END OF EACH OF THE TWO FORTNIGHTS, BOILED BARLEY-GRUEL.—(20).

Bhāṣya.

Ends of the fortnights—i.e. the New Moon Day and the Full Moon Day;—on these two days he shall eat boiled barley-gruel;—'*once*' i.e. either in the morning or in the evening.—(20).

VERSE (21).

OR, HE MAY ALWAYS SUBSIST ONLY ON FLOWERS, ROOTS AND FRUITS, WHICH HAVE RIPENED IN THEIR OWN SEASON AND FALLEN DOWN SPONTANEOUSLY,—KEEPING FIRM IN THE WAYS OF LIFE PRESCRIBED IN THE 'VAIKHĀNASA' INSTITUTES.—(21).

Bhāṣya.

'*Ripened in their own season*'.—The jack-fruit and some other fruits are ripened (artificially) by means of fire also; and it is with a view to exclude these that this epithet has been added. But fruits ripened by means of fire are not forbidden for the Householder.

'*Vaikhānasa*' is the name of a treatise where the duties of the Hermit are prescribed;—keeping firm on these rules;—i.e. he should seek to learn also the other details of life prescribed in that treatise.—(21).

VERSE (22).

HE SHALL ROLL ABOUT ON THE GROUND, OR STAND ON TIP-TOE DURING THE DAY; HE SHALL BEGUILE HIS TIME BY STANDING AND SITTING, GOING TO WATER AT THE 'SAVANAS'.—(22).

Bhāṣya.

'*Rolling about*'.—Lying down on the ground on one side for sometime and then turning over on the other side. He shall pass his time thus rolling about, except during meal-time and the time during which he has to move about, he shall neither sit down nor walk about, nor sit on a bed, or a seat, or a parapet.

'*On tip-toe*'—'*prapadaiḥ*'.—'He shall stand'.

'*By standing and sitting*'.—During the day; as for the night, it is going to be declared that the man should sleep on the bare ground.

'*At the savanas.*'—i.e. in the morning, at midday and in the evening ;—'*going to water*'.—This indicates that where a river or some such reservoir of water is not available, one may perform his bath even with water pulled out (of a well).—(22).

VERSE (23).

DURING SUMMER HE SHALL KEEP FIVE FIRES; DURING THE RAINS, HE SHALL HAVE THE SKY FOR HIS SHELTER ; AND DURING THE WINTER HE SHALL KEEP WET CLOTHES ; GRADUALLY INCREASING HIS AUSTERITIES.—(23).

Bhāṣya.

He shall heat himself with five fires ; he shall kindle four fires close to himself on his four sides and shall expose himself to the sun at the head.

During the rainy season, he shall have the sky for his sole shelter; i.e. he shall live in a place where the rain falls, and he shall not hold the umbrella or any such thing to ward off the rain.

'*During the winter*',—i.e. whenever it is cold ; i.e. during the two seasons of *Hemanta* and *Shishira* (Winter and Mid-winter)—he shall have his clothes wet.

'*Gradually*'—In due course.—(23).

VERSE (24).

BATHING AT THE THREE SAVANAS, HE SHALL OFFER LIBATIONS TO THE GODS AND PITṚS ; AND PRACTISING HARSHER AND HARSHER AUSTERITIES, HE SHALL EMACIATE HIS BODY.—(24).

Bhāṣya.

'*Upasparshana*'—means *bathing*.

'*Austerities*'—such as holding up the arms permanently, fasting during the whole month, or for twelve days, and so forth.

'*Harsher*'—what is calculated to cause greater suffering to the body.

He shall '*emaciate*',—make to dry up,—his body.(24).

VERSE (25).

HAVING REPOSITED, ACCORDING TO RULE, THE SHRAUTA FIRES WITHIN HIMSELF, HE SHALL BE A SILENT HERMIT, WITHOUT FIRES AND WITHOUT A HOUSE, LIVING UPON ROOTS AND FRUITS.—(25).

Bhāṣya.

'*Vaitāna*'—*Shrauta.*

These fires he shall reposit within himself, by swallowing their ashes and perfoming such other rites as have been laid down in connection with it. The exact procedure of this *repositting* should be learnt from the *Shravanaka* (?).

When austerities have been performed for a long time, and the man has reached seventy years of age, then, still remaining a hermit, he shall be '*without fires and without a house*'; i e. he shall give up his thatched dwelling-house.

"Where then should be live ?"

He shall dwell '*at the roots of trees*',—as is going to be said in the next verse.

'*He shall be a silent hermit*'.—The construction is '*munih syāt*', 'he shall be a *muni*'; which means that he shall keep his speech under control; the man who has his speech under control is called 'a keeper of the vow of silence'.

'*Living upon roots and fruits*'.—This serves to exclude all other kinds of food; he shall not eat even *Nīvarā* and the other wild grains.—(25).

VERSE (26).

MAKING NO EFFORT TO OBTAIN PLEASURE-GIVING OBJECTS, AND MAINTAINING CELIBACY, HE SHALL SLEEP ON THE GROUND ; AND NOT CARING FOR SHELTER, HE SHALL HAVE THE ROOTS OF TREES FOR HIS DWELLING.—(26).

Bhāṣya.

He shall make no effort to obtain things that give pleasure ; e.g. troubled by heat, he shall not move into the shade, and troubled by cold, he shall not kindle fire. If, however, his sufferings are removed by such natural causes as the falling of the sun's rays and the like,—this is not forbidden. This rule refers to seasons other than the rains ; because special rules have been prescribed with special reference to this latter season.

Or, the text may be taken as prohibiting the use of medicines by the hermit if he happen to fall ill,—being cured of disease also being a kind of 'pleasure ;' hence he shall not make any effort to secure this pleasure.

'*Sleeping on the ground*';—i.e. he shall sleep on the ground, covered only with grass.

'*Shelter*'—dwelling-places, such as houses, tree-roots and so forth ;—for these he shall not care ; he shall not have any hankering after the possession of these.

He shall make the roots of trees his dwelling. In the event of their being not available, stone-slabs, mountain-caves and such places have also been ordained for him.—(26).

VERSE (27).

HE SHALL RECEIVE ALMS JUST ENOUGH FOR SUBSISTENCE, ONLY FROM BRĀHMAṆA-HERMITS, OR FROM SUCH TWICE-BORN HOUSEHOLDERS AS LIVE IN THE FORESTS. —(27).

Bhāṣya.

The Locative ending in '*tāpasēsu*' &c. has the sense of

the Ablative ; meaning 'from hermits'—'*he shall receive alms*', —in the event of his being unable to obtain fruits and roots ; —'*or from such householders as live in the forests*'.

'*Enough for subsistence*';—what is just sufficient to satisfy his hunger.—(27).

In the absence of such alms.—

VERSE (28),

WHILE DWELLING IN THE FOREST, HE MAY BRING FOOD FROM THE VILLAGE,—RECEIVING IT EITHER IN HIS HOLLOWED HAND OR IN A POTSHERD,—AND EAT EIGHT MORSELS.—(28).

Bhāṣya.

The use of the term 'morsel' implies that the alms are *not* to consist of fruits and roots only. In fact the present text permits the use of cultivated grains, in the absence of wild ones.

Receiving the alms either '*in the hollowed hand*'—without a dish—or in a piece of broken earthenware, dish, &c.—(28).

VERSE (29.)

THE BRĀHMAṆA DWELLING IN THE FOREST SHALL ATTEND TO THESE AND OTHER RESTRAINTS ; AND ALSO TO THE SEVERAL VEDIC TEXTS CONTAINED IN THE UPANIṢADS, IN ORDER TO ATTAIN THE SELF.—(29).

Bhāṣya.

These '*restraints*'—observances and '*others*'—such as standing in water, keeping the eyes closed and so forth.

'*Vedic texts contained in the Upaniṣads.*'—He shall study the texts contained in the esoteric sections of the Veda, and think of them and ponder over them ; '*in order to attain the Self.*'

Or this may refer to the several forms of worship that have been laid down for attaining Brahman.

'*Several*'—this is a mere re-iteration.—(29).

VERSE (30).

SUCH OF THESE AS HAVE BEEN ATTENDED TO BY SAGES AND BRĀHMAṆA HOUSEHOLDERS, FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE AND AUSTERITIES, AND ALSO FOR THE PURIFICATION OF THE BODY—(30).

Bhāṣya.

It has just been stated in general terms that 'he shall attend to *others*'; this might be taken to imply the propriety of practising the restraints and observances laid down in the '*Shākya*', the '*Pāshupata*' and other heterodox scriptures. Hence the present verse is added for the purpose precluding these.

'*By sages.*'—The *Mahabharata* describes several restraints and observances practised by the ancient sages.

Those attended to by '*Brāhmaṇa-householders*';—as has been declared under Gautama (3·9)—'This refers to those coming later, also, because there is no incompatibility in this.'.

'*Knowledge*'—the realising of the unity of the Self; this one should '*advance*'—confirm, strengthen—by the study of the Veda.

'*For the purification of the body*'—he should attend to the restraints relating to the regulation of food—(30).

VERSE (31).

OR, HAVING FIXED UPON THE NORTH-EASTERLY DIRECTION, HE SHALL GO FORWARD, MOVING STRAIGHT ON, INTENT AND LIVING UPON WATER AND AIR,—TILL THE FALLING OFF OF HIS BODY.—(31).

Bhāṣya.

The '*Aparājitā*' is the name of the North-Easterly direction, known among the people as '*Aishānī*';—'*Having fixed upon*' this direction—as "this is the direction towards which I shall go',—he should proceed towards it.

'*Moving straight on*'--not swerving from his path, not seeking to avoid even rivers and streams. This is a rule laying down the going towards the North-East.

'*Intent, living upon water and air, till the falling off of the body.*'—That is, until the body falls off, he shall live upon air and on water.

'*Intent*',—having concentrated himself by the rules of Yoga.

This refers to the 'Grand Journey' (towards certain death).—(31).

VERSE (32).

HAVING DISCARDED HIS BODY BY ONE OF THESE METHODS ADOPTED BY THE GREAT SAGES, THE BRĀHMAṆA, WITH SORROW AND FEAR DEPARTED, BECOMES EXALTED IN THE REGION OF BRAHMAN.—(32).

Bhâṣya.

The austerities spoken of above and the 'Grand Journey' just spoken of constitute '*the methods adopted by the Great Sages.*' By '*one of these*'—by drowning in a river, by falling from a preicipice, by burning one'self by fire, by starving one'self to death—one should discard his body.

The result of this is that 'with sorrow and fear departed' he reaches the regions of Brahman. '*Sorrow*' consists in the experiencing of the sufferings of hell, etc.,—'*Fear*'—of going to hell. Both these disappear for the man; and directly—not having to pass through the several stages of Light, etc.— he goes to the region of Brahman.

The '*region of Brahman*' is a particular place, superior than Heaven itself; and in that '*he becomes exalted*'—remains to honoured. This does not mean that he obtains the 'Self-sovereignty' of Brahman; since the text distinctly adds the term 'region'; specially as Liberation is going to be spoken as being led to from the *fourth* Life-stage.

They say that Liberation is not attained by mere Action.

But this is not right ; since in this very work it has been said—'he should study the Vedic texts contained in the Upaniṣads in order to attain the Self' ; and 'attainment of the Self' is nothing more than *meditating upon the Self and thereby becoming absorbed in it ;* there can be no other meaning of the term 'attain'. And further what is to be meditated upon by *yogins* in connection with the Upaniṣad-texts is the Self:—'One fixed in Brahman reaches immortality', 'he becomes absorbed therein' and so forth.

It might be argued that—"there are other forms of success proceeding from austerities, spoken of in such texts as 'if he is desirous of reaching the regions of the Pitṛs etc. etc.' ; wherein we find it stated that man can attain that degree of greatness which belongs to Brahman, and which is acquired by his determined activity ; but this cannot be *Liberation.*"

But this is not right. Because there is no distinction made. The man of action is just as much entitled to 'Immortality' (which is Liberation) as to the forms of worship leading to inferior results. It is nowhere declared that those forms of worship which relate to Non-duality shall be followed by the *Renunciate only.*

"But, having declared that 'there are three departments of *Dharma*', the Upaniṣad (Chhāndogya) names 'sacrifice, study and charity', which represent the duties of the Householder ; then it mentions 'austerity' which refers to the Hermit ; then it speaks of the 'Student dwelling in the Teacher's house', which refers to the Life-long Student ; and lastly it mentions 'one who is fixed in Brahman', and this refers to the Renunciate. Further on, it declares that the former three lead to 'sacred regions' ; from which it follows that it is the remaining fourth, the Renunciate, who attains Immortality."

Not so at all ; the term '*brahmasamstha*', 'fixed in Brahman', is used in its literal sense of 'one who is given up to meditating upon Brahman' [and this has no reference to any particular stage of life].

"If all men were equally entitled to it, then all that the Upaniṣad need have said is 'one who is fixed in Brahman reaches Immortality' [and nothing need have been said regarding the three life-stages]".

Not so ; what the passage means is that,—'the several life-stages lead to sacred regions, which constitutes the result mentioned in connection with the Injunctions relating to the stages ; but if, *while still in the same stages*, if a man fixes himself upon Brahman, he attains *Immortality*, which means *non-return to birth*.'

"Those who know the Self have declared that Brahman is non-dual ; and It is also called 'one in whom all activity has ceased' ; the Life-stages on the other hand, all constitute the path of activity, consisting of the performance of various acts leading up to various results ; so that there is a clear incompatibility between the 'knowing of the *non-dual* Self' and the performance of the *Agnihotra* and other rites, which are inseparable from the stages of the Householder &c., and which are all based upon notions of *diversity*".

Our answer to this is as follows :—This would be equally applicable to Renunciation also, which also consists of restraints and observances, which presuppose diversity.

It might be argued that—"For the man who has renounced all activity and entered the path of Inaction, there are no scriptural injunctions at all".

Such certainly is not the meaning of the scriptures. Renunciation is going to be described as 'the surrendering of the notions of *I* and *mine*', and not the abandoning of all that is enjoined by the scriptures. Further, in connection with the Renunciate also, when he is hungry and goes about begging food, the notion of action and agent is always present. Under the circumstances, what reasonable man could assert that—"in the case of the Renunciate there is no incompatibility between his engaging in the said acts pertaining to the ordinary worldly life and his realising of the non-dual Brahman,—while there is a

clear incompatibility between this latter and the performance of the *Agnihotra* and other acts prescribed by the scriptures" ?

The following argument may here be put forward :—"When the Renunciate is hungry and engages himself in eating, there is certainly incompatibility between this act and his knowledge of Self ; but this incompatibility or incongruity lasts during that ime only ; just when a man walks in the dark he may put hist foot upon thorny places ; but when the sun rises and he obtains sufficient light, he places his foot only upon the right path, which is free from thorns ; in the same manner, during the time that the man is suffering from hunger, he loses sight of his knowledge of Self ; but as soon as the cessation of hunger comes about, like light in the other case, his firm conviction regarding the Self reasserts itself and the man regains his knowledge".

The same may be said regarding the Hermit also.

For the Householder also, there would be nothing incongruous in his attending to his wife and children and also meditating upon Brahman.

"But how can the man of manifold activities, who has become identified with *diversitty*, ever obtain conviction regarding *Non-duality*" ?

In connection with the duties of the Householder also it has been laid down that—'he shall meditate in solitude' (4.248), and 'having made over eveything to his son &c.' (4.247).

"It has been declared in the *Shruti* that 'the man desiring heaven should not die before the span of his life has run out'; how then can there be any 'giving up of the body' for the Hermit ? It is not possible for the present text to restrict this *Shruti*-text to cases *other than that of the Hermit.* Because the *Shruti* is more authoritative, and as such, could not be restricted in its scope by the *Smṛti.*"

There would be no going against the said *Shruti* if the man were to seek death when his body is torn up by old age and by sorrows and he knows that death is near at hand. What the

Shruti says is 'before the span of his life has run out'; where as if dying were not considered right under any and every circumstances, then it would have simply said 'one desirous of heaven should not die.' Further, the Upaniṣads speak of several signs of approaching death; and these also have their use in connection with the *Shruti* in question; the sense being that 'unless a man knows of impending death by means of such signs he shall not seek to die."—(32)

SECTION. 4

The Renunciate.

VERSE. (33)

HAVING THUS PASSED THE THIRD PART OF HIS LIFE IN THE FOREST, THE MAN SHALL, DURING THE FOURTH PART, RENOUNCE ALL ATTACHMENTS AND GO FORTH (A WANDERING MENDICANT).—(33).

Bhāṣya.

Henceforward we have the description of the fourth life-stage.

'*Third part.*'—*i. e.* having remained in the forest *for some time*; for such time as would suffice for the due performance of austerities and the proper allayment of longing for objects of enjoyment. The phrase cannot be taken as standing precisely for the exact 'third part' of the man's life; because the period of the life-stage is not determined precisely with reference to one hundred years (the alleged span of man's life); because the time for entering on the third life-stage has been indicated as that marked by the appearance of 'wrinkles and grey hair'; and in every man these do not always appear at the completion of fifty years. Then again, elsewhere it has been declared that 'one should go forth on the completion of his austerities'.

"In the case of the other life-stages the time has been precisely indicated—*e.g.* (*a*) Studentship shall continue till the Veda has been got up, (*b*) the life of the Householder shall continue till the appearance of wrinkles and grey hairs; in the present instance however no such time is indicated; whether we take it to be the 'third part' as asserted in the present text, or 'on the completion of austerities,'—even so we stand in need of information regarding the exact time meant; for there is no knowing by what time one's austerities might be completed. For these reasons it is necessary that the time should be indicated by the words of the text."

It has already been explained that the 'third part of life' cannot be determined with reference to 'a hundred years'; and as regards the exact time, it has been clearly indicated by such words as—'one should take to the life of the Wandering Mendicant after the body has fully ripened'; which means that 'one should go forth after he has performed enough austerities, and till sufficiently advanced age, to be convinced that there is no more chance of any recrudescence of the passions.'

'*Having passed*'—having lived through; *i.e.* having carried on the duties as detailed above.

'Renouncing of attachment' consists in not harbouring notions of *I* and *mine*, in *resting within one'self*.—(33).

VERSE (34)

IF ONE, AFTER PASSING FROM STAGE TO STAGE AND AFTER OFFERING THE SACRIFICES, WITH SENSES SUBDUED, TIRED OF ALMS AND OFFERINGS,—GOES FORTH AS A WANDERING MENDICANT, AND THEN DIES, THEN HE PROSPERS.—(34)

Bhāṣya

This verse lends support to the view that one should pass through all the life-stages.—'*Passing from stage to stage*; that is passing from the Householder's stage to that of the Hermit.

'*After offering the sacrifices*'—during both the stages.

'*With senses subdued*'.—when he becomes so, then alone he should go forth.

'*If he dies, then he prospers*'—*i. e.* obtains most excellent for splendour,

'*Tired of alms and offerings*'—by having recourse to these a long time.

This is a reiterative reference to the duties of the Life-stages.—(35).

VERSE. (35)

ONE SHALL TURN HIS MIND TOWARDS LIBERATION ONLY AFTER HAVING PAID OFF THE THREE DEBTS ; WITHOUT HAVING PAID THEM, IF HE SEEKS FOR LIBERATION, HE SINKS DOWNWARDS.—(35)

Bhāṣya.

'*Paying off*'—Clearing off the debt.

'*One shall turn his mind towards Liberation*'.—The term 'liberation' here indicates the stage of Renunciation ; it is this stage that is spoken of as the principal path which leads to Liberation only ; not so the other stages (which lead to other results also) ; hence '*liberation*' means the *Stage of Renunciation*.—(35).

SECTION. 5

The manner of Paying the three Debts.

VERSE (36).

AFTER HAVING STUDIED THE VEDAS ACCORDING TO RULE, HAVING BEGOTTEN SONS IN THE RIGHTFUL MANNER, AND HAVING OFFERED SACRIFICES TO THE BEST OF HIS ABILITY,—HE SHALL TURN HIS MIND TOWARDS LIBERATION.—(36).

Bhāṣya.

This *Smṛti*-text reiterates what has been said in the following *Shruti*—'Man is born beset with three debts—the debt of sacrifice to the gods, the debt of offspring to the Pitṛs, and the debt of vedic study to the sages' (*Shatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*, 1.7.2.1).

"But the Jābāla-shruti has declared that—'one should go forth as a mendicant after having been a house-holder, or he may go forth directly after studentship'."

Our explanation of this is as follows :—What the text just quoted does is to mention the mere coming into existence of the stage of Renunciation ; and if it were taken in its literal sense it would be contrary to what is said in the following verse regarding the impropriety of 'going forth, without having begotten offspring'.

"Well, when we have the *Shruti* just quoted, what if it be contrary to a *Smṛti*-text ?"

We explain. The necessity of taking to the House-holder's life has been directly enjoined (with all its details) ; while all that the text does in regard to the Renunciate is to enjoin that 'one shall go forth' ; and nothing is said as to the rites to be performed by the Renunciate, or

the procedure to be adopted in regard to those rites. As regards the Householder on the other hand, the *Agnihotra* and other rites have been prescribed along with all their appurtenant details. This is what we meant (by urging that the *Shruti* text quoted, if taken in its literal sense, would be contrary to the *Smṛti*-text) Those persons then who, not knowing of the *Shruti* text describing the 'three debts', take their stand upon *Smṛti*-texts only, and become life-long 'students', find themselves running up against the 'Householder's Life' which has been directly enjoined.

There are some people who explain the Smṛti-texts relating to the 'Life-long Student' as applying to the case of such men as are suffering from impotence or some such debility, and are, on that account, not entitled to entering upon the Householder's Life.

But we do not understand what these people really mean. Their meaning may be as follows :—Such a person is not entitled to the rites laid down in the Shruti, on account of their being incapable of properly accomplishing such acts as *the examining of the clarified butter* (which cannot be done by the *blind*), or the *walk in Viṣṇu's steps* (which cannot be done by the *lame*); and that even so the said Shruti-texts have their application in the case of such men as are capable of duly accomplishing the rites with all the said details; so that there is no need for taking them as forcing the disabled persons also to perform the acts".

If this is what is meant, then as regards the *Smṛti*-texts also which speak of the 'Life-long student',—such a student also would have to 'fetch water for the Teacher,' to beg for food, and so forth; and in regard to the Renunciate also it has been declared that 'he shall not dwell in any one place for a second night'. So that how could the blind and lame be entitled to these life-stages as prescribed by the *Smṛti*-texts? In fact the Initiatory Ceremony (*upanayana*) itself is clearly indicative of all (the four life-stages). Hence the desire of the person for marriage, which is referred to later on (9·203) in the text—

'if he has need for a wife etc. &c.' Though in connection with the Initiatory Ceremony also, there are several details, such as *looking at the sun, going round the fire* and so forth (which cannot be done by the blind or the lame), yet—in as much as the uninitiated person, by reason of his having become an outcast, would not be entitled to marry,—it is open to the man to keep up his studentship, even though defective, by serving his Teacher to the best of his ability. As for the impotent man, he is, by his very nature, unfit for the Initiatory Ceremony; in fact, like the outcast, he is not entitled to anything at all.

From all this our mind is not satisfied with the view that the life of the Renunciate (directly after studentship), or that of the Life-long Student, is meant for disabled people. In fact the two methods may well be regarded as optional alternatives; as is done in the case of the two Vedic texts laying down oblations to be offered 'before sunrise' and 'after sunrise'. And it is in accordance with the alternative view that all the four life-stages should be passed through that we have the passage—'without paying off his debts &c.',—which is *deprecatory* and not *prohibitive* (of Life-long Studentship, or Direct Renunciation). Or, it may be taken as referring to cases where the married man is going to take to Renunciation.—(36).

VERSE (37)

THE TWICE-BORN PERSON, WHO SEEKS LIBERATION, WITHOUT HAVING STUDIED THE VEDAS, WITHOUT HAVING BEGOTTEN OFFSPRING, AND WITHOUT HAVING OFFERED SACRIFICES, SINKS DOWNWARDS. —(37).

Bhāṣya.

'*Sacrifices*'—such as the Animal-Sacrifice, the Soma-Sacrifice and the like, which are obligatory on persons who have set up the Fire.—(37).

SECTION 6.

Procedure of going forth as a Wandering Mendicant.

VERSE (38).

HAVING PERFORMED THE PRĀJĀPATYA SACRIFICE, WHEREIN ALL HIS BELONGINGS ARE GIVEN AWAY AS THE SACRIFICIAL FEE,—AND HAVING REPOSITED THE FIRES WITHIN HIMSELF,—THE BRĀHMAṆA SHOULD GO FORTH FROM HIS HOUSE.—(38).

Bhāṣya.

'*Prājāpatya Sacrifice*'—as prescribed in the Yajurveda; at this the giving away of all one's belongings is enjoined. After this has been performed, the Fires are reposited by the man within himself; the exact procedure of this *repositing* also has to be learnt from that same Veda.

The compound '*Sarvavedasadakṣiṇam*' is to be treated as a *Bahuvrīhi* compound; 'that at which all one's belongings are given away as the sacrificial fee'. '*Vedas*' mean *wealth*; and the whole of this is to be given away. This is the sense attributed to the '*aṇ*' affix in the term '*sarvavedasa*'. Or the '*aṇ*' affix may be taken in the reflexive sense; the '*Prajñādi* group' (which are laid down as taking the said affix in this sense) being a purely tentative one.

Others have explained the 'Prājāpatya sacrifice' as *human sacrifice*. At this latter the Brāhmaṇa forms the first animal to be sacrificed in accordance with the injunction 'the Brāhmaṇa should be sacrificed to Brahman'; and 'Prajāpati' is only another name for Brahman; and since a sacrifice is named after its chief deity, 'Prājāpatya' is the name for the *human* sacrifice. Further, it is only in connection with this sacrifice that the scriptures have enjoined the *giving away of all belongings*, *the repositing of the Fires within oneself* and *the going forth as a mendicant*. We have the following *Shruti*-text on this point:—'Having reposited the

Fires within himself, and regarding this repositing as a worship rendered unto Aditya, the man should go forth; then alone does he become securer than gods and men'.

Some people have held that the 'repositing of the Fires within himself', which is mentioned in connection with Renunciation, becomes fulfilled if the Fires are made over to the wife at her death; and hence Renunciation is to be taken to only in the event of the wife's death, when a second wife need not be taken.

But in that case the text bearing on the subject should have been in some such form as—'in the event of the wife dying first, the Fires should be made over to her at her funeral rite', and since the present treatise is the work of a human author, and not a Veda, the answer would not be available that no exception can be taken to its words. (?)—(38).

VERSE (39).

HE WHO GOES FORTH FROM HOME AFTER HAVING GRANTED FREEDOM FROM ALL FEAR TO ALL BEINGS,—TO THAT EXPOUNDER OF THE VEDA BELONG REGIONS OF LIGHT.—(39).

Bhāṣya.

This verse eulogises the fourth life-stage at the expense of the Household̀ing stage.

At sacrifices animals are killed; the cutting of herbs and grasses also constitutes 'killing', according to the theory that 'all that grows is animate'. It is this that constitutes the 'fear' of living beings. So that when one has gone away from home, and has disposed of the Fires, there is no such fear from him. This is what is meant by the words—'*having granted freedom from fear to all beings.*' This also indicates that the Renunciate shall not pick up for his use any such leaves or twigs as have not quite dried up.

'*Of light*'—ever effulgent; where the rising and setting of the sun are not perceived; this is what is described by the words of the Upaniṣads—'Beyond this the sun does not rise or set.'—(39).

VERSE (40)

THE TWICE-BORN PERSON, FROM WHOM NOT THE SLIGHTEST DANGER ARISES TO LIVING BEINGS, SUFFERS NO DANGER FROM ANY SOURCE, WHEN HE HAS BECOME FREED FROM HIS BODY.—(40).

Bhāṣya.

The same idea is repeated again.

'*When he has become freed from his body*'—*i. e.* when his present body falls off. (40)

VERSE (41).

HAVING DEPARTED FROM HIS HOUSE, FULLY EQUIPPED WITH THE SACRED THINGS, HE SHALL GO FORTH, SILENT AND WHOLLY INDIFFERENT TOWARDS PLEASURES THAT MAY BE PRESENTED TO HIM.—(41.)

Bhāṣya.

'*Sacred things*'—the muttering of sacred texts, kusha-grass, water-pot and deer-skin;—'*Equipped*'—supplied—with these. Or '*pavitra*' may be taken as standing for the *purifying* penances.

'*Muni*',—'*silent*,'—speaking little.

'*Presented*'—offered by some person;—'*pleasures*'—pleasure-giving objects, such as nice food and the like, which may come to him by chance,—or the sounds of music &c.,—or sons and other relations. When these happen to be presented before him, he should be '*indifferent*' to them; *i. e.* he shall not look upon them for long with loving eyes, shall not listen to them, or shall not sit with them.—(41).

VERSE (42).

HE SHALL ALWAYS WANDER ABOUT ALONE, WITHOUT A COMPANION, IN ORDER TO ATTAIN SUCCESS; WHEN ONE REALISES THAT SUCCESS ACCRUES TO THE SOLITARY MAN, HE NEITHER FORSAKES NOR BECOMES FORSAKEN.—(42)

Bhāṣya

This verse enjoins solitude.

'*Alone*'—denotes the giving up of past acquaintances.

'*Without a companion*':—he shall not take with him even his former servant &c. It is only in this way that the man becomes free from friendship, hatred and love; and thus comes to look upon all things as equal. Otherwise, if a servant happen to be near him, he could have the notion that—'this man is *mine*, not that'; and this is the attachment that becomes the cause of bondage.

When he realises this, then he does not '*forsake*'—no son or anybody else is ever forsaken, by him; and hence he himself also is not '*forsaken*'—not separated from this son and others; *i. e.* he is not beset with the pain of separation from them. Otherwise—if there had been attachment—the giving up would cause great pain. In fact, for such a man no one dies, nor does he die for any one.—(42).

VERSE (43).

HE SHALL BE WITHOUT FIRES AND WITHOUT HOME; HE MAY GO TO A VILLAGE FOR FOOD;—DISINTERESTED, STEADY, SILENT AND CALMLY-DISPOSED.—(43)-

Bhāṣya.

The abandoning of the *Shrauta* fires has been mentioned before; this verse speaks of the abandoning of the *domestic* fire. Or this may be taken as forbidding the act of cooking, and of seeking for fuel for the fire required for the allaying of cold and such other purposes.

'*Niketa*' is home.

'*He may go*'—for one night—'*to a village for food*'; and having got what he needs, he should spend the rest of his time in the forest. This living in the village for a single night has been declared by Gautama. If the man happen to be near a village, then he shall enter it only for obtaining food; but if he happens to be far off from it, then he may dwell there for a single night, and pass on to the forest for the second.

'*Disinterested*';—he should not own his even such inanimate objects as the water-pot and the like. Or, it may mean that he shall not have recoursee to any remedy for his bodily ailments.

Some people read '*asaṅkusukaḥ*';—'*saṅkusuka*' means fickle, unsteady; and the opposite of this denotes firmness of mind.

'*Silent*'—with the organ of speech under his full control

'*Calmly disposed*'—Calm in disposition; i. e., he shall give up all mental imaginings; he shall be calm by *disposition* not in mere speech (43).

VERSE (44).

THE POTSHERD, THE ROOTS OF TREES, COARSE CLOTH, SOLITUDE, EQUALITY TOWARDS ALL,—ARE THE MARK OF THE LIBERATED MAN.—(44).

Bhāṣya.

The '*potsherd*'—the broken jar—shall be his dish and his begging-bowl;—the '*roots of trees*' shall be his home.

'*Coarse cloth*'—Rough and torn pieces of cloth.

'*Equality*'—towards the friend and the enemy, to one who is neither a friend nor an enemy, as well as towards himself.

'*Mark of the liberated person*'. What this means is that for such a man Liberation is quickly attained; not that the man becomes liberated by these alone.—(44).

VERSE (45).

HE SHALL NOT REJOICE AT DEATH; NOR SHALL HE REJOICE AT LIFE; HE SHALL AWAIT HIS TIME, JUST AS THE SERVANT AWAITS THE FULFILMENT OF HIS CONTRACT—(45).

Bhāṣya.

This denotes freedom from troubles.

He shall not seek death; nor shall he seek life, for the purpose of acquiring more knowledge.

'*He shall await his time*'.—He shall cultivate the habit of thinking 'let anything happen at any time it may'.

'*Just as the servant waits for the fulfilness of his contract*'—'This work I have got to do for him during the day,—if I stop in the middle, I shall not obtain full wages'.

Worldliness having thus ceased, when the man's body falls off, he attains Liberation, by this process and not by doing whatever he likes.—(45)

VERSE (46).

HE SHALL PLACE HIS FOOT SIGHT-PURIFIED, DRINK WATER CLOTH-CLARIFIED, UTTER SPEECH TRUTH-SANCTIFIED AND ACT WITH PURE MIND—(46).

Bhāṣya.

Having looked over the path with the eye, he should place his foot on a spot where there may be no animals to suffer from his tread.

It being already known that one should tell the truth, the term '*pūta*', '*sanctified*', is meant to show that the term '*satya*', '*truth*', is purely indicative; hence there is nothing incongruous in this.

One shall always remain *pure in his mind*; *i.e.* he shall not even think of possessing what belongs to another and so forth.—(46)

VERSE (47),

HE SHALL PATIENTLY BEAR IMPROPER WORDS, AND SHALL NOT INSULT ANYONE ; AND HE SHALL NOT MAKE ENMITY WITH ANY ONE, FOR THE SAKE OF HIS PRESENT BODY.—(47).

Bhāṣya.

When one speaks in a manner contrary to the scriptures, his words are called '*improper*'—*i.e.* hard, disagreeable taunts;—these he shall '*bear patiently*'—*i.e.* tolerate, not answer back. In fact, he shall not bear ill-will even in his mind ; what is implied by the direction is that 'on being cursed he shall pronounce a blessing," which forbids even mental perturbation ; and it does not mean that he shall actually ask the man—'is it well with you ?' Because if he spoke thus (and bore anger in his mind) he would be a liar, saying one thing and thinking of another.

'*He shall not insult*'—shall not show disrespect towards—any one. That is, he shall not omit to show respect to his elders.

'*For the sake of his present body ;*'—*i.e.* if some one were to strike his body—'he shall not make enmity with him.' He is to think all the time in the following strain—'what would it matter whether this body perished or not, I may have an effulgent body.'—(47).

VERSE (48).

TOWARDS AN ANGRY MAN HE SHALL NOT RETORT IN ANGER ; WHEN HE IS CURSED, HE SHALL PRONOUNCE A BLESSING ; AND HE SHALL NOT UTTER AN UNTRUE WORD, SPREADING OVER THE SEVEN OPENINGS.—(48).

Bhāṣya.

'*Seven openings*'—(1) Duty and wealth, (2) duty and pleasure, (3) wealth and pleasure, (4) pleasure and wealth, (5) pleasure and duty, (6) wealth and duty, and (7) wealth—pleasure—duty. He shall not utter an untrue word spreading over all these. All these are based upon notions of *diversity* ; and all diversity is untrue ; hence the word relating to these is called 'untrue

The sense is that the man shall speak only such words as pertain to Liberation.

Or, the '*seven openings*' may stand for the seven breaths in the head; and these are the 'openings' of speech. Or, it may stand for the six sense-organs and Intellect as the seventh. It is only when objects have been perceived by means of these that words speak of them. Others explain that the '*seven openings*' stand for the seven declensional terminations.—(48).

VERSE (49).

CENTERED IN SPIRITUALITY, DISINTERESTED, FREE FROM LONGINGS, WITH HIMSELF AS HIS SOLE COMPANION, HE SHALL WANDER FORTH IN THE WORLD, SEEKING BLISS.—(49).

Bhāṣya.

'*Spirituality*'—disposition to concentrate one's attention upon the quest for the true nature of the self;—'*centered*'—always thinking of it, he shall remain.

'*Disintrested*;'—this re-iterates what has been already said before regarding his not caring for the due fulfilment of *Dharma* and other things.

'*Nirāmiṣaḥ*'—free from longings. Flesh is '*āmiṣa*', which indicates (figuratively) *longing*, by reason of the fact that living beings have a great liking for flesh; and this longing is forbidden.

All the rest has already been explained before.—(49).

VERSE (50)

HE SHALL NEVER OBTAIN ALMS EITHER BY MEANS OF PRODIGIES AND PORTENTS, OR BY MEANS OF THE SCIENCE OF ASTROLOGY AND PALMISTRY, OR BY MEANS OF COUNSEL AND DISCUSSION..—(50)

Bhāṣya.

'*Prodigies*'—appearing in the heaven, in the atmosphere and on the earth, e. g. eclipess, the appearance of particular planets,

the appearance of a comet, reddening of the atmosphere, earthquake and so forth. The man shall not go about describing the probable effects of these, for the purpose of obtaining alms.

'*Portents*'—the evil effects of planetary aspects.

'*Science of astrology*'—the science which enables one to say—'To-day the moon is in the asterism of *Kṛttikā*, which is fit for starting on a journey and so forth.

'*Science of palmistry*'—which describes the effect of marks in the palms and other parts of the body.

'*Counsel*'—offering advice to the King and his subjects,—in such form as 'It is right to act in this manner,—make peace with this King—declare war with that—why did you do this?—why don't you do this?'

'*Discussion*'—the urging of arguments in sheer arrogance, for and against certain doctrines in regard to which there is difference of opinion.—(50)

VERSE (51).

HE SHALL NOT GO NEAR A HOUSE THAT IS FILLED BY HERMITS, BRĀHMAṆAS, BIRDS, DOGS OR OTHER MENDICANTS—(51)

Bhāṣya

'*Filled*'—where many people have collected for the purpose of obtaining food,—to such a place he shall not go for alms.—(51)

VERSE (52).

HIS HAIR, NAILS AND BEARD CLIPPED, EQUIPPED WITH VESSELS, STAFFS AND WATER-POT, HE SHALL CONSTANTLY WANDER ABOUT, SELF-CONTROLLED AND NOT CAUSING PAIN TO ANY LIVING BEINGS.—(52)

Bhāṣya

'*Vessels*'—to be described later on.

'*Staffs*'—three; the Renunciate being required to carry three staffs.

'*Kusumbha*'—is *water-pot*, not the colouring substance.

What is said in the second half of the verse has been already said before. (52)

VERSE (53)

HIS VESSELS SHALL BE NON-METALLIC AND FREE FROM HOLES; THE CLEANSING OF THESE HAS BEEN ORDAINED TO BE DONE BY WATER, JUST LIKE THAT OF THE VESSELS AT A SACRIFICE(53)

Bhāṣya.

'*Non-metallic* :'—His vessels for carrying food or water shall not be made of gold or other metals.

'*Free from holes*'—not having any holes etc.,

These are cleansed, like the sacrificial vessels, by means of water alone; but only when they are not stained; if there are stained, these should be removed by the use of other (cleaning) substances also. (53)

VERSE (54)

MANU, THE SON OF SVAYAMBHU, HAS DECLARED THAT THE VESSELS OF THE RENUCIATE SHALL BE A GOURD, A VESSEL OF WOOD OR OF EARTHENWARE, OR OF SPLITS. (54)

Bhāṣya

'*Splits*'—i. e. of cane, or bamboo or such other split things.

'*Vessels of the Renunciate*'—for carrying food and water. (54)

VERSE (55)

HE SHALL GO FOR ALMS ONLY ONCE, AND SHALL NOT SEEK FOR A LARGE QUANTITY; BECAUSE THE RENUNCIATE WHO BECOMES ADDICTED TO COLLECTING ALMS BECOMES ATTACHED TO SENSUAL OBJECTS ALSO. (55)

Bhāṣya

What is laid down here is that the man shall *eat once*, this being the purpose of the alms; it does not mean that he shall go to

beg only once. What is intended here is the prohibition of eating twice; that is, the man, having gone for alms once, shall not save out of it for eating again. It is with a view to this that we have the prohibition *of eating*. It is for this reason that the text adds-'*he shall not seek for a large quantity*;' *Seeking for a large quantity* can only be for the purpose of eating again and again ; specially because for one who delights in solitude, large quantities of food would not be wanted for the sake of servants and other dependents. By supplying a reason for what is laid down, the text implies that even at a single meal the man shall not eat too much.—(55)

VERSE (56).

THE RENUNCIATE SHALL GO FOR BEGGING ALMS AT A TIME WHEN THERE IS NO SMOKE ISSUING, WHEN THE PESTLE HAS CEASED TO PLY, WHEN FIRE EMBERS HAVE BEEN EXTINGUISHED, WHEN PEOPLE HAVE EATEN, AND WHEN THE REMOVAL OF THE DISHES HAS BEEN FINISHED.—(56)

Bhāṣya

That time at which people have already eaten. Similarly with the other epithets, '*Vidhūmē*' and the rest.

'*Removal of the dishes*'—the throwing away of the dishes in which people have taken their food; when this has been finished.

From all this what follows is that he shall beg for food after the first occasion for the giving of alms, during the first instalment of the cooking, has passed away.

'*When there is no smoke*' etc., indicate the impossibility of the cooking being done again.

When the pestles have '*ceased to ply*'—i. e. kept aside.—(56)

VERSE (57).

HE SHALL NOT BE SORRY AT NOT OBTAINING ALMS; NOR SHALL HE REJOICE AT OBTAINING IT; HE SHALL HAVE ONLY WHAT SUFFICES TO SUSTAIN HIS LIFE, AND BE FREE FROM ALL ATTACHMENT TO HIS ACCESSORIES.—(57)

Bhāṣya

If at the stated time he should fail to obtain food, he shall

not be '*sorry*,' dejected in mind. He shall not allow grief or joy to overtake him at failing or succeeding to obtain food.

'*What suffices to sustain his life.*'—This indicates the quantity of food to be begged. What this implies is that in the event of his failing to obtain alms, he shall sustain his life by such fruits, roots and water as do not belong to another person.

'*Accessories*—vessels, staff and so forth ;—'*attachment to these*'—i. e. making special efforts to obtain them ;—from this he should be '*free*'; that is he shall harbour no longings.—(57)

VERSE (58).

HE SHALL DISDAIN ALL HONORIFIC PRESENTS ; BY HONORIFIC PRESENTS THE RENUNCIATE, EVEN THOUGH LIBERATED, BECOMES FETTERED—(58).

Bhāṣya.

"*Honorific presents*'—what is given after due honouring ;—this he shall '*disdain*'—deprecate, shun ; and what is deprecated he shall not do.

'*All*'—at all times ; not even for a single day he shall accept such an alms.

The second half of the verse is a purely laudatory exaggeration ; in reality one who has been liberated can never be '*fettered*' again.—(58).

VERSE (59)

BY EATING LITTLE FOOD AND BY STANDING AND SITTING IN SOLITUDE, HE SHALL RESTRAIN HIS SENSES, WHEN ATTRACTED BY SENSUAL OBJECTS.—(59).

Bhāṣya.

'*In solitude*'—in a place devoid of people—he shall stand and sit.

This indicates that 'subjugation of the senses' is the result of living in solitude. Or, it may be taken to be indicative of *freedom from curiosity*.

He shall not stay even for a moment at a place where large number of people, men and women, with various kinds of dress and ornaments, congregate.—(59)

VERSE (60)

BY THE RESTRAINING OF THE SENSES, BY THE DESTRUCTION OF LOVE AND HATRED, AND BY NOT INJURING LIVING BEINGS, HE BECOMES FIT FOR IMMORTALITY.—(60)

Bhāṣya.

'*Restraining*'—preventing from operating on their objects.

'*Becomes fit for immortality.*'—He is enabled to become immortal. This shows that what is mentioned here is as useful as self-knowledge itself.—(60)

VERSE (61)

HE SHOULD REFLECT UPON THE CONDITIONS OF MEN, ARISING FROM THE DEFECTS OF THEIR DEEDS, THEIR FALLING INTO HELL AND THEIR SUFFERINGS IN THE ABODE OF THE DEATH-GOD.—(61)

Bhāṣya.

What is stated here is a mode of meditating upon the Supreme Truth, consisting in the noting of the fact that birth and rebirth abound in pain.

Finding that life in the world abounds in sufferings caused by the separation from friends, relations, sons and wife and the loss of wealth &c., how could the man voluntarily go on undergoing the physical troubles of wandering about, begging for alms and so forth ?

The '*conditions*' of men abound in pain and result from the defects of their actions,—from their doing what is forbidden ; *e.g.*, such acts as doing injury to living beings, stealing, adultery, cruelty,

back-biting, improper intentions and so forth. Or 'conditions' may stand for what the man undergoes in the world of the living itself,—in the shape of sorrows resulting from poverty, disease, ill-treatment and so forth.

As regards the other world, there is '*falling into hell*'—*i.e.* being born as worms and insects in places filled with urine, ordure and dirt &c.

'*Sufferings in the abode of the death-god*'—in the form of *Kumbhīpāka* and other hells.

Something more has to be reflected upon (and this is pointed out in the next verse).—(61)

VERSE (62).

ON THE SEPARATION OF LOVED ONES AND THE MEETING OF HATED PERSONS ; ON BEING BESET WITH DECREPITUDE AND SUFFERING FROM DISEASES.—(62)

Bhāṣya.

The Accusative ending is due to the verse being construed along with the verb 'should reflect' (of the preceding verse.)

'*Loved ones*'—sons and other relations.

'*Separation*'—caused by their untimely death.

'*Hated persons*'—Enemies.

'*Meeting*'—in battle &c.

'*Decrepitude.*'—'Decrepitude' is a peculiar state of the body during the fourth quarter of man's age.—'*Being beset*'—*i.e.* having the shape of the body spoilt, feebleness, weakness of the senses, the advent of asthma and other diseases, being loved by none, being jeered at by all ;—all this constitutes being 'beset with decrepitude.'

'*Diseases*'—even before the advent of old age, some people are attacked by diseases.—(62)

Even when reduced to such a condition, if strong desires continue to appear in the man, he is, irresistibly and involuntarily led on to the following contingencies :—

VERSE 63.

THERE IS FOR HIS INNER SOUL DEPARTURE FROM THE BODY, THEN AGAIN BIRTH IN THE WOMB, AND TRANSMIGRATIONS AMONG MILLIONS OF LIFE-FORMS.—(63)

Bhāṣya.

There is '*departure*'—going out—of the life-breaths; and this constitutes unbearable pain.

'*Birth in the womb*'—where there are several kinds of pain: the organs are not yet developed, the child in the womb is in utter darkness, and it also suffers from diseases, described in the medical science, as proceeding from the extremely cold and hot foods eaten by the mother in varying quantities.

'*Transmigrations*'—passing through—'*among millions of life-forms*';—the soul being born in the bodies of lower animals, worms, insects, dogs and so forth.

Objection—"The Inner Soul is held to be omnipresent and eternal; how can there be any '*departure*' for it, when it is present everywhere? how again can there be any '*transmigration*' among life-forms? how too can there be any '*birth*' for it when it is eternal?"

Our answer is as follows:—The theory of some people is that there lies within the body the 'personality' of the size of the thumb, composed of rudimentary substances, mind and intellect; and it is this personality that goes on being born during the entire series of births and deaths; and when this becomes endowed with a certain merit, the faculty of consciousness becomes manifested in it; and it is through this faculty that the qualities of the said Personality come to be attributed to the Inner Soul.

Or, the explanation may be that the inner soul is related to certain entities in the shape of the life-breath and so forth; and when these depart, the soul is said to 'depart.' Similarly with 'birth.'

All this we shall explain again under Discourse XII and we need not prolong the discussion here.—(63)

VERSE (64)

ON THE INFLICTION OF PAIN UPON LIVING BEINGS, CAUSED BY DEMERIT; AS ALSO UPON THE IMPERISHABLE UNION WITH HAPPINESS PROCEEDING FROM THE ESSENCE OF MERIT.—(64)

Bhāṣya.

The '*infliction*'—experiencing—'*of pain*' proceeds from Demerit.

'*Merit*'—as described above, is an '*artha*', an '*entity*' and from this—entity, essence—proceeds '*union with imperishable happiness*'.

This also has to be reflected upon.

The meaning is that Renunciation constitutes the principal merit.—(64)

VERSE (65)

BY MEDITATION HE SHALL RECOGNISE THE SUBTILE CHARACTER OF THE HIGHER SELF, AS ALSO THE POSSIBILITY OF ITS PRESENCE IN ALL ORGANISMS, HIGH AND LOW.—(65)

Bhāṣya.

'*Meditation*'—steadiness of the functioning of the mind, as described by Patañjali. By means of that, '*he shall recognise the subtile character*' of the conscious entity in the body, the soul; and he shall not look upon either the body etc. or the life-breath etc, as the 'Soul,' which latter is to be understood, by the help of intuition born of meditation, as something different from all external and internal things;—this is what is meant by the text. Of the Soul, there are no grosser manifestations. And just as he can realise the 'possibility of its presence'—in the higher organisms in the form of the bodies of the Gods and other such beings—i. e. the fact of its ensouling these bodies and passing through experiences born therein, even though in reality it is omnipresent,—exactly in the same manner can one realise it also in the lower organisms, of lower animals, spirits, demons and so forth.

According to the philosophy of Monism, the souls in the organsims are only so many manifestations of the Supreme Self; and it is for this reason that the text has spoken of the man recognising the '*transmigrations* of the Higher Self.'—(65)

VERSE (66)

EVEN THOUGH HE BE ADORNED, THE MAN SHOULD FULFIL HIS DUTY, TO WHICHEVER ORDER HE MAY BELONG. HE SHOULD BE EQUAL TO ALL BEINGS ; MERE EXTERNAL MARKS ARE NOT CONDUCIVE TO MERIT.—(66)

Bhāṣya.

'*Adorned*'—with flowers, bracelets and other ornaments.

'*Duty*'—all that has been prescribed for the Renunciate, such as meditation on the Self and so forth, he shall perform with care. In fact one should perform the duties of that order to which he may belong.

One should not consider himself to have become a 'Renunciate' merely by wearing such external marks as the 'three staffs' and the like ; in fact '*he should be equal to all beings*;—that is, he should, with care, eschew all love, hatred and greed.

By deprecating the external marks it is not meant that the man should wear ornaments.—(66)

VERSE (67)

THOUGH THE FRUIT OF THE KATAKA TREE CLARIFIES WATER, YET WATER DOES NOT BECOME CLEAR BY THE MERE MENTION OF ITS NAME.—(67)

Bhāṣya.

When the fruit of the *kataka* tree is put in dirty water, the water becomes clarified, takes the clear form. But it does not become clear by the mere mention of the name of that fruit ; it

needs *action*. Similarly, the wearing of external marks is like the pronouncing of the name of the fruit ; and success is attained, not by that wearing alone, but by the due fulfilment of such duties as 'resting in solitude', 'meditation', 'equal-mindedness towards all beings' and so forth.

This verse is a laudatory supplement to what has gone before.—(67)

VERSE (68)

WITH A VIEW TO THE SAFETY OF LIVING BEINGS, HE SHALL ALWAYS, DURING DAY AND NIGHT, EVEN DURING BODILY ILLNESS, WALK AFTER HAVING SCANNED THE GROUND.—(68)

Bhāṣya.

This verse shows the necessity for what has been said above (46) regarding the treading on the ground 'sight-purified.'

'*Even during bodily illness*'—when the body is suffering from some disease ;—*during day and night*'—when the grass-bed has been spread for sleeping, he shall not lay down his body upon it without having carefully looked over it. The transgression of this rule involves the necessity of performing an expiatory rite.

Or, the text may be taken as referring to those minute animalcules that become attached to the man's body and perish by the mere moving of the limbs.—(68)

VERSE (69)

BY DAY AND BY NIGHT, IF THE RENUNCIATE UNINTENTIONALLY INJURES SOME LIVING CREATURES, HE SHALL, FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXPIATING IT, BATHE AND THEN PERFORM SIX 'BREATH-SUSPENSIONS.'—(69)

Bhāṣya.

'*Living creatures*'—here, should be understood as standing for minute animalcules ; 'for the expiation of the sin accruing from the injuring of these';—such is the construction of the passage.—(69)

SECTION (7)
Means of Removing Sin.

VERSE (70)

EVEN THREE 'BREATH-SUSPENSIONS,' ACCOMPANIED BY THE THREE 'VYĀHṚTI'-SYLLABLES AND THE SYLLABLE 'OM', WHEN DULY PERFORMAD, SHOULD BE REGARDED AS THE HIGHEST AUSTERITY FOR THE BRĀHMAṆA.—(70)

Bhāṣya.

By using the term '*brāhmaṇa*' the text implies that what is mentioned constitutes the duty of the whole caste, and is not restricted to the Renunciate only.

'*Even three*'—more than three lead to more excellent results; *three* are absolutely necessary.

'*Vyāhṛti syllables*'— those mentioned under 2.81.

'*Praṇava*'—the syllable 'om'.

The breath-suspensions are to be '*accompanied by these*'.—This indicates the duration of the breath-suspension.

These breath-suspensions are of three kinds, named '*Kumbhaka*' (total suspension), '*Pūraka*' (inhaling) and '*Rēchaka*' (exhaling). The total suppression of air passing out of the mouth and the nostrils constitutes the (inhalation and suspension); and when the man does not inhale breath but continuously keeps on exhaling, it is called 'Rechaka', 'exhalation.' The exact duration of each of these has been described under Discourse II. Or, in view of its being spoken of as 'austerity,' it may be continued till it becomes actually painful.—(70)

VERSE (71)

JUST AS THE IMPURITIES OF METALLIC ORES ARE CONSUMED WHEN THEY ARE BLASTED, EVEN SO ARE THE TAINTS OF THE SENSES CONSUMED THROUGH THE SUSPENSION OF BREATH.—(71)

Bhāṣya.

When the 'metallic ores,' of gold for instance, are blasted in

a furnace, what is left behind is pure gold ; similarly when the senses apprehend their objects, the man feels joys and sorrows, and these are productive of sin ; this sin is consumed through the suspension of breath.

For the man seeking Liberation, indulging in joys and griefs has been forbidden.

But even in a man who has given up all attachment, and has his organs under his control, these are bound to appear, in howsoever small a degree, through the sheer nature of things, whenever by chance various kinds of colour, sound &c. become presented before him. And it is for the removal of the taints due to these that breath-suspensions have to be practised.—(71)

VERSE (72)

BY MEANS OF 'BREATH-SUSPENSION' HE SHALL DESTROY THE TAINTS ; AND BY MEANS OF 'CONCENTRATION,' ALL SIN ; ALL ATTACHMENTS BY MEANS OF 'ABSTRACTION,' AND BY MEANS OF 'CONTEMPLATION,' THOSE ATTRIBUTES THAT ARE NOT INDEPENDENT.—(72)

Bhāṣya.

What is said here regarding Breath-suspension has already been indicated in the preceding verse.

But some people explain this verse to mean that 'one shall destroy the *taints*'—i. e. *love*, *hatred* &c.

But how can these latter be destroyed by means of Breath-suspension ? What can be destroyed by it is *sin* (not *love* &c.); specially as it is sin only which has its *origin* as well as *destruction* both indicated in the scriptures, and hence imperceptible ; while Love or Hatred and the rest are all directly perceptible ; so that what destroys these, and what is destroyed by them, can also be learnt by perception, and not through the scriptures. If the scripture were to speak of the destroying of these, its meaning would be that 'one should destroy these things, which are by their very nature, destructible';—and what would be the authority attached to such a declaration ? From all this it is clear that what is meant by the term 'taint' is the *evil deed* that proceeds

from Love and the rest. And this is 'destroyed' by the destruction of its effects ; because as for the act itself, it perishes by reason of its evanescent character. This is what is meant by '*dāha*', 'being consumed', and not being actually *burnt to ashes*.

Thus the present verse is only a reiteration of what has gone before in the preceding verse.

'*By means of Concentration*'—

Objection—" '*Kilviṣa*' is *sin*, so is '*doṣa*' also. Hence the words of the text should have been 'by means of Breath-Suspension and Concentration he shall destroy all *taints*, *doṣas*'; and there would be no need of mentioning *kilviṣa*, *sin*, separately. Or, only '*kilviṣa*', *sin*,' need have been mentioned, and where was the need for mentioning '*doṣa*,' '*taint*', also ?"

The explanation is as follows :—It is absolutely necessary to mention the 'taint', in order to show that what are destroyed by means of Breath-suspension are only particular kinds of sin, not all. The term 'taint' stands for Love and other like things ; and hence the word can be rightly taken as figuratively indicating such *sinful acts* as are prompted by Love, Hatred &c., as has been already pointed out.

"If so, then, let the *taint* be mentioned, what is the use of mentioning the '*kilviṣa*,' *sin* ?"

No objection can be taken to it, as it is mentioned only for the purpose of filling up the metre. Further (the use of the second term gives the further meaning that) Breath-suspension is destructive of the sin accruing from the taints of Love &c., while Concentration stops the sin from arising at all.

"What is 'Concentration' ?"

By a longing for sensual objects and their enjoyment the mind is sometimes drawn away from the point where it may have been resting during the periods of quiescence, self-control and the like ; and it is by means of 'Concentration' that it is concentrated, kept fixed on that same point. As a matter of fact, when one perceives brightness, charm, youth, shapeliness of the body and so forth in a woman, they give rise to his longing for

her; all these details are apprehended by concrete perception; and all such perceptions are so many thoughts. Hence they can be counter-acted by counter-thoughts pertaining to the defects in the object perceived,—such as 'her body is filled with urine and ordure,' 'the very object Woman consists of skin and bones;—fie upon the men that long for such a despicable object;—even the slight pleasure that she affords is momentary, and ultimately leads to terrible sufferings at the hands of the Death-god'. This is what is called 'reflecting over' the object. This reflection of the defects is what is spoken of below under verse 76.

The same method of reflection is to be employed regarding food and other objects of enjoyment. For instance—'all this—sugar, cakes, fresh butter, milk-rice and so forth—stands on the same footing as coarse food obtained in alms; there being no difference in their nutritive power; the slight difference in their taste that may be felt on the tip of the tongue, is felt for the infinitesimal part of a second, so that even this momentary taste is like the imaginary city. Similarly one may reflect upon the defects in the objects of touch; and so forth. This is what is taught in the present text (by the term 'Concentration').

Others offer the following explanation of the term '*dhāraṇā*' of the text:—When a man by constant practice succeeds in concentrating his breath, moving along his mouth and nose, in the cavity of his heart,—this is what constitutes 'Concentration'.

"In what way would this differ from Breath-suspension?"

The difference is that we have 'concentration' also when the breath is held up in such places as the arms, the forehead and the like; whereas in Breath-suspension there is always exhalation at the end.

Others again hold '*Dhāraṇā*', 'Concentration', to consist in the qualities of 'Friendliness, Joyfulness, Pathos and Indifference.' 'Friendliness, Kindness, Joyousness and Indifference, towards all living beings, carry the contemplation to the regions of Brahman; and these constitute *Dhāraṇā*'. (says an old text.)—Here 'friendliness' stands for *absence of hatred*, and not

friendly affection ; as this latter would be of the nature of a hindrance ;—'kindness' is pity, a disposition of the mind ; it consists in the longing to rescue a suffering person from suffering, and not the actual desisting from injuring, or conferring a benefit upon, others ; it is in view of this that it has been described as a *disposition of the mind*, which should be practised—'joyousness' also stands for *absence of grief* at suffering caused by disease, or at the fear of the sufferings of hell, and not for actual *pleasure*, as this would be conducive to attachment ;—'indifference' towards objects, favourable as well as unfavourable, is well known.

Or again, 'concentration' may be explained as consisting in fixing the mind on the inner cavity of the heart, in the process of meditating upon Brahman.

'*By Abstraction, all attachment* ;—'attachment' here stands for the connection of the senses with their objects and their being drawn towards them. This is destroyed by Abstraction ; whereupon the senses become drawn off from the objects, or their attraction is obstructed. For instance, when one happens to see a bracelet or some such ornament, or a handsome woman, he shall not fix his eyes upon them, he shall move his eyes to something else ; similarly with all the senses. In this manner the composure of the Yogin becomes unperturbed.

'*By means of Contemplation, those attributes that are not independent.*' The 'attributes' meant here are those of Harmony, Energy and Inertia ; and these are '*not independent*,' being subservient to something else, in the shape of Consciousness. Though the soul or person is free from pleasure &c., yet there appears in him the false notion 'I am happy—I am unhappy' ; though he is free from attributes, he identifies himself with them ; —all this has got to be destroyed by contemplating upon the distinction between the Soul and the Attributes ; that the distinction between the two has to be drawn in some such form as—'the Person, being of the nature of Consciousness is beyond Attributes, and it is Primordial Matter that consists of the Attributes.'—(72)

How is this to be done? What too is to be contemplated upon by contemplation? This is explained in the next verse.

VERSE (73)

BY THE PRACTICE OF MEDITATION HE SHALL RECOGNISE THE PRESENCE OF THIS INNER SOUL IN ALL BEINGS, HIGH AND LOW,—WHICH IS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND BY UNREGENERATE PEOPLE.—(73)

Bhāṣya.

Inner soul—the inner controlling personality;—'*presence*'—character—should be recognised.

Notions of pleasure and pain appear not only among human beings but among all kinds of '*beings, high and low*,'—i.e. among animals, goblins, Pishāchas &c.— there is the notion of 'I' and 'mine'; and this has to be got rid of.

Or, the man may go on pondering over the following ideas—'This soul is omnipresent, higher than the sky, higher than heaven, higher than all these regions, having all happiness, all tastes, all odours, all touches; and yet he is beset with hunger and thirst; and in the midst of such pleasures and pains, he passes through the experiences of his physical body, known as the *I*; how wonderful is the power of actions, that even this all-pervading, all-embracing soul is made subservient to the actions! I shall never have recourse to these acts, which are like a wicked master. Like a hired servant I shall wait upon the acts (already done by me); as when a man enters a man's service being urged to it by his need, thinking him to be kind, but soon finding out that he is difficult to please, irascible, given to beating, and harsh of speech, the man decides that he would not serve him any longer, after he has cleared off by service all that may have been advanced to him.' The thought to be practised should be in the form—'I shall get to the end of my past acts by going through the experiences resulting from them, and shall perform no further acts', and so forth. Similarly one should study the Vedānta, and having, with its help, discussed the question as to

whether the embodied souls are only manifestations of the Supreme Self or independent entities, and come to the conclusion that there is no soul apart from the Supreme Self,—he should ponder over this.

Others explain the text as follows :—'*Dhyāna*' is *Contemplation*, and '*Yoga*' is *Meditation*; and by means of these '*he should recognise the presence of the Inner Soul*'; and having recognised it, he should meditate upon it.

Or '*Dhyāna-yoga*' may be explained as '*yoga*', *calmness of mind*, for the purposes of '*dhyāna*,' *contemplation*;—having secured this calmness, '*he should recognise the presence of the Inner Soul*'; i.e. by means of devout worship he shall realise its presence as equipped with the qualities of Immortality and the like, free from defects, as described in the Vedānta-texts.

'*Akṛtātman*' '*unregenerate person*' is one whose '*ātman*', soul, mind, is '*akṛta*,' untutored. By such persons the Inner Soul cannot be grasped.—(73)

VERSE (74)

EQUIPPED WITH TRUE INSIGHT, HE IS NO LONGER FETTERED BY HIS ACTS; BUT DESTITUTE OF INSIGHT, HE FALLS INTO THE CYCLE OF BIRTHS AND DEATHS.—(74)

Bhāṣya.

This describes the result of what has been just enjoined.

'*True insight*'—true knowledge of the Self, just described; '*equipped*' with this,—i. e. having obtained direct apprehension of it.

'*Is not fettered by acts*'—does not fall into the cycle of, births and deaths; since the past acts have become exhausted on account of their effects having been already experienced, and no fresh acts are done.

This does not mean that Liberation is attained by mere knowledge.

He who is not endowed with the spiritual insight, taught in the Vedanta, and who is only given to the performance of acts, falls into the cycle of births and deaths.—(74)

VERSE (75)

BY ABSTENTION FROM INJURING, BY THE NON-ATTACHMENT OF THE SENSES, BY THE ACTS PRESCRIBED IN THE VEDA, BY THE RIGOROUS PRACTISING OF AUSTERITIES, THEY ATTAIN THE POSITION OF THAT BEING.—(75)

Bhāṣya.

These two verses are indicative of the doctrine that Liberation is attained by Knowledge and Action combined. The preceding verse spoke of *Knowledge* and the present one speaks of *Action.*

Question:— "What are those acts 'prescribed in the Veda,' whose result is here spoken of as the 'attaining of the position of That Being' ? As for the voluntary acts, the results of these are already mentioned in those very texts that enjoin the acts themselves; and if they were to assume results other than those, there would be carrying the matter to an absurd length; and it would give rise to the great evil that the results of the acts would become mixed up and confused. Further, since the injunctive text would have all its syntactical needs supplied by the mention of the single result, how could any connection be established between that text and the additional words that would have to be thrown in if we were to connect the acts with the further result of 'attaining the position of That Being' ? As a matter of fact, the needs of the injunction having been supplied by what is directly mentioned in the text, it does not stand in need of anything else."

Our answer to the above is as follows:—In fact in the Esoteric Section (of the Veda) we have a distinct text to the effect that 'one attains That by means of sacrifice.' So that by a proper adjustment there would be both kinds of results accomplished by means of Action ; and there would be nothing incongruous in all the voluntary acts leading to the more limited results, as also

to the attainment of 'the position of That Being'; as two distinct sacrifices performed at two different times would lead to two distinct results. The present text moreover has not specified any particular sacrifice, which could justify the conclusion that the result here spoken proceeds from the *obligatory* acts, and not from the voluntary ones.

The following argument might be raised against us:—"In as much as no results have been spoken of in the Vedic texts regarding any results following from the obligatory acts, it is only right that what is mentioned in the present text should be connected with those acts, and not with the voluntary ones ; because there would be no difficulty in connecting it with them; and what the Esoterictext just quoted has declared regarding '*sacrifice*' leading to That' would also be amply justified by this construction.'

Why should any importance be attached to the mention of results in Vedic texts ? Vedic Texts are purely injunctive in their character ; their function lies in laying down *what should be done* ; and that a certain act *should be done* is made known to us by such terms as 'as long as one lives' and the like, without the help of any words speaking of results; so that (even when the result is actually mentioned) the word expressive of the result is not needed at all by the sentence; so that in cases where it is assumed (and not directly mentioned) it would be entirely superfluous, and hence could not be construed along with the injunctive text. Thus then, the conclusion is that the esoteric text quoted above speaking of 'sacrifices' not being capable of being restricted to any particular kind of sacrifice, must be taken as including all kinds of sacrifices, obligatory as well as voluntary.

Further, the sesult spoken of in the present text cannot proceed from the voluntary acts ; as none of then has been enjoined as to be done by ' one desirous of Liberation '. In fact it was with reference to this that the text declared (under 2. 2) that 'being given up to desires is not commendable' ; and also in the *Mahābhārata*—'May thy acts not be done simply with a view to results. May thou not be addicted to inaction." (*Bhagavadgītā* 2. 47).

The conclusion thus is that so long as the actor has his mind beset with notions of diversity, is under the influence of Desire and Ignorance, and is not free from the notions of 'I' and 'mine',—the results obtained by him are just the narrow ones that he had bargained for (on the strength of the Vedic texts); while the other kind of actor, who undertakes an act without reference to any results, and simply because it has been enjoined by the Veda and as such *should be done*, attains *Brahman* Itself, which consists of the highest boundless bliss.

It will not be right to urge against this the following argument :—"There are one hundred and seventy-one sacrifices; in as much as it would be impossible for anyone to perform all these, the text would be enjoining an impossibility (if it meant *all kinds of sacrifices*)".—Because in the present context the performance of the acts is meant to be accomplished by the attainment of *true insight* itself. The meaning is that all sacrifices are to be accomplished by the said *insight*. This is what is meant by such texts as—'Other Brāhmaṇas offer secrifices by means of Knowledge itself'.

Or, the particular position or region spoken of in the present text as attained (by non-injury &c.) may be taken to be just those whose special character would be determined by the man's desires—according as he may be desirous of heaven or sons &c. &c. In fact persons who have their minds still beset with notions of such diversity as those of 'past', 'present' and so forth, are prompted by false longings, even when betaking themselves to acts leading up to the highest ends of man; just as when a child is tempted to drink a nutritious medicine by the false hope (set up before it) in the form that by drinking it it would have long hair.

Another theory on this subject is as follows :—The acts referred to in the present text are the obligatory ones. It is these whose omission is sinful, and acts as an obstacle to liberation. And it is the fact of these being properly performed, the obstacle being thereby removed, that is spoken of by the expression '*by the acts prescribed in the Veda*' :—even though these have not been enjoined as leading to liberation.

'*Rigorous*'—powerfully conducive to the emaciation of the body.

'*Of that Being*'—of Brahman.

'*Position*'—place, region.

'*Attain*'—Acquire.

Or, the '*position of that*' may mean that character of Brahman which may be in accordance with his desire ; i. e. being the Lord of all beings, or self-sufficiency, or the attaining of its very essence, and so forth.—(75).

VERSES (76-77)

HE SHALL DISCARD THIS ABODE OF MATERIAL SUBSTANCES, WHERE THE BONES ARE THE PILLARS, WHICH IS HELD TOGETHER BY THE TENDONS, PLASTERED WITH FLESH AND BLOOD, COVERED WITH THE SKIN, FOUL-SMELLING, AND FULL OF URINE AND ORDURE ;—(76) BESET WITH WRINKLES AND SORROW, THE SEAT OF DISEASE, HARASSED, SULLIED WITH PASSIONS AND PERISHABLE.—(77)

Bhāṣya.

This is meant to create disgust.

To say nothing of the bodies of worms insects and fleas, which are born in the earth and out of moisture etc.,—the human body itself, which has been considered highly desirable, the likelihood of losing which keeps man in constant fear,—is like a latrine, the abode of urine and ordure. It is this latrine-hut that is described.

The *bones* constitute the pillars ; the hut is supported by the bones ;—it is tied up with the tendons ; it is plastered outside with flesh and blood ;—and it is covered up with the *skin*; or *roofed over* with the skin;—'*filled with urine and ordure*';—the use of the Genitive here is analogous to that in the expression '*odanasya pūrṇaḥ*', filled with rice.—(7 6).

'*Wrinkles*'—indicates a peculiar state of the body in old age, due to its decrepitude.

'*Harassed*'—ever beset with diseases.

'*Sullied with passions*'—i. e. harbouring desires, the non-fulfilment of which brings irremediable unbearable pain.

Realising all this the man '*shall discard*' this body, which is the abode of '*material substances*'—the products of the Earth, in the form of fat, marrow, phlegm, urine, semen and blood ;—it cannot be the abode of the *Soul* ; because this is all-pervading. For all these reasons one should not cherish any affection for the body.—(77.)

VERSE (78.)

HE, WHO LEAVES THIS BODY, EITHER AS THE TREE LEAVES THE BANK, OR AS THE BIRD LEAVES THE TREE, BECOMES FREED FROM THE SHARK OF MISERY.—(78.)

Bhāṣya.

Continuing the figure of the body spoken of as the hut, we have the simile—'*as the bird leaves the tree*'. What is meant is, not that the body should be voluntarily given up, by entering into the fire, or such methods of suicide, but one shall not cultivate attachment to it. And then the body shall fall off by itself, by the exhaustion of Karmic residuum ; just as the tree on the banks falls off. This is what has been said above (40) in regard *not rejoicing at death.*

But when the man has acquired the inner light, has controlled the movements of his breath, and has withdrawn his mind from all manifestations of illusion ;—he may even voluntarily leave off the body ; in the same manner as the bird leaves the tree.

'*Shark*'—which is like the shark, resembling it in being a source of trouble ; hence the text has added the term '*misery*'; Even for the man who has attained discriminative wisdom, troubles continue to beset him so long as the body lasts ; as such is the very nature of it.

This second alternative (of leaving the body voluntarily) has been put forward in view of there being objections against the

former one (of awaiting the chance of the falling off of the body)—(78)

VERSE (79)

HAVING, BY THE PRACTICE OF MEDITATION, ATTRIBUTED WHAT IS AGREEABLE TO HIM, TO HIS GOOD ACTS, AND WHAT IS DISAGREEABLE, TO HIS EVIL ACTS, HE REACHES THE ETERNAL BRAHMAN.—(79)

Bhāṣya.

Disturbance of the mind caused by pleasure and pain, and appearing in the forms of joy and sorrow, should be got rid of in the following manner. [He shall cultivate the following idea]—'When such and such a person does anything pleasing to me, it is the result of some good act that I may have done in the past; and the doer of the act has not done it through any feelings of affection towards me; in fact he could not do anything inimical to me; and when some one does what is disagreeable to me, there also what is the source of my pain is only my own evil act';—this is what he shall ponder over while practising meditation; so that he does not feel any attraction towards the man who does what is agreeable to him, nor any repulsion towards one who does what is disagreeable to him.

By doing thus '*he reaches the eternal Brahman*', directly, and has not got to pass through the intervening stages of the Luminous Path and so forth.

The presence of the epithet '*eternal*' implies that the man does not return to the cycle of births and deaths.—(79)

VERSE (80)

WHEN, BY DISPOSITION, HE BECOMES FREE FROM LONGING FOR ALL THINGS, THEN HE OBTAINS LASTING HAPPINESS IN THIS WORLD, AS ALSO AFTER DEATH.—(80)

Bhāṣya.

This teaches the cultivation of a mental disposition.

It is not by the abandoning of the acquisition of desired things that one becomes 'free from longings'; he becomes so only when he renounces what forms the source of all longing.

'*Disposition*' is an attribute of the mind, or of the soul, in the form of *desire*..

'*Towards all things*'—'*sarvabhāvēṣu.*'—This second '*bhāva*' denotes *things*. The presence of the epithet '*all*' implies that *attachment* to even such necessary things as articles of food and drink which are required for the maintenance of the body, is to be deprecated ;—and not the *desire*. Because the *desire* for such things, in the form of hunger and thirst, arises from the very nature of things and is bound to appear. But 'desire' is something different from 'longing': *Longing* arises from attachment and is demeaning ; while *desire* for food &c. appears in the man naturally, after the digestion of what has been eaten and drunk.—(80)

VERSE (81)

HAVING, IN THIS MANNER, GRADUALLY RENOUNCED ALL ATTACHMENTS, HE BECOMES FREED FROM ALL PAIRS OF OPPOSITES, AND REPOSES IN BRAHMAN ALONE.—(81)

Bhāṣya.

'*Having renounced all attachments.*'—'*Attachment*' stands for the notion of 'mine' that people have with regard to such things as the cow, the horse, the elephant, gold, slaves, wife, agricultural lands, houses and so forth. When this has been renounced, and the man has begun to delight in solitude ;—having taken to this as the principal method, and in the manner detailed above—i.e. by the due performance of the temporal and spiritual acts prescribed —he '*reposes in Brahman,*'—which is of the nature of pure consciousness ; and he is no longer fettered by actions. This is what is meant by the phrase '*from all pairs of opposites*'—i.e. pleasures and pains as resulting from good and bad acts.—*he becomes freed*'—(81)

VERSE (82)

ALL THIS THAT HAS BEEN DECLARED HERE IS APPURTENANT TO MEDITATION; HE WHO DOES NOT REALISE AND CULTIVATE THE SAID MENTAL ATTITUDE DOES NOT OBTAIN THE REWARD OF THE ACTS.—(82)

Bhāṣya.

'*Appurtenant to Meditation*',—i e. what comes about only when there is Meditation; what is attained only when meditation is properly done.

"*All this that has been declared here*'—directly described, not merely indirectly implied. That is, the cultivating of the feeling that good and bad deeds are the causes of agreeable and disagreeable experiences;—when man does something disagreeable, it is always the outcome of natural forces (of one's own acts) and stands on the same footing as when fever causes suffering or fire burns; and just as the man, who has been burnt by fire, does not hate fire, so also he should not hate the man that causes him pain; nor shall he forbid him to do it (just as no one goes to forbid the fire).

All this becomes possible only when there is Meditation, when the mind is duly concentrated. Consequently one should at all times, cultivate the following thought:—Pleasure and pain are the effect of past Actions; in reality the King is not the bestower of happiness, of landed property and other things; in fact it is by my own effort that the first approach to him was obtained; it is my own past meritorious act that is the real bestower of the gift, and not the King; similarly the fine imposed (Penalty inflicted) is not what causes me trouble; it is my own acts that are troubling me; neither the King nor any one else is able to do it.'

All this shall always be pondered over, reflected upon; and all that has been described above as conducive to disgust with the world—thinking of the body a hut having bones for pillars &c. (76)—this also has to be always pondered over.

(A) '*Anadhyātmavit*';—'*adhyātma*' here stands for *mental attitude*;—he who does not realise,—does not cultivate—the above-described mental attitude,—'*does not obtain the reward of the acts*'; of such acts of the Renunciate, for instance, as *begging alms, living in the village for a single night* and so forth, he does not obtain the 'reward,' in the shape of *Liberation*. That is to say, the mere cotemplation of the body as a hut with bones for its pillars and so forth does not always bring about freedom from longing, so long as love and hatred have not been got rid of by the attributing of all that happens to one's own acts. When this attitude of the mind becomes permanantly fixed, then alone is the reward obtained, and not when it comes about only once in a way.

(B) [*Second explanation of* '*anadhyātmavit*']—Or, '*what has been declared*' may refer to the 'reposing in Brahman' (81); and the meaning thus is that this '*reposing in Brahman*' is '*appurtenant to meditation*,' and is not attained merely by the perpormance of acts. And as regards the question as to what is it that has to be *meditated upon*, the text adds '*nahyanadhyātmavit*'—and the term '*adhyātma*' stands for those teatsises on Vedānta that have been composed on the subject of the Soul;—he who does not know this.—Or '*adhyātma*' may stand for *that which pertains to the soul*; i. e. such ideas as—'the Soul is something distinct from the body, the sense-organs, the mind, the intellect, the life-breath and so forth, and it does not perish when these perish;—it is neither the doer of acts nor the enjoyer of their fruits';—all these notions belong to one who is swayed by the idea of diversity;—when it has destroyed all evil, it is not affected by the taints or their effects;—being one, it is all this, there is nothing apart from it;—diversity is only apparent. One who does not know all this as described in the Harisavama, Sadaka and other (?) Upaniṣads, and does not strengthen these ideas by constant and one-pointed meditation, does not obtain the said '*reward of acts*.' The sense of the verse in this case would be that—'Except at the time that one is either taking food or engaged in some necessary act, one should always keep meditating upon the soul as described in the Vedanta and other treatises'.

(C) (*Third Explanation*) Or, even though the text occurs in the section dealing with Renunciation, yet the '*reward of acts*' may be taken as refering to the Householder also; specially as it is this latter for whom the performance of acts constitutes the most important duty. According to this view, the meaning of the verse comes to be this:—Though Householders may duly perform the *Agnihotra* and other rites, yet, if they happen to be ignorant of the esoteric sciences,—those sciences which form the very essence of the rites, in the shape of the *Udgītha*, which is described as permeating all acts, and with which all persons learned in rituals are thoroughly conversant,—they do not obtain the full reward of those rites, which appear after a long time. This is what has been described in two *Shruti* texts of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and the *Chhāndogya* Upaniṣads:—(a) 'O Gārgi, he who without knowing this syllable, performs sacrifices and practises austerities even for several thousand years, all this becomes only perishable; but what is done through full knowledge, with faith and in full accordance with the esoteric science, becomes extremely virile';—that is, excellent results accrue only to him who performs acts only after having understood the philosophy of the soul. (b) This has also been declared in the *Chhāndogya*—'Those who know this and meditate upon it as faith and austerity etc., etc.,' (5-10-1) It is with reference to these persons equipped with full knowledge and performing the prescribed acts that the *Shruti* has declared that they reach the region of Brahman by the path of light etc.(82).

The object to be meditated upon, for the sake of obtaining the knowledge of the Soul, having been thus indicated, it would appear as if the repeating of Vedic *mantras* were not required at all; hence it is this that is enjoined by the next verse.

VERSE (83)

HE SHALL CONSTANTLY RECITE VEDIC TEXTS BEARING UPON SACRIFICES, THOSE DEALING WITH DEITIES AND THOSE DEALING WITH THE SOUL, WHICH HAVE BEEN CALLED 'VEDĀNTA.'—(83)

Bhāṣya

What this verse permits (for the Renunciate) is the mere

reciting of the texts, and not the repeating and getting up of them, as is prescribed for the Householder.

'*Bearing upon sacrifices*'—i. e. the Brāhmaṇa texts prescribing the sacrificial rites.

'*Dealing with deities*'—those indicating the deities of sacrifices.

A particular kind of texts of this last class is '*those dealing with the Soul*;'—i. e. '*aham manurabhavam &*,' '*aham rudrēbhiḥ etc.*' and so forth.

Which have been called '*Vedānta*'—and which deal with Action and Knowledge both. This shows that it is the combination of these two that makes one reach Brahman.—(83)

VERSE (84)

THIS IS THE REFUGE FOR THE IGNORANT, THIS FOR THE LEARNED; THIS FOR THOSE SEEKING HEAVEN, AND THIS ALSO FOR THOSE DESIRING IMMORTALITY.—(84)

Bhāṣya.

'*This*' refers to the Veda; which also is Brahman; as has been declared in the following words—'Two Brahmans have to be recognised—the Verbal Brahman and the Supreme Brahman; one who is thoroughly acquainted with the Verbal Brahman reaches the Supreme One';—one is said to become 'acquainted with the Veda' when he studies it, understands it and acts according to its injunctions.

This verse is a commendatory supplement to the foregoing injunction.

'*For the ignorant*'—those who do not understand the meaning of Vedic texts, and are yet entitled to and desirous of their reciting. The revered Vyāsa has declared success for the mere reciter. Or, 'ignorant' may mean *those not knowing the true nature of the Soul*; i. e. those who have not realised, with the help of the scriptures, the real nature of the Soul, and though engaged in meditation upon it, have not yet acquired the requisite steadiness of the mind.

For these people the Veda is the '*refuge*'; as by reciting it, acting in accordance with it and acquiring some knowledge of it, they are saved from falling into the life of worms and insects, or into hell.

'*This for the learned.*' The text proceeds to show how it is the 'refuge' for the learned—'*this for those seeking heaven;*'—i. e. those who know only the Ritualistic Sections of the Veda, and have not acquired any firm conviction regarding the Soul; and when these people perform the rites laid down in the Veda, they obtain heaven and other rewards. Others however, who have renounced all attachment and destroyed all passions, and are intent upon the contemplation of the real nature of the Soul, obtain '*immortality*', i. e. non-return to the cycle of births and deaths.

For all these the Veda is the only '*refuge*', and there is no other path. Such is the sense of the verse—(84)

VERSE (85)

THE TWICE-BORN PERSON, WHO, BY THIS SUCCESSIVE PROCESS, GOES FORTH (AS A MENDICANT), SHAKES OFF EVIL AND ATTAINS THE SUPREME BRAHMAN.—(85)

Bhāṣya.

'*Successive process*'—the adopting of the method that has been described as consisting of the combination of action and knowledge;-i. e. after having paid off his debts.

'*Shakes off evil*'—just as the horse shakes off its hairs, so the man shakes off evil by means of self-knowledge. This has been thus described—'Just as the water does not become attached to the lotus-leaf so evil does not become attached to the man who knows It.'

'*He attains the Supreme Brahman*'—becomes one with Brahman, having got rid of all notions of diversity.

This verse describes the reward following from true knowledge and from the proper fulfilment of the duties of the particular life-stage.—(85).

SECTION (8)

The Renouncer of the Veda

VERSE (86)

THUS HAVE THE DUTIES OF THE SELF-CONTROLLED RENUNCIATES BEEN EXPOUNDED TO YOU. LISTEN NOW TO THE DUTIES OF THE 'RENOUNCERS OF THE VEDA.'—(86).

Bhāṣya.

Those who have taken to the renouncing of the Veda are called '*Veda-sanyāsika*,' 'renouncers of the Veda.' The term '*veda*' indicates the renouncing of all such acts as the pouring of libations and the like, and not that of reciting Vedic texts; then again, as for meditation on the soul, this has been enjoined for these men also; so that what are forbidden for them are such acts as going on pilgrimages, keeping of fasts and so forth, all which require (for their accomplishment) wealth as well as bodily labour; and the prohibition does not apply to such acts as the twilight-prayer, repeating of mantras and the like, for which the man needs nothing besides himself. All this we shall explain at the proper place.

The first half of the verse sums up the section on Renunciation, and the second half introduces the duties of the 'renouncer of the Veda.'—(86).

VERSES (87) & (88).

THE STUDENT, THE HOUSEHOLDER, THE HERMIT AND THE RENUNCIATE,—ALL THESE, SEVERAL STAGES EMANATE FROM THE HOUSEHOLDER.—(87). BUT ALL THESE, WHEN OBSERVED IN DUE ORDER, ACCORDING TO THE SCRIPTURES LEAD THE BRĀHMAṆA WHO HAS (THUS) ACTED ACCORDING TO THE LAW, TO THE HIGHEST STATE.—(88).

Bhāṣya.

Objection :—"Inasmuch as the author has promised that he is going to expound the duties of the Renouncer of the Veda, the assertion of the sequence of the life-stages is entirely irrelevant."

In answer to this some people have explained that the four life-stages have been mentioned in the present context with a view to show that 'Renunciation (of the Veda)' is not a distinct stage, being included among these same four ; and the question arising as regards the particular stage in which it is included, the present verse points out that it is included in the state of the 'Householder'; since the man has to dwell in the 'house.'

Others however point out that the said 'Renunciation of the Veda' is to be included under the fourth stage of 'going forth as a mendicant', since it resembles this latter on this point that in both there is 'renouncing of attachments' ; nor is there any need for including it under any one stage ; because by virtue of the qualities of the man and of the Renunciate, the man would no longer have anything to do with sacrifices and other acts ; specially as these have been enjoined by means of such specific words and expressions as restrict them to a definite life-stage.

"But if the man belongs to no life-stage, he would be liable to the penalty of the expiatory rite that has been prescribed for one who, for one year, remains outside the pale of all orders."

Since such a state of things would have been brought about by the strict observance of the words of the text, how could there be any liability to an expiatory penance ?

From all this it follows that the other orders have been mentioned in the present text for the purpose of eulogising Renunciation ; and this serves the purpose of lending support to the view that the combination of knowledge and action (as represented by the four orders) is necessary (for liberation).

In view of the fact that the house is the shelter, the dwelling-place, for all these orders, they have the Householder for their '*source*', their support. Such is the explanation of the compound.—(88)

VERSE (89)

AMONG ALL THESE HOWEVER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INJUNCTION OF THE DIRECT VEDIC TEXT, THE HOUSEHOLDER IS DECLARED TO BE THE BEST ; BECAUSE HE SUPPORTS THE OTHER THREE.—(89)

Bhāṣya.

"What is asserted here does not appear to be right. For what it means is that the order of the Householder is directly enjoined by Vedic texts, which speak of the others only as supported by the former. In fact, in the event of the order of the Householder alone being directly enjoined by the Veda, there would be no room for the other orders ; because the Vedic text (laying down Householding) would be more authoritative than the *Smṛti*-texts laying down austerities and other things (connected with the other orders.)—It might be argued in this connection that—'the words of the present verse are not to be construed as *By reason of the injunction of the Vedic text* (the Householder is superior), but that *the superiority of the Householder spoken of in the Vedic text is due to the fact of his supporting the others ;* this is what is made clear by the sentence '*he supports the other three*'.—It has however got to be explained how this can be.—It may be urged that this would be so on account of the other orders also being enjoined in the Veda.—But if they are enjoined in the Veda, (and this is what is referred to in the present verse), then the present text clearly runs counter to the Smṛti text that—'the Householder's order alone is directly enjoined by the Veda' (*Gautama*, 3-36). Nor is there any other construction possible.—It might be urged that 'In view of the *Jābāla-shruti*, where we read that, having become a Householder, one shall become a Hermit, and having become a Hermit he shall go forth

as a Wandering Mendicant,—all the orders are equally *enjoined by the Veda*'.—But even so, the contradiction of the *Smṛti*-text remains unexplained. Then again, this *Jābāla-shruti* is not injunctive in connection with the other orders; it does not contain any such injunction as that 'one shall wander about in the forest in such and such a manner,—such and such acts shall be done by the man dwelling in the forest,—and such and such by the man who has gone forth as a Wandering Mendicant',—in the way in which the duties of the Householder, beginning from the Laying of the Fire and ending with the Final Sacrifice, are found to be directly laid down; it merely mentions their name—'having become a householder &c.' From all this it is clear that to speak of the Householder's order as well as the other orders as equally enjoined in the Veda involves a contradiction of what has gone before."

Our answer to the above is as follows:—It is true that for the man who has taken a wife to himself, the Veda has directly enjoined the duties, commencing with fire-laying and ending with the final sacrifice. Now, in connection with the marriage-rite itself, we have to consider the question as to what it is by which that act of marriage is prompted,—whether it is prompted by the Vedic texts that speak of persons entitled to offer the *Agnihotra*-libations?—or by the injunction that lays down the duty of begetting children?—or by the visible (worldly) purpose of the man?

"What sexual love prompts is only the taking of a woman, and not the *marriage-rite*; that alone can be regarded as prompting an act, without which this latter could not be accomplished; and for persons influenced by sexual love, all their domestic business would be accomplished by simply having a woman; why then should they need to perform the marriage-rites?"

This would be all right, if intercourse with a mere woman in general were not forbidden. Though what the Veda says regarding the fire-laying may apply to any woman in general, yet the scriptures always make a distinction between the woman with whom one may, or she with whom he may not, have inter-

course. It is for this reason that for men with a steady character, the desired purpose cannot be accomplished without marriage. So that it is only natural that there should be the idea that marriage is prompted by the Veda itself.

"If it be as the text says, then there would be nothing to prompt the other orders. And the purposes of all orders being accomplished by Householdership alone, what would be the need of examining what prompts the others. That which prompts the marriage may serve as the prompter (of Householdership); but if Householdership alone is actually enjoined, how could the other orders come about? Under the circumstances again, how far would any investigation into the prompter of marriage be justified?"

Our answer is as follows:—It has been asserted that the purposes of all the orders are fulfilled (by Householdership). This is quite true; when one order has been duly prompted, and the aid required by the others becomes indirectly accomplished by the same, there can be no need for the assumption of what would prompt these latter. For instance, the *Vrīhi* corn, the acquiring of which is prompted by the motive of livelihood, is also used in the performance of rites; and there is no acquiring of property for the purpose of the rites;—or again, even though the unlearned man is not entitled to the performance of sacrifices, yet the acquiring of learning is not prompted by those performances, being, as it is, already accomplished in obedience to the injunction of Vedic study itself. Similarly in the case in question (of marriage), the necessary motive being already supplied by the man's own desires, the act does not need the prompting of Vedic texts. Thus the injunction of the acts to be done would be applicable to those also who have not married.

Thus it is that the man who has all his passions deadened during the period of Studentship itself, does not wish to marry at all; and such a person, on account of having no companion (wife), would not be entitled to the second order. Thus not being entitled to the rites prescribed in the Vedic texts, he would

naturally take to the next (the third) order (having skipped over Householdership).

Others have offered the following explanation:—Marriage does not stand on the same footing as Property. Without some property living is impossible, as it is on property that man lives; but in the absence of the wife living is not impossible; so that the wife is not as essential as property; and the act of marrying a wife is prompted soley by considerations of religious acts (which cannot be done without a wife); and it is necessary to realise in this connection the necessity of making every effort to become entitled to the performance of religious acts. Otherwise, (if no such effort were necessary), having lost his title to such acts by reason of the impurity brought about by evacuations, if one were to omit the necessary purifying processes, he would not be open to the charge of having omitted an obligatory duty; under the circumstances, why should anyone take the trouble of getting rid of the impurity caused by death and other circumstances?—It might be argued that this latter is also itself enjoined.—Even so, the omission would involve the transgression of this one injunction only, and not of the thousands of injunctions (relating to the acts that the man would perform after due purification).

In answer to this, the following arguments may be put forward:—"Of what particular injunction would it be the meaning that 'for the sake of acquring the title to the performance of religious acts, the agent shall make an effort to accquire that title'? All the Injunctions that there are pertain to the performance of the *Agnihotra* and other rites, and all that they lay down is that the acts therein specified ought to be performed, and they donot urge the bringing into existence of the Fires. These fires are kindled, in connection with the voluntary acts, by the man who undertakes them through desire for the rewards to be obtained from them; and it is only when these Fires have been thus kindled that the man becomes 'one who has laid the Fires,' and hence subject to the injunctions relating to the life-long performance of the *Agnihotra* rites. Then again, it is only the man with a wife that is entitled to the 'laying of fire'; so

that the man would desire to marry a wife in the same manner as he lays the Fires for the purpose of acquiring the title to the performance of religious acts. So that the sense of no Injunction is offended if one omits to acquire the title to the performance of the Agnihotra and other rites [simply because there is no such Injunction as that *one shall acquire this title*]. Nor does the Injunction of Marriage itself indicate that *marriage shall be performed*; because the act of Marriage is a sanctificatory or sacramental rite, just like the Vedic rites of the obligatory daily *Agnihotra* and other rites; specially as no rewards are mentioned in connection with it."

In answer to this the ancients offer the following explanation: There is a direct Vedic text laying down the paying off of the 'three debts'—'When the Brāhmaṇa is born, he is born beset with three debts &c. &c.'; and this text becomes applicable to the man as soon as he is born; this 'birth' can not refer to the second 'birth' in the form of 'Initiation'; as in that case, the man would be as good as an animal, prior to his 'Initiation'. In fact the exact time referred to by the passage speaking of the 'debts' is that at which the man, having been born, comes to realise his responsibilities. Thus then, after the has accquired learning and thus become entitled to marry, if after having sought for a bride, he fails to obtain one and becomes grey, he would certainly be entitled to proceed to the stage of the Hermit. In fact, such a man comes to the following conclusion—'all through my youth I have been seeking for a bride;—they say that Fire-laying has been enjoined for only such men as have their hair still black;—and by the man of grey hairs Fire is not to be laid except in the event of his wife having died,—such is the meaning that they attribute to the Vedic Injunction'.

The '*Householder is the best of all*', because of his connection with religious acts; hence the superiority belongs to the *stage* itself (not to the *man*).

'*These three.*'—That it supports ths other three stages is another ground for its superiority. This is what has been referred

to by the text—'By means of knowledge and by good &c. &c.' —(89).

This same dea is further supported by means of an example.—

VERSE (90)

JUST AS RIVERS AND RIVULETS ATTAIN THEIR RESTING-PLACES IN THE OCEAN, SO DO MEN OF ALL OTHER ORDERS OBTAIN SUPPORT IN THE HOUSEHOLDER.—(90).

Bhāṣya.

'*Rivers*'—the Gaṅgā and the rest;—'*rivulets*'—the Bhidya and others. The distinction between 'rivers' and 'rivulets' is based upon the difference of position or of taste.

In actual usage both are treated as one and the same; and the diversity of gender (in that case) is explained as standing on the same footing as that in the case of the synonymous words '*bhāryā*' (feminine) and '*dārā*' (Masculine).

'*Resting place*'—support.

Just as the Ocean is the resting place for all kinds of water, so is the Householder entitled to the performance of all duties—(90)

VERSE (91)

BY TWICE-BORN MEN BELONGING TO ALL THESE FOUR ORDERS THIS TEN-FOLD DUTY SHALL ALWAYS BE ASSIDUOUSLY OBSERVED. —(91)

Bhāṣya.

This verse introduces what is going to be described below.

'*Ten-fold*'—That which has ten 'folds' or forms.

'*Be observed*'—Always be performed.

Though all these have already been mentioned before, yet they are repeated here in order to indicate their great importance; and this repetition also lends support to the view that it is the

combination of 'Knowledge' and 'Action' that accomplishes the hightest end of man—(91)

VERSE (92)

(1) STEADINESS (2) FORGIVENESS, (3) SELF-CONTROL, (4) ABSTENTION FROM UNRIGHTEOUS APPROPRIATION, (5) PURITY, (6 CONTROL OF THE SENSE-ORGANS, (7) DISCRIMINATION, (8) KNOWLEDGE, (9) TRUTHFULNESS, AND (10) ABSENCE OF ANGER,—THESE ARE THE TEN-FOLD FORMS OF DUTY.—(92)

Bhāṣya

Steadiness and the rest are qualities of the Soul.

(1) '*Steadiness*'—the feeling of contentment even at the loss of property and such things ; expressed by such feelings as 'if it has been lost, what does it matter ? It can be acquired again.' Similarly at separation from a beloved person, the man regains former equaminity by thinking that 'such is the way of the world.'

(2) '*Forgiveness*'—the excusing of wrongs committed; not seeking to do injury to a person in return for an injury that might have been done by him.

(3) '*Self-control*'—absence of haughtiness, renouncing of pride due to superior learning &c.

(4) '*Absention from unrighteous appropriation*' :—this is well known.

(5) '*Purity*'—cleanliness of food etc.

(6) '*Control of the Sense-organs*'—not allowing them to be drawn even towards unforbidden things.

(7) '*Discrimination*'—true knowledge, following upon the refutation of all doubtful and contrary views.

(8) '*Knowledge*' of the Soul. The difference between 'discrimination' and 'knowledge' is that the former refers to *Acts*, and the latter to the *Soul*.

In view of this tautology, some people read '*Dhīvidyā*' (wise discrimination). But this is not right; specially as we have explained the difference between the two.

The rest are well known.

'*Absence of anger*' is not permitting anger to arise when there is an occasion for it, and '*forgiveness*' is not doing harm to others even when they may have done harm to one.—(92).

VERSE (93).

THOSE BRĀHMAṆAS, WHO PROPERLY STUDY THE TEN FORMS OF DUTY, AND HAVING STUDIED THEM, FOLLOW THEM IN PRACTICE, REACH THE HIGHEST STATE.— 93).

Bhāṣya.

This describes the reward of what has just been enjoind. The mention of the reward of study is meant to eulogise the actual performance.—(93).

VERSE (94)

THE TWICE-BORN PERSON, PERFORMING, WITH COLLECTED MIND, THE TEN-FOLD DUTY, AND HAVING DULY LEARNT THE VEDĀNTA TEXTS, AND BECOME FREE FROM DEBTS, SHOULD TAKE TO RENUNCIATION.—(94).

Bhāṣya.

'*Being freed from debts, should take to Renunciation.*'—This text is meant to lay down that Renunciation should come only after the three debts have been paid off. Just as all men are not entitled to go forth as a mendicant at the same period of their life, so with Renunciation also.

'*Having duly learnt the Vedānta texts*'.—There is no renunciation for one who has not learnt what is contained in the *Vedānta* texts. Though the performance of Rites, as well as the learning of the Vedānta, are both implied in the injunction of 'Vedic study'—both kinds of texts being equally 'Veda,'—yet the learning of the Vedānta texts has been reiterated here for

the purpose of laying special stress on it ; the sense being that 'the man shall devote himself entirely to it'.

"What is the actual meaning of the injunction.—'*shall take to Renunciation*'? What is this that is called 'Renunciation'?"

'Renunciation' consists of abandoning the notion that 'this is *mine*'.

"What have been referred to above are the '*Renouncers of the Veda*', from which it would seem as if there were 'renunciation' of the 'Veda' or of 'what is contained in the Veda',—and not that of such acts as the *accepting of gifts* and the like, which are done for the purpose of enabling the man to perform the acts enjoined by the Veda."

In verse 84 above it has been declared that the Veda is the 'refuge for those seeking immortality' ; so that Vedic study is enjoined even for that stage at which *Knowledge* (and not Action) becomes the predominating factor in one's life. In as much as the *Agnihotra* and other rites are accomplished with the help of material substances, they naturally become *renounced* when there is no sense of property (the notion *of mine*). Such 'renunciation' is meritorious only for one whose wife is dead, or who, having made arrangements for the upkeep of his Fires, concentrates his attention on the Supreme Self. We read in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*—'when he thinks of going away, he says to his son &c. &c.,' which lays down the handing over of the Fires. This renunciation of the Fires is enjoined also for the decrepit old man—'By decrepitude does he become absolved from this.' Those rites however which do not take the aid of material substances—such for instance as the Twilight Prayers, the daily *Agnihotra* and the like—the performance of these being not forbidden, one remains entitled to it till his very last breath.—(94).

VERSA (95.)

HAVING RENOUNCED ALL ACTS, AND THROWN OFF THE TAINT OF HIS ACTS, AND STUDIED THE VEDA WITH MIND SELF-CONTROLLED, HE SHALL LIVE AT EASE UNDER THE PROTECTION OF HIS SON.—(95).

Bhāṣya.

'*Having studied the Veda*';—this implies that the Veda shall not be given up. This has been already explained above.

The right reading would appear to be the present-participial form '*abhyasyan*,' 'studying.'

'*He shall live at ease under the protection of his son*';—i. e. if he has a son born to him; or of any other person who may be in the place of his son; such, for instance as his grandson. They say that in this case also one should retire to another house.—(95).

VERSE (96).

HAVING THUS RENOUNCED ALL RITES, INTENT UPON HIS OWN DUTY, FREE FROM LONGINGS, HE DESTROYS SIN BY HIS RENUNCIATION AND ATTAINS THE HIGHEST STATE.—(96).

Bhāṣya.

'*His own duty*'—meditation on the Soul; he for whom this is the highest duty.

'*Free from longings*'—not entertaining a desire for anything, even in his mind—(96).

VERSE (97).

THUS HAS THE FOURFOLD DUTY OF THE BRĀHMAṆA BEEN EXPOUNDED TO YOU, WHICH IS CONDUCIVE TO IMPERSIHABLE REWARDS AFTER DEATH. NOW LISTEN TO THE DUTY OF KINGS.—(97.)

Thus ends Discourse VI of the Mānava-Dharma-Shāstra.

Bhāṣya.

'*Fourfold Duty*'—pertaining to the four life-stages; all this has been expounded for the *Brāhmaṇa*.

"At the outset the text has spoken of the *twice-born person*, in the opening verse—'Having thus lived the life of the Householder, the accomplished *twice-born person* &c. &c.', and it has been decided that the term stands for all the three castes, as there is no sort of incongruity involved in this. Under the circumstances, the term '*brāhmaṇa*' of the present verse should also be taken as

standing for all the three castes. There would be a justification for denying this only if the entire Discourse did not form one organic whole, beginning from the opening verse and ending with the present verse. As a matter of fact, the opening verse is perfectly amenable to being construed with this last verse (the whole discourse thus forming one organic whole); so that it is quite open to us to take this verse as referring to what has been mentioned in the opening verse."

As a matter of fact, the sentence is regarded as having that meaning which is found to be expressed by it, after a thorough consideration of the sentence as a whole. And in this way, it is distinctly more reasonable to take the term 'twice-born person' (of the opening verse) as standing for the *Brāhmaṇa* (rather than the other way). Because every '*Brāhmaṇa*' also is 'twice-born', but every 'twice-born person' is not a '*Brāhmaṇa*'. So that the term 'twice-born' being capable of being directly applied to the *Brāhmaṇa*, it cannot be right to take the term '*Brāhmaṇa*' as indirectly indicating the wider circle of *twice-born* persons.

"But in the *Mahābhārata* we find three life-stages laid down for the *Shūdra* also;—having started with the words 'for the *Shūdra* who has accomplished all his work, there is *attendance*', it goes on to say 'all the life-stages have been prescribed for him, except the *Nirāmiṣa*'—that is Renunciation."

This is not right. Such is not the meaning of the text quoted; what it means is as follows—'the *Shūdra* should not have recourse to the four stages, he obtains the reward of all the stages by means of *service* and the *begetting of children*';—which means that—'during Householdership he obtains, by means of serving the twice-born men, the rewards of all stages, with the sole exception of Liberation, which is the reward of Renunciation.'

From this it follows that the Four Life-stages are meant for the *Brāhmaṇa* only.—(97)

Thus ends the *Bhāṣya* on Discourse VI.

Printed by Rameshwar Pathak at the Tara Printing Works, Benares.